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
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
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504
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1911







THE LIFE
OF
FIELD MARSHAL SOUVAROF;

WITH

REFLECTIONS UPON THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS,

POLITICAL AND MILITARY,

CONNECTED WITH

THE HISTORY OF RUSSIA,

DURING

Part of the Eighteenth Century,

BY L. M. P. DE LAVERNE,
FORMERLY AN OFFICER OF DRAGOONS,

Translated from the French.

BALTIMORE:

Published by Edward J. Coale ; and by Eastburn, Kirk, & Co. New-York;
and Mathew Carey, Philadelphia.

P. MAURO, PRINTER.

.....
1814.

Souvarof
Laverne
AN

DISTRICT OF MARYLAND, *to wit:*

BE IT REMEMBERED, that on this twenty-second day of February, in the thirty-eighth year
of the Independence of the United States of America, Edward J. Coale, of the said
district, hath deposited in this office, the title of a book, the right whereof he claims as
proprietor, in the words and figures following, to wit:—

“The Life of field marshal Souvarof, with reflections upon the principal events, political and
military, connected with the history of Russia, during part of the eighteenth century, by L. M. P.
de Laverne, formerly an officer of dragoons, translated from the French.”

In conformity with the act of the congress of the United States, entitled “An act for the encourage-
ment of learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and books to the authors and proprietors
of such copies, during the times therein mentioned.” And also to the act entitled, “An act supple-
mentary to the act entitled, ‘An act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of
maps, charts, and books to the authors and proprietors of such copies during the times therein men-
tioned,’ and extending the benefits thereof to the arts of designing, etching, and engraving historical
and other prints.”

PHILIP MOORE,
Clerk of the District of Maryland.

EDWARD J. COALE
DEPOSITED
FEBRUARY 22 1825

Advertisement.

THE work of which a translation is now offered to the American public, appeared in Paris in 1809. Our intercourse with the continent of Europe is now so slender, that a long time must necessarily elapse before we can be apprised of the existence of any work, which can shed any light upon the complicated relations of European politics, or illustrate the biography of their generals or statesmen. The copy which has been translated, and which, most probably, is the only one that has yet found its way to these distant regions was procured through the courtesy of his Excellency Mr. DASCHKOFF. His politeness and zeal will, it is hoped, be rewarded, by the removal of some of the uncharitable prejudices and errors respecting the true character of the Russian nation, which are too much countenanced in America. The national character of the Russians is the subject of much animated discussion. They are represented, on one side, as a compound of ferocious barbarism and vicious profligacy; while, on the other side, they are pictured with all the virtues as well as the strength of an infant and growing people. It is not difficult to discover, in part, the sources of these contradictory opinions. On the progress of a nation from barbarism.

ADVERTISEMENT.

refinement, every successive stage in the early part of its career is marked with scenes of confusion and blood. The ideas of civil liberty begin to be felt and acknowledged before the mighty independence of a warlike spirit is entirely subdued. The history of every nation in Europe may be traced back to ages when a wild insubordination pervaded the community, and thrones rocked almost continually upon their bases. But these times are but faintly remembered, as we trace down the progress of enlightened policy; and the mind of the reader reposes with so much satisfaction, upon an era of domestic peace and tranquility, that he is but little disposed to recal the remembrance of former commotion and slaughter. When Russia arose after slumbering for a night of ages, Europe had forgotten the spectacle which she herself had exhibited in the early periods of her history. Like skilful artificers, the other nations of the continent ridiculed the awkward, though well intentioned efforts of the untutored beginner. Every interruption of domestic quiet was construed into a proof of ferocity; every step in the path of improvement, was pointed out as a mark by which to estimate the distance Russia had yet to go, instead of being instanced as an evidence of the progress she had already made. It is owing to this circumstance that Russia has been considered as inferior to her polished and refined neighbours; until the habit has become so confirmed that it will remain long after the cause that created it has ceased to exist.

Catharine the Second, developed in a surprising manner, the resources, the wealth, and the greatness of Russia. Catharine (in the language of our author) did for Russia, what

ADVERTISEMENT.

Charles the Fifth, did for Spain ; Louis the Fourteenth, for France ; and Frederick the Second, for Prussia. But Catharine, from the epocha at which she lived, will enjoy her after a singular glory ! the glory of having laid the foundation and prepared the means of successful resistance to the tremendous desolation that was lately spreading over the continent, and which, in its progress, threatened to prostrate for centuries to come, the chivalry, freedom, commerce, civilization, and virtue of Europe. The defeat of the French invasion of 1812, is one of the most wonderful events that has ever occurred. When we consider the army which the emperor Napoleon led into Russia,—the skill of his numerous officers,—the experience of his veteran soldiers, swelling their number to half a million of combatants, and provided with all the apparatus of war, which modern ingenuity has nearly perfected—the admirable organization of that army, and the magazines, stores, and equipments provided for it—we shall in vain search through the stream of ages, from the earliest records of history, for an event which in its magnitude, its threatened consequences, or its actual results, can sustain a comparison with that great invasion. Surely then the life of that general must be singularly interesting, who organised as it were, the Russian armies ; whose victories made them perhaps the best troops in Europe ; and the last achievement of whose life was the splendid campaign of Italy :—A campaign in which two famous generals of France, Moreau and Macdonald, were completely overcome ; and in which Massena, who had the singular honour of receiving from the great Napoleon himself the title of “spoiled child of fortune,” found his expectations baffled by a handful of troops led on by the

invincible Russian. Surely the history of that man must afford matter of deep reflection and instruction, to the man of letters and the student, the soldier, and the politician, of every party, profession, or nation.

The "Life of Souvarof," was written by an officer who appears to have profoundly investigated the causes and nature of the military operations of the latter part of the eighteenth century, and the policy of the different courts of Europe during a considerable portion of that period. With a soldier's eye he has surveyed the various campaigns in which his hero was engaged. The life of a soldier ought perhaps always to be written by a soldier, as none can display the scientific operations of war, so well as he who professionally understands them, and has personally witnessed their practical results.

It may be remarked that M. Laverne maintains throughout the work, the superior excellence of the Russian troops, and the opinion that Russia, although by her partition of Poland she had exposed herself to invasion on that side, is yet invincible at home. Little did he think that the correctness of his judgment was so soon to be established by the terrible battle of Borodino, and the complete destruction of an army of five hundred thousand men.


Conceiving from these circumstances that the work would be interesting and instructive, a few months ago, a translation of it was undertaken. It was commenced as an useful exercise, and an employment for hours of leisure or study. The late occurrences in Europe, in which the Russian armies have

borne so conspicuous a part, have given, it is thought, a superior degree of interest to a work, which is a history of the origin and progressive discipline of those armies. Its publication was therefore hastened before the severity of subsequent correction had chastened and amended faults, from which we are scarcely permitted to believe it is free.

With respect to the orthography we adopted of the name *Souvarof*, we have been favoured with the following observations from the pen of a Russian gentleman and a scholar—
 “ Many of the Russian names end in *ov* or as in *love*. The
 “ French and Germans transform this syllable by corruption
 “ into *off* or *ow* : and Russian gentlemen having occasion to
 “ write their names in a foreign language, adopt indifferently
 “ the one or the other, but the *off* prevails. The usual way
 “ of writing the name of the Russian hero is *Suvaroff* ; some
 “ would write it *Suvorove*, but according to my idea, to give
 “ it the true Russian pronunciation, if the *Su* in English has
 “ not exactly the sound of *Soo*, it would perhaps be better to
 “ write it *Soovoroff*.—The French write *Sou* to give the exact
 “ sound of the Russian *Su*.”

But in English *Sou* has exactly the sound of *Soo*. We may add that Doctor Clarke writes *Suvorof* and *Suvarof*—Tooke, the author of the “ Life of Catharine,” *Suvarof*—and the French, *Souvarof*. We have adopted the manner in which it is constantly written by our author.

Baltimore, February 14, 1814.



*The publisher has been favoured with the following letter from
his Excellency Mr. Daschkoff:*

WASHINGTON, January 22d, 1814.

SIR,

I am very happy to learn that you intend to gratify your countrymen with an edition of the Life of SOUVAROF, one of the greatest chieftains of the last century.

There is none which more justly deserves a translation, than the one which I had the pleasure to forward to you, written by L. M. P. de Laverne, an Austrian officer. I recommend it to you with the more confidence, as GENERAL MOREAU, the best judge of military works, noticed this for its worth. I have read his campaigns and his life in several languages, and must own this has been more satisfactory to me than any I have yet seen.

I beg you to accept the assurances of great consideration with which I am,


Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

ANDREW DASCHKOFF.

Mr. E. J. Coale, Baltimore.

B



Preface.

THE life of Souvarof, such as we now offer it to the reader, has never been presented to the public. Indeed we may say, that there is no complete account of the actions of this illustrious general. The history of his campaigns against the Turks, the Tartars, and the Poles, which has been translated from English into French, is still more diffuse and tedious in the translation than in the original. The author of that work (and of course his translator) have been guilty of inaccuracies in many parts of the history of the seven years' war, in which Souvarof first appeared in arms. Errors have crept into a vast number of his statements with regard to the war of the confederation of Poland, which was concluded in 1772, by the partition of that kingdom; and his account of the first war with the Turks abounds in mistakes. The "History of the Campaigns," attributes, for example, to Souvarof the victory of Koslodji, which was obtained by Kamenski. The credit of the defeat of Pugatchef is also given to Souvarof, whilst it is universally acknowledged that Russia is indebted to Panin and Michelson for crushing this rebellion, and that the division of Souvarof did not arrive until the troops of the rebel were dispersed and he himself had become a fugitive.

The exploits of Souvarof in the second war with the Turks, and in that which decided the ultimate destiny of Poland, are narrated in the same loose manner. Souvarof is made to do every thing. Nothing creates mistrust in the mind of the reader sooner than this folly of the historian in making his hero an omnipresent and perfect being. It is entirely unnecessary, to say the least of it, to attribute the victories of another to Souvarof, who can boast of so many and such brilliant triumphs of his own.

But exactitude in the narration of facts is not the only requisite of a historian. Although it must be acknowledged that facts are the foundation of history, yet the mere recital of them is far from being sufficient to keep alive that interest in the mind of the reader, which the historian should carefully cherish. This is particularly the case with regard to military transactions, when they are described with minuteness, by sacrificing every other species of detail. We have studiously avoided this error. In speaking of war (and we have constant occasion so to do, as our hero was almost always engaged in it) we have examined into its causes, and delineated the characters of the eminent personages on both sides of the contest. We have enquired into the political, moral, and natural history of the places which are mentioned as the scenes of remarkable occurrences. The theatre being thus prepared, we exhibit our hero, not however as an actor who performs his part as it had been written for him, but as a being reflecting for himself, and carrying into effect the plans which he had previously conceived. We develop

these plans, we trace them as they are gradually unfolded, and remark those modifications which the counteraction of the enemy made it proper to introduce; modifications which a dexterous general should always regard, without deviating essentially from the great outlines of his own plan. This outline of the campaign always evinces the abilities or incapacity of the general; and hence we have taken the utmost care to give a clear and exact sketch of it at the commencement of each war. In the same manner every battle is fought for the attainment of an object, more or less important and distinct, according to the talents of the commander. An engagement cannot indifferently be drawn on or avoided; and when the contending armies are in presence of each other, there is always some point in their respective positions, the defence or occupancy of which is decisive of success. Even in the heat of action, there is always some auspicious moment to seize, some manœuvre to execute with decision, which will secure a probable victory, or avoid an approaching defeat. These are circumstances to which we are particularly attentive, and we think that this plan of narration affords more solid instruction to military men, than if we had offered the most minute details of the operations of the campaign.

Reflecting upon the part which Russia is now acting in Europe, we have thought that the history of her first general;—of the man who did most to render her illustrious,—who carried farthest the glory of her arms, and contributed most effectually to the establishment of her power, would not be uninteresting to the public. It is true as a general remark,

that every thing which concerns illustrious strangers, is not only interesting, but useful, as a means of comparison and a source of information.

We have read and compared all the historical, political, military, and biographical works that have appeared in Germany or France, treating of the affairs of Russia during that period of her history when Souvarof was most actively employed, that is, from 1758 to 1800. But independently of the information which we have drawn from these sources, a long residence in Russia and Germany has enabled us to exercise over these documents the authority of a critic, founded on a personal knowledge of the characters and places of which they speak.

Nor have we been contented with examining public sources of information and papers which are within the reach of every one. We have received many minute and valuable statements from those persons who were eye-witnesses of the events of which they have transmitted us an account. Those of our readers who have been attentive observers of the current of affairs in Europe during the last ten years of the last century, will perceive that we are better instructed, owing to the assistance of friendship, than those who are compelled to resort to libraries alone for aid.

This work may perhaps be blamed for the same supposed defect that has been imputed to the "*Life of Potemkin*;" that is, the author dwells with too much complacency upon the

good qualities of his hero, and too often makes the history appear like the style of a studied eulogium.* Unquestionably it would have been easier simply to relate facts, and permit the reader to form his own opinion of the person whom they concerned, than to attempt to bias his opinion. Knowing that this is the proper path for a judicious historian to follow, we have adhered to it as closely as possible. But it was not always in our power to pursue it strictly. Is it our fault that hatred, envy, treachery, party spirit, and folly (to speak as mildly as possible) have poured out their venom upon the character of Souvarof, and painted him in colours altogether too deep? Could we pass over these falsehoods in silence, content with refuting them by relating the truth? Undoubtedly not. He knows little of human nature who supposes that their prejudices would be eradicated in this manner. We have dwelt with energy upon the truth in many places, because it is important to exhibit our hero correctly to the world and to posterity. Impartiality itself, that first virtue of a historian, has required us to eulogize him with warmth, because that

* We mentioned this reproach because it applies to us. We revised and retouched the political and military part of the "Life of Potemkin," with the consent of the family of the authoress, Madame de Cerenville, a lady as enlightened as she was highly respectable in society, but whose loss must be deplored by literature and her friends. Whilst living she laid us under a promise to perform that service. She had so much diffidence that she was mistrustful of her powers in treating of those subjects which were foreign to her pursuits and education as a woman, but by no means beyond the reach of her comprehension. We have adopted her opinion of Potemkin, because we believe it to be just, and because our reflections and observations made when in Russia have concurred in persuading us that the acknowledged blemishes in the character of this singular man, have occasioned his great genius and good qualities to be too much overlooked.

impartiality has been hitherto denied him with striking injustice.

If we have set a value on those things which shew the character of our hero in an advantageous point of view, we have written nothing which could create an exaggerated opinion of his worth. We have painted him exactly as he appeared to our judgment. If there is any error in the description it is not a wilful one. There is not in the whole work a single word which is contrary to our conscience, and both men and things are depicted in conformity with its dictates. In the midst of the convulsions which have occasioned so much calamity to agitated Europe, it may be possible (and it must be pardoned if such is the case) that our hearts have contracted some little irritability. Perhaps, from an over anxiety to avoid misrepresentation from this cause, we have adopted too much moderation in our opinions. Every thing has its favourable and unfavourable side, according to the manner in which it is viewed. One of these may be substantially as true as the other, and without deviating from strict equity one may be presented with more minuteness than the other. We have taken advantage of this liberty, but always on the favourable side of the question; and however palatable satire and sarcasm may be to a certain class of men, we have charity enough to believe that the majority are in favour of leniency when the facts will admit of a choice. Finally we repeat with confidence that neither flattery, interest, nor enmity has for a moment guided our pen, and secure from this reproach, we submit with resignation to all those which the poverty of our abilities condemns us to incur.

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
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ERRATA.

The reader is requested to correct the following typographical errors.

<i>Page 49, line 34, for</i>	<i>glaire,</i>	<i>read</i>	<i>gloire.</i>
86	31	affect,	effect.
93	3	verify,	vivify.
189	10	concession,	concussion.
203	5	became	become.



THE LIFE
OF
SOUVAROF.

CHAPTER I.

*Introduction—Birth of Souvarof—His education—His entrance
into the army.*

THE extraordinary man who is the subject of this work, must be considered in the light of a military character alone, since war was the constant employment of his life. The system with which he conducted his campaigns, his numerous exploits, the glory that he acquired for himself and his country, the superiority which he gave the Russian armies over those of every nation in Europe, are circumstances sufficiently powerful to interest the majority of the readers of his life. But the principles which guided him in his military operations, whether we consider them as relating to his intelligence and experience, or, extrinsic circumstances, such as the genius of his nation, the nature of the government which he obeyed, or the spirit of the people whom he had to oppose, will interest, in a peculiar degree, the admirers of the man, and furnish the military order with useful precepts and instructive examples.

The true merit of a man must be ascertained from those advantages which he has gained, through foresight and calculation. The success which is obtained by circumstances, comparatively fortuitous, will always be placed low on the scale of excellence by impartial judges. They know that sometimes man is but the instrument of an order of things, to which he himself is as much subjected as those whom he vanquishes. Nor is the virtue of foresight alone sufficient to entitle its possessor to the name of Great. It is necessary that his actions should be the result of the purest intentions, and produce a useful and durable effect upon the community to which he belongs. At first view it appears impossible for a soldier to produce such an effect, as the object of his profession is to destroy. But if the love of glory and noble enthusiasm with which he inspires the hearts of the men under his command, are capable of being disseminated through the nation at large; if it is of advantage for a people to be freed from all apprehension of an attack from their powerful neighbours, and to have their weight in the balance of power augmented; if the rapidity of conquests renders the burthen of them less onerous, we may safely say that a warrior can have a beneficial and permanent influence in increasing the happiness of his country.

Did Souvarof conduct so many brilliant campaigns, and lead his comrades to victory so often, because circumstances were always propitious to his triumphs, or did he draw lessons in the art of war from the experience of ages and conquer because he adopted proper measures to conquer? Were his plans directed by the whim of the moment, or founded on an intimate acquaintance with the character of his co-adjutors? Did he combat the different nations against whom he waged war, regulating his conduct by the natural, political and moral situation of each, or had he one method for all? Did he sincerely love his country and glory, or was he a spoiler, voracious of carnage and plunder? Upon the answers to these questions will depend the decision, which will assign him a place among

the great men of the world, or stamp him as an impostor, concealed under a mask of originality, and receiving applauses really not his due. The formation of this decision will be the useful part of the present work.

Among the means by which we are to be led towards this essential object, may be placed anecdotes of Souvarof himself or of those persons who were connected with him ; the exposition of their principles and actions ; reflections on the causes of the wars in which he distinguished himself ; geographical and moral delineations of the countries which were the scenes of his exploits ; digressions upon politics and war ; observations upon the general progress of society in Russia ; in a word, the history of that country and Europe, so far as it may be illustrative of our subject. These are all episodes to which we shall occasionally resort, for the purpose of enlivening the dry narrative of facts, and adding drapery to the naked biography.

ALEXANDER SOUVAROF descended of an ancient and noble family, was born in 1730, in Livonia, a country proverbially productive of good soldiers. When the Swedes ceded Livonia to Peter the Great, the grandfather of Souvarof attached himself to the service of this prince, and had no reason to complain of his treatment. His son, Basil, father of Alexander, was employed in many negociations by the Russian court. His fortune, however, was not large, and this circumstance probably convinced him of the necessity of giving such an education to his only son, as would enable him to rise by the force of his qualifications. Persuaded that a residence near the court was more likely to create that importance which is generally attached to riches alone, and even riches themselves, than a situation in the camp, he chalked out for his son the same path that he himself had pursued through life ; and from this single circumstance, which proves that the bent of genius cannot always be discovered, the celebrated general who af-

terwards evinced such transcendant military talents, and who would have preferred serving in the ranks as a common soldier to an entire renunciation of arms, was doomed to wield the pen instead of the sword. But Souvarof, like other uncommon men, soon felt the nature of his powers, and the prospect of a tranquil and luxurious life, yielded to the force of his ruling passion.—Scarcely had he entered upon the threshold of youth, when his father was compelled to renounce his hopes of seeing him a civilian, and to decide upon educating him as a soldier. This resolution being taken, every auxiliary plan was adopted, to carry it into complete effect. As soon as he was capable of reading with advantage, the best historical works were put into his hands. By this means the dispositions which we inherit from nature are developed and strengthened, as history contains models of every species of character, and every one in perusing it finds some particular one which suits his taste and which he wishes to resemble. Souvarof did not hesitate to choose Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar and Charles XII. To this last he was particularly attached, and this fondness manifested in his tender years, indicates the analogous traits in his budding character to some of the qualities of the Swedish hero, those of intrepidity, boldness and decision. But we must not infer that he possessed the rashness of the Swede, although the vigour of his enterprises and the astonishing celerity of his movements appear to justify such a suspicion. To clear it away effectually, it need only be mentioned that the character of Montecuculli was also one of his greatest favourites. This is sufficient to prove that boldness was not his dominant characteristic, when unsupported by reflection and calculation. Although he believed that a general should carry on war with energy, yet he thought it should be tempered and regulated by the light of experience and prudence.

Souvarof completed by his own efforts the education which his father had begun. He applied himself to the study of mi-

literary works, became familiar with the actions of renowned generals, and inspired by their example, and before he had the least acquaintance with the practice, was deeply versed in the theory, of the military profession.

In the mean time fortune was not propitious to his rising merit. His father, from having destined him to another profession, had neglected to enroll him at his birth in a regiment of the guards; a method to which the nobles resort, to secure a high rank for their sons when they become capable of assuming it. The consequence of this omission was, that the young Souvarof was compelled to pass in person through the different grades, which he would otherwise have filled fictitiously before quitting his mother's arms. It was not until he had been for some years a private, afterwards for some time a corporal in a regiment of guards, that he was raised to the rank of a subaltern officer, then about nineteen years of age. This slow promotion and consequent experience of the feelings and duties of the different grades, were certainly useful to him. A knowledge of human nature can be acquired only by an association with the subordinate classes of society. Such a com-mixture may be considered as a test of ability; for it will either degrade or improve, according to the noble or grovelling nature of the soul.

After having served with much zeal in the guards, and acquired the esteem of his companions, Souvarof was appointed in 1754 a lieutenant in the regular army. But his promotion after this period, became more rapid, as we find him a lieutenant colonel in 1757. At this stage of his military advancement, the theatre of war opened before him, and he entered upon it, to lay the foundation of his reputation. Those talents which he was soon to exhibit, drew him from the common road, the instant that an opportunity offered of his departing from it.

Europe was at this time in flames. The fourth campaign of that sanguinary and memorable war, known by the name of the seven year's war,* had just commenced. A monarch, feeble in physical resources, but rich in those which he drew from himself, sustained a struggle against three powers, either of which possessed and commanded forces sufficiently numerous to annihilate his empire. But whether Heaven, designing to erect a new monarchy in the heart of Europe, permitted its infancy to be environed with perils, in order to shew the world that the utmost efforts of man are fruitless, when contending against the decrees of Almighty Providence; or whether in the nature of things the contradictory interests of a coalition diminish its effect, the play of the machine being enfeebled by the multitude of its springs, it is certain that the combined armies of France, Austria and Russia, only served as instruments in the hands of the Prussian Hero, to reap a rich harvest of laurels to adorn his brow.

The king of France had engaged in this war, merely to gratify his animosity towards the king of Prussia. Upon principles of policy, his conduct was utterly inexplicable. Prussia might have been considered by France in the triple light, of a balance to the power of Austria, a curb to the ambition of Russia, whose gigantic arms threatened to embrace all Europe, and a substitute in the equilibrium of the North for Sweden, unnerved by the mad wars of Charles XII. Russia, on the other hand, could have had no interest in the destruction of Prussia; for although nature had furnished her with almost insurmountable barriers against the invasions of France, yet the existence of Prussia would check and restrain the aggrandisement of that power in Germany and Holland. In relation to Austria, the stability of Prussia was of vital importance to Russia; whether she turned her eyes to Poland or extended her views to Turkey, with the intention of seizing upon part

* So called from the time of its duration.

of their territories, she found in Austria a formidable rival, covetous from juxta-position of the same tract of country, and to whom it would be equally advantageous. Prussia on the contrary, could have had no prospect of partaking in the spoils of Turkey, and would have readily lent her aid to plunder Poland, content with the share assigned her by Russia. Under all these different views then, it was contrary to the interest of Russia to sacrifice Prussia ; but it was the height of absurdity to sacrifice her to Austria.

Russia, however, chose to think otherwise, and was instigated by motives similar to those which animated France. The empress Elizabeth had conceived a violent hatred to Frederick II. which the empress queen, Maria Theresa, had had the art to create, by representing him as the only obstacle to the accomplishment of one of Elizabeth's favourite projects, ~~that of enabling~~ Russia to interfere in the affairs of Germany. Austria had thus succeeded in drawing France and Russia into a war entirely foreign to their interests, and the benefits of which were to result to her alone ; for had Prussia been permitted to attract to itself as a centre, the several planetary protestant states, a system would have been formed radically different from the old one, and a new Germanic confederation erected upon the ruins of the ancient and imperial House of Austria. The means which the component powers of the combination possessed of obtaining the accomplishment of their wishes, were exactly in inverse proportion to their interest in success ; for Austria, to whom the humiliation of Prussia was most essential, from the narrow and contracted scale of her operations, attacked her to the least advantage : whilst France, less deeply and inveterately hostile to the common enemy, found comparatively few impediments to her incursions. Nothing prevented her troops from passing the Rhine ; and her failure in the object of the campaign must be ascribed only to the length of the line of operations, and consequent

expense which she was obliged to incur, Russia, on the other hand, who had evidently but little reason to wish for the annihilation of the Prussian monarchy, was the power most likely to accomplish it. Facts have demonstrated that her armies could with little difficulty cross the Vistula and even the Oder, inundate Prussia from the north and east with their numerous battalions, and devastate the country through its whole extent, with as much ease as a vulture lacerates his prey. What divine arm was stretched forth to save Frederick from the ruin to which he had been devoted by such terrible enemies? Who was able to weaken the blows of his adversaries, among whom we discern Souvarof? We must believe however, that if this bold and indefatigable warrior had directed, without control, the movements of the Russian troops, Prussia and her monarch would have been trodden to the dust. But let us not anticipate events; neither the age nor character of our hero is yet ripe enough to verify our prediction.

Souvarof joined the army under the command of field marshal count Soltikof in 1759, and for the first time witnessed in person the war which he had so often contemplated in perspective. Happily for Prussia the operations of the Russians, like those of all former years, were extremely tardy. The multitude that composed their armies; the difficulty of collecting magazines for their support; the excessive irregularity of their light troops, which prevented them from profiting by the resources of the country in which they were, and obliged them to draw all their supplies from home, and a habit common to all novices in war, of groping instead of seeing their way in every thing, were circumstances that augmented the sluggishness of their marches to such a degree, as to prevent them from reaching the theatre of war before the middle of summer, though they left their own frontiers in the month of April. The commencement of autumn furnished them with an excuse for returning to com-

fertable quarters at home; and whether they returned as conquerors or conquered, was a matter perfectly indifferent to them. The troops which thirty years afterwards, under the command of Souvarof, were the most expeditious in the world, were at this time absolutely models of laziness and inactivity. It is probable however, that the different manner in which Frederick conducted his campaign, the vigor of his movements and celerity of his marches, proved a fertile source of instruction to Souvarof, and that he first derived from this hero the foundation of the bold daring system which he afterwards practised with such energy at the head of his redoubtable band of warriors.

But slowness was not the only reproach of the Russian armies. The most judicious of the military writers of the last age, general Lloyd, remarks, with regard to the campaign of 1757, that they had no consistent and uniform plan of operations, and appeared to be ignorant of every thing beyond alternate predatory incursions and retreats, and adds, that in all probability, they never would know how to conduct a war. The severity of this decision arises from Lloyd's having been a rigid and finished disciplinarian: who could not endure the least taint of barbarism, either in the plan or the execution; but he should have reflected that it requires time to mature the genius and institutions of a people. The two last Turkish wars, the exploits of Romanzof, of Replin, of Gallatzin, the conquest of the Crimea by Potemkin, and that of Poland and Italy by Souvarof, have established their national character, and are sufficient to satisfy even the scrupulous mind of Lloyd, that under the auspices of such leaders as we have mentioned, the Russians at length know how to conduct a war.

If they were not familiar with the arcana of the science, during the seven year's war, they at least possessed one of the essential requisites of a good army, the power of commanding

themselves. The battle of Kunersdorf, in the campaign of 1759, the first engagement in which Souvarof bore a part, affords a striking and sanguinary illustration of the existence of this indispensable qualification. It is true that to a political historian this battle would be comparatively uninteresting, as the result of it was not decisive; but in a military point of view, it must be considered as important and remarkable, from its frightful bloodshed and carnage. We see at Kunersdorf a consummate captain, at the head of valorous troops, for a long time trained and disciplined by him with the utmost care; a prince whose reputation would not only have been increased, but whose kingdom would have been preserved from menacing dangers by victory, and who, forgetful of his accustomed prudence, thought himself sure of defeating his enemy, * even before he came in sight of him, attack with a boldness backed by every effort of his genius, a general who now commanded in chief, for the first time in his life, supported by soldiers unskilled in battles, but despising death, as their duty to their religion, their country and their sovereign, required it of them; we see these soldiers, in the struggle of national courage against disciplined bravery, defeating the most dexterous manœuvres of the enemy, by their unbending obstinacy, and finally carrying off the palm of victory, merely from their intrepidity and contempt of death.

In this battle, Souvarof gave proofs of his courage and intelligence, which presaged his future greatness. If we may be allowed to conjecture the thoughts of his youth from the actions of his age, he must have been chagrined at the ill use that Soltikof made of his brilliant victory, since he was con-

* A few hours before the battle, one of the duke Ferdinand of Brunswick's aids arrived with the account of the defeat of the French at Minden. "As I intend to attack the Russians presently" replied Frederick "wait here for a short time, that you may carry back to the Duke, a piece of intelligence as important as that which he has sent to me." The courier returned, however with a different story.

tent with sending a detachment of Cossacks to harrass the retreating Prussians. Had he, on the contrary, pursued them with his whole army, and effected a junction with the Austrians, which he might easily have done, the Prussian army, reduced to sixty thousand exhausted men, could not for an instant have defended its territories against an overwhelming force of two hundred thousand victorious troops, and Frederick must have been irrecoverably lost. In the course of the seven year's war, this phenomenon frequently occurs; and even after a dear-bought victory, we see Prussia often trembling on the brink of a precipice. This state appeared to be destined to give an illustrious example of the superiority of moral over physical strength, by showing how strenuously the combination of a great leader with a spirited people could resist and repel the force of armies which seemed sufficient to crush and annihilate them in a moment.—Had Souvarof consulted only the principles of the military art, he must have repined at the inaction of count Soltikof; but had he been guided by the feelings of his heart, he could not have regretted the escape of Frederick from those toils, which impolitic or ambitious enemies had wound around him.

The merit of Souvarof was now rapidly bursting forth, and acquired for him the esteem of many of his generals. Amongst those who ardently sought his friendship was count Ferneor, a chief distinguished for zeal, activity and talents, and who engaged in war from passion rather than ambition. He had yielded the supreme command to count Soltikof, and reserved to himself that portion of the army which was most frequently in the presence of the enemy. This was exactly the post which suited Souvarof. He was constantly with the advanced guard. He accompanied all detachments, took an active part in all expeditions, and sought with avidity every opportunity of partaking in danger and glory. In the numerous skirmishes which occur between the out posts of armies in the vicinity of each other, he displayed that brilliant courage, that unwea-

ried perseverance, that correctness of view, that promptness in the discovery of resources, and that art in animating his men, which in his future life contributed so materially to his success.

In the following year 1760, the Russians under the command of the generals Tchernichef and Tottleben, captured and plundered Berlin. Souvarof assisted in this expedition which was calculated to yield more profit than honor. It was easy for them to penetrate with their numerous armies into a country which was open and unprotected; for the King of Prussia not having forces enough to face all his enemies, was obliged to concentrate them and leave his frontiers unguarded. From this unfortunate cause too, he was unable to defend his capital; and he was compelled to witness the mournful spectacle of the entire demolition in one day, of those establishments which his economy and taste had been years in erecting, for the accommodation of his subjects, or the embellishment of his residences. But though this blow humbled, it did not subdue him. Two important military principles may be deduced from the events we have just mentioned—1st. That the possession of the Capital does not decide the fate of a State or even a campaign; and 2d. That in the modern art of war, men are of more importance than fortified places, and that a general should never acknowledge himself vanquished though all his strong holds be subdued, if he retains his soldiers and his constancy. The firm intrepidity of Frederick was still left him, and he defied all Europe at the head of his excellent troops, who could be sometimes beaten but never dispersed whilst they had such a leader around whom to rally. When driven from Brandenburg, he retreated into Silesia and Bohemia; when forced to evacuate Silesia, he revenged himself upon Saxony. He was thus always in force, and at last wearied his antagonists out. Souvarof professed his principles and adopted his conduct. Certain of the ascendancy which a man of genius acquires over other men, he placed the most unli-

mitted confidence in his soldiers, and the world knows what he accomplished at their head.

In 1761, the Russians under the command of Marshal **Bouttourlin**, always in considerable numbers, were more inactive than they had been in the preceding years. **Bouttourlin** did not however imitate the example of his predecessors in omitting to profit by his victories, for he obtained none to profit by; but persevered in remaining so completely at rest, that it must be looked upon as a favor from Heaven to the King of Prussia. After idling away a part of the summer in Silesia, the Russian general resolved to evacuate it, in consequence of some altercations with the Austrian commander **Laudon**. This intention was communicated to **Frederick**. Knowing that the season was not far enough advanced to admit of their going into winter quarters, and fearful that so large a body of men might undertake some enterprise, injurious to his interest; he determined to ensure their retreat into the interior of Poland, and accordingly dispatched general **Plathen** with a detachment of the army to destroy their magazines at **Posen**. The expedition however failed through the activity of general **Berg**, who covered the town with the light troops of the Russian army. **Souvarof** commanded a division of **Hussars** and **Cossacks** in this corps, and contributed more than any other officer, both by his manœuvres and example, to foil the attacks of the enemy, and to induce the men to bear with cheerfulness the fatigues and privations to which they were subjected. The body of the army moved into **Pomerania** to countenance the operations of the siege of **Colberg**, which count **Romanzof** had undertaken in the beginning of the summer. The rest of the campaign consisted merely in efforts on the part of the Prussians to throw supplies into the place, and endeavours by the Russians to counteract them. In the petty war to which this state of things gave rise, **Souvarof** distinguished himself by vexatiously and continually harrassing

the Prussians. Enterprises of greater pith and moment than are usually entrusted to a lieutenant colonel, were committed to his care. At the head of eight squadrons of hussars and Cossacks, he overthrew in the environs of Stargard the Prussian general Schenkendorf, killed five hundred of his men and took as many prisoners. A few days afterwards he had a lively skirmish with colonel de la Motte Courbieres, who commanded the advanced guard of general Plathen. He had defeated the hussars and was pursuing them with four squadrons of mounted grenadiers, when Souvarof came up with his Cossacks, routed the grenadiers and rallied his hussars, and charged two battalions who composed the infantry of the corps so furiously, that in spite of their fire, though they had formed a square to receive him, he compelled them to lay down their arms. These successes obliged the Prussians to give up all hope of relieving Colberg; and the campaign terminated with its surrender. The Russians retired into winter quarters, and issued from them in the spring, only to return peaceably to their homes. The empress Elizabeth was dead; and her successor Peter III. was as enthusiastic in his admiration of the king of Prussia, as Elizabeth was inveterate in her hatred. Peace was speedily concluded, and if time had been allowed him, the new king would have entered into an active alliance with Frederick. But his wife put an end to all his projects. She removed from his pusillanimous brow, a crown which his feebleness could not wear; and under the name of Catharine II. seated herself upon the throne which her husband had disgraced by his puerilities. Intent upon maintaining her usurpation and stabilitating her power, she perceived that peace was necessary for both, and accordingly negotiated one with the king of Prussia; sedulously confining herself, however, within the bounds of a strict neutrality. Souvarof was rewarded for his past services, by being appointed to the rank of colonel, in August 1762, and nominated to the command of the regiment of Astrachan, in garrison at Petersburg.

CHAPTER II.

Commencement of the reign of Catharine II—War of the Confederation of Poland—Causes of the war—Exploits of Souvarof—First partition of Poland.

WE have arrived at the period in the history of Russia, from which we may date the commencement of that important part which she acted during the last age, and the origin of that preponderance which her politics and military successes enabled her to assume in the affairs of Europe. This acquisition of influence has been so enormous, that she is at this day regarded by the most ancient and powerful states, as one of the main pillars of the political fabric, when a century ago her name was scarcely known.

Nature had made this nation formidable, but ignorance prevented them from seeing the extent of their power. It was a woman who first communicated to them a progressive motion of improvement, and raised them to that height, to which they had previously no pretension. This circumstance adds to the wonder of this singular spectacle. It is true, that this woman was assisted by men of genius; but then she may claim the exclusive merit of distinguishing them among the croud of courtiers, of exciting and encouraging their exertions, and of raising many of them from the obscurity to which their birth and fortune had consigned them, to the enviable privilege of co-operating in the improvement of their country. By thus discerning hidden talents and sustaining them against all party intrigues, this great princess at length rendered her people the most formidable in Europe, and her reign one of the most illustrious in modern history. From the moment of her accession to the throne, the new system

was distinctly observed, and its effect might have been as distinctly foreseen. She roused the nation from the profound repose in which they had been ingloriously indulging under the indolent Elizabeth, and shook off the despondency which the short but absurd tyranny of Peter III. had created. The spirit of reform was introduced into the administration of the civil, military and naval departments, and care was taken that the people should be gratified with the revival of those customs which were exploded, and the preservation of those which remained. Catharine professed a great regard for the Russian habits, manners and language ; but at the same time, she extracted whatever she thought useful from the usages of those states in Europe, whose institutions had been sanctioned by experience. She did not, like the empress Anne, require to be served by strangers alone ; nor did she, like Elizabeth, proscribe them altogether. But, adopting the middle path, she received them kindly, consulted them, profited by their wisdom, and rewarded them nobly, without advancing them over the heads of the Russians. By this address, she satisfied the pride of those who thought that a generous hospitality should be exercised towards strangers, and far from irritating her subjects, disposed them to receive with complacency the lessons which would direct their youth, and enlighten their inexperience.

The foreign politics of Catherine were still more widely different than her internal regulations, from the system of her predecessors. On her ascension to the throne, she conceived the project (from which she never departed) of profiting by the dissensions of Germany and indifference of France, to obtain the regulation of the balance of power in Europe and enable herself to dictate terms to the different cabinets, by becoming the arbitress of their decisions. To arrive to at this much desired object, she abandoned the system of entangling alliances, by which the views and means of Russia were made to subserve the interests of other courts, instead

of conducing to her own advantage and aggrandisement. With the penetration of a superior mind, she perceived that she had nothing to gain by becoming a party to their wars, except the doubtful profit of receiving money in exchange for men; and that her interest led her to engage in wars in which Europe could not interfere. She cast a longing eye on the domains of Poland and Turkey; the one as an inexhaustible mine of riches, the other as the canal and *depot* of an extensive commerce, and both as admirable nurseries of soldiers. She was not insensible of the difficulty of subjecting them by force; but actual force was meant to be employed only in striking the last decisive blow. The great weapon that she intended to wield was that celebrated maxim *Divide et Impera*. Hitherto it had been used chiefly by princes to strengthen their power in their own kingdoms by establishing an equilibrium between the different orders of society; but Catherine tried its efficacy in adjusting the neighbouring nations. She saw that Poland was condemned to anarchy through the vice of its constitution, that the king and his subjects were in a continual struggle for superiority. She saw Turkey composed of various nations, which differed from each other in religion and manners; and exposed to a worse anarchy than that which enfeebled Poland; an insubordination of the people to a government, which could inspire only sentiments of fear, horror, or disgust. Catherine judged wisely in supposing that these jarring elements might be shaken into a chaos, extremely favourable to her purpose, as in such a state there can be no resistance to a regular and well digested attack. When this cunning scheme of policy becomes interwoven into the plans of the cabinets of Europe (for they have always been inclined to adopt it) and experience convinces them of its efficacy in increasing the means of annoyance and diminishing the power of opposition, it will be the cause of continual and sanguinary revolutions, until the whole social edifice is prostrated and another erected in its place.

In order to accomplish the important designs which the empress meditated, it was necessary for her to attract the eyes of Europe to her empire, and accustom it gradually to feel her influence in the political system. The measures of Catherine for this purpose were adopted with an address of which a man would have been incapable; and this is not the only instance which might be urged in support of the position, that a woman endowed by nature with the gift of genius, and thus partaking of the qualities of the other sex, without losing the peculiar characteristics of her own, is really superior in range of abilities to a man. Uniting brilliant wit and solid information to the seductive fascination of the graces, and an amiable temper, Catherine made her court the centre of the arts and sciences, of politeness and taste. She fixed upon Petersburg the attention of astonished Europe; the philosopher wished to contemplate this new world; the diplomatist directed to this point all his speculations; the artist considered it as a noble field for his exertions, and the poet regarded it as the genuine country of his hopes.

The croud of strangers who poured in upon the Russian court were all welcomed and enriched, and returned to their own country sounding its praises and the magnificence of its immortal empress. It was necessary especially to gain over the French, as it was their office to distribute and apportion European fame. Neither advances nor flattery nor entertainments were spared to accomplish this object. The empress even consented to steal a little time from the cares of government, to enter into a correspondence with the literary men of France; and this incense inflaming their ardent tempers, like fire falling upon powder, she succeeded beyond her hopes. The colossal grandeur of the empire was exaggerated, and its power deemed commensurate with its immense extent. Russia was supposed to be able to subdue every other state, because she was invincible at home; and the boundaries of her prosperity placed so distant from each other, that even to this day she has not filled the intermediate space.

In the mean time Catherine proceeded regularly in the plan which she had conceived. Poland was the first object of her attention. Having concluded peace with Prussia and declared her neutrality, she recalled the troops which had already penetrated into Germany, and caused them to retire into the interior of Russia. A corps of fifteen thousand however stopped in Courland, in order to terminate the discussions which had arisen between Russia and Poland, respecting the choice of a sovereign for the latter country. A corps of two thousand men remained also in garrison at Graudoutz, a small town, in Poland, important and strong from its being built on a height and surrounded by a marsh. The reason assigned to dissatisfied Poland, for the retention of this town, was, that the provisions collected for the campaign which had not taken place, might be preserved from waste. The rest of the Russian army remained in that part of Russia contiguous to Poland, and in this menacing attitude, held itself ready to execute any orders which its sovereign might think fit to issue.

Imprudent Poland stretched out her own hands to receive the chains in which Catharine wished to bind her. The Poles, estimable for their courage and love of liberty, maintained the extraordinary and unexampled pretension of carrying into civil society the absolute independence of the savage state. This was confined, however, to the nobles, the descendants of the Sclavi, who conquered Poland in the fourth century. These barbarians reduced the primitive population of the country to a state of slavery, under which their posterity still groaned at the period of which we are speaking. The whole nation was thus divided into masters and slaves, without any intermediate classes; and such was the perfect equality between the former, that in their deliberations upon the public interests, one voice was sufficient to reject a law, which the rest had then no power to enforce. If all the inhabitants had been freemen of this kind, the civil society would

either have been dissolved from the force of internal disorder, or they would have seen the necessity of establishing an energetic constitution, and laws which should be equally obligatory upon all. But the slaves whom the nobles possessed ; who cultivated the earth and kept up the natural existence of Poland, while their masters were quarrelling to prevent her from assuming any moral character, furnished these nobles with the means of perpetuating anarchy, in the heart of the country for ages, without producing a dissolution of all social ties. Instead of being one entire body, Poland found herself separated into a number of little societies, in which some sort of order may be said to have existed, as each one had its chief. But then these little societies were so unequal in the extent and fertility of their possessions, and the number of their slaves, that there arose among the nobles an aristocracy of wealth. Thus there was not only anarchy in the state, but anarchy in the different factions. Although this was ruinous to the dignity, tranquility and happiness of the nation, it was not as dreadful as the utter dissolution of all social order, which must have been the consequence, if all had been freemen. It is probable that this state of things would have resulted in the preponderance of some one faction, and the establishment of an hereditary monarchy in Poland, if unfortunately for her, the neighbouring nations had not far outstripped her in the career of civilization. But we have only to observe her, surrounded by powerful monarchies which had at their command disciplined and permanent armies to execute the schemes of a regular system of politics, and witness their actual interference in her internal concerns, by tampering with the factions ; and it is easy to see that it was the natural course of things for Poland to fall a prey to the rapacity of her neighbours.

This was precisely what Catharine foresaw, and wished to effect. Pretexts against a nation who commit many political imprudences are never wanting to an empress. The one

which she adopted, however was rather singular. It was to maintain the freedom and purity of the Polish constitution against the attempts which the king was making to invade it. But the king happening to die, she pretended that her object was to give them a king of her own choosing. She pitched upon the young count Poniatowski, her former lover, as the person whom she wished to seat upon the throne. As it was impossible for this choice to be approved of by the majority of the nation, she knew that its effect would be to weaken Poland still further by irritating the different factions against each other, and to give her the concurrence and assistance of one party who would call in the aid of her troops and thus facilitate the meditated invasion. In case of success, she knew that Poniatowski was devoted to her, and would give her more direction than himself, over the affairs of his kingdom. But these events did not happen with as little disturbance as Catharine had supposed. At a time when the Russians had already invaded Poland and subdued most of its strong places, one hundred gentlemen of the country, stimulated by patriotism, and listening only to despair, assembled in a small town and formed a confederation for the expulsion of the strangers who opposed them. Unfortunately for so good a cause, their number was small, and their first measures were taken with a precipitation which necessity perhaps required, but which certainly proved injurious to their party. The Russian troops, better prepared than their adversaries, were immediately put in motion to prevent the confederates from having time to increase their forces. Then commenced the war known by the name of the *war of the confederation of Poland*, in which Souvarof manifested more and more his military genius, and advanced in the construction of that edifice of brilliant reputation and success, which his merit and bravery afterwards completed. At this epoch he was at Petersburg, at the head of his regiment. Catharine was surrounded in the first years of her reign, with select troops, and the officers whom she supposed most intrepid and most devoted to

her person. But this was a moment when the service of her faithful warriors was more essential in the field than in the protection of her throne. Souvarof, therefore, received orders in November 1769, to march into Poland with his own regiment and another which was put under his command, and join the army destined to act against the confederates. On this occasion he was appointed a brigadier general. To evince his zeal in obedience, he marched a thousand versts*, or near two hundred and fifty leagues in the space of one month, in a detestable season, and arrived in Poland to take his share in the war without having allowed his troops the least time for refreshment.

The supreme command of the army was entrusted to count Weymarn, an experienced officer, of a crafty and intriguing disposition. This last quality was extremely useful in a partizan war, which does not require great manœuvres and extensive plans, but the art of which consists in preventing the junction of detached parties, in destroying them in detail, and in enveloping the movements and designs of the commander in the greatest uncertainty. The Poles had been so often conquered by being divided among themselves, and the indiscreet nobles were so ready to imbibe the germs of discord that were sown among them, that their enemies regarded this method of subjugation as infallible. Half of the nation was already in arms against the other half. The king and the diet, terrified by the menaces of the Russian ambassador†, con-

* Dr. Clarke states the Russian verst to be equal to two-thirds of an English mile. This calculation would make the distance six hundred and sixty-six and two-thirds English miles. Two hundred and fifty French leagues are upwards of six hundred and eighty English miles.—AM. TR.

† This ambassador was prince Repnin. He treated the Poles with a singular and excessive degree of haughtiness and violence, but whether it was in obedience to his orders, or the consequence of his own disposition, cannot at this late day be decided. However this may be, it could not have been

sent to apply to the empress for assistance ; so that Catharine appeared to be aiding the legitimate and constituted authority of Poland, by declaring the confederates rebels, and sending her troops to punish them as traitors, when in truth their object was to shake off a foreign yoke, and restore to their country her liberty, her constitution and her rights.

On arriving at Warsaw where he fixed his head quarters as a centre from which every movement could be overlooked, count Weymarn divided his army into numerous bodies, stationing them in the provinces most favourable to the insurgents, or into which he was apprehensive the spirit of the confederation would spread. These corps were placed in such a manner, that they could receive frequent intelligence from each other, and the only manœuvre that they had to perform, was to approach each other, advancing in a semi-circular form so as to drive the confederates gradually to one point, where they could all be destroyed at one blow. By this dexterous plan the spirit of resistance was prevented from spreading ; or if the provinces in the rear of the Russian army were infected with it, they were cut off from all communication with the interior and of themselves, were too weak to be formidable. Souvarof was sent to Lublin, a little nearer to the centre of Poland, and was already honoured with the confidence of count Weymarn as his activity was signally useful in that desultory species of warfare. In addi-

supposed that in a fierce and almost savage nation, among whom personal vengeance was frequently resorted to, no individual could have been found daring enough to expose himself to every danger, rather than submit to be trampled upon by a stranger. We cannot say that civilization had produced the effect upon them (which it has upon so many others) of lessening their exalted notions of honor ; for they were not exceedingly civilized. Their disgrace must then be attributed to a radical defect in their character, or rather a defect which had been caused by a long state of anarchy. From this circumstance we may more readily conceive, how they happened to undergo the fate which they experienced at the close of the last century.

tion to the two regiments of infantry which he had under his command, the count gave him the regiment of Narva, the Carabiniers of Petersburg, a regiment of Cuirassiers and another of Cossacks. This corps forming a division of the army, Souvarof was promoted to a rank analogous to his new command, by being created a major general.

For the space of a year before the arrival of count Weymarn, the Russian troops who were in Poland had been carrying on a war against the confederates, the more furious as Reppin who had the direction of it, was personally interested in the annihilation of the confederation. He had persuaded Catherine that from conviction, interest, or fear, the Poles would not make the least effort to break their chains, and she remained under this impression until facts convinced her of his deception or folly. But to extricate himself from his embarrassment, he had given the officers commanding the different expeditions to quiet the country, the strictest orders to hasten the destruction of the confederacy, and as he could discover no more expeditious method, commanded them to lay waste the provinces in which it flourished, and put the inhabitants to death. The Russians needed no stimulus to carnage, and we may imagine the scene which followed the faithful execution of these orders. But from a fatality which prolonged the scene of horrors, they were not strong enough to overwhelm the confederates at once, so that their persecution only swelled each day the number of the devoted victims. Reppin, on the other hand, did not describe the danger in its true extent and demand adequate re-inforcements, as it would have contradicted his former statement. The philosopher who contemplates this situation of things is obliged to lament for the sake of humanity, that there was not a greater number of blood-thirsty butchers.*

* This correct and abridged narration of the evils which Russia inflicted upon Poland, would create a contemptuous idea of their national character, if the reflecting mind were to forget, how many strange contrasts

The face of the country was extremely favourable to the increase of the number of the confederates and added to the difficulty of extirpating them entirely. All the interior of

enter into the composition of man; how little, those actions which spring from the passions of our nature, are to be considered as proofs of the true disposition; how many disgusting vices are redeemed by the virtues upon which they border: and finally how much, frail, erring humanity is entitled to indulgence.

A friend whose judgment we think discriminating and whom we wish we could name for the honour of this work, in the success of which he has kindly interested himself, has communicated to us his observations upon the Russian character, made after a long residence among them. We are convinced that these remarks are just, because they are consonant to the deductions of our own personal information. We insert them, because they terminate with an anecdote of the same prince Repnin that we have mentioned, although as much to his advantage, as our remarks are to his discredit. The services of prince Repnin have been so beneficial to his country, that we would gladly speak his eulogium, if truth did not require our censure.—We give the note of our friend just as we received it.

“The knowledge of the particular character of the Russian nobles and nation at large, becomes so interesting at a time when the influence of this empire is felt throughout Europe, and of course, the world, that it will doubtless appear useful to remark its principal traits.

“The Russians unite to generous feelings of hospitality, a natural love of glory, which renders them capable of the sublimest efforts. They obey its dictates, though they lead to death itself—the recital of brave actions agitates them, and you may distinguish in the midst of the admiration which they excite, the most ardent desire to acquire celebrity. Riches are not the highest gifts which the Sovereign can bestow—and if we carefully study the Russian character, instead of repeating the remark of a superficial writer. (M. Senac de Methian.) “*I saw nothing in this empire, but diamonds and ribbons.*” we would admire the wisdom and power of the rulers of these vast territories, who have been able to attach such value to this currency of glory (*monnaie de la gloire.*) There is no action which cannot be sufficiently rewarded in their estimation by a badge of honour, and men have even died through grief, at not obtaining those distinctions to which they thought

Poland is full of immense forests, into which vanquished troops may retire as a secure asylum, from their victorious pursuers. In these forests and even in the unwooded plains,

themselves entitled. It may be pardonable to cite a story in support of this assertion, well known in Russia, although foreign to the life of Souvarof.

"A brother of the last prince Repnin had obtained from the empress Catherine II. the command of a corps of the army. Toward the conclusion of a brilliant campaign against the Turks, this general found himself under the necessity of retreating, to avoid being surrounded by a superior force. Aware of the rapid marches of the Turkish cavalry, he ordered his troops to re-cross the Danube, and to protect their passage, remained himself to direct the retreat. His troops had not yet reached the opposite bank of the river, when general Repnin was attacked by such superior numbers, that it was almost hopeless to resist; he did not surrender however until every resource of valour was exhausted. The capture of a Russian general gave this affair all the brilliancy of a victory to the eyes of the Turks. The report and the suffrages of the army would not allow Catherine to accuse her general of having tarnished the lustre of her arms; but misled by the maxim of Mazarin, who trusted armies only to *fortunate generals*, she resolved to employ him no more.

"Silence and neglect inflicted a wound upon the brother of prince Repnin, which nothing could cure. He languished in retirement, and chagrin soon terminated his life. The prince hastened to receive the last sighs of his beloved brother; and soon under the necessity of performing the last sad offices for him, resolved that they should be correspondent to his birth and military services. He conducted the mournful procession to the sepulchre of the princes of Repnin, and at the moment when the earth was about to close over the body of the general, the marshal approached and ordered the coffin to be opened, and taking from his side a sword enriched with diamonds, which the empress Catherine had given him as the reward of one of his victories. "No," said he, "*my brother shall not descend into the tomb, without one mark of honour; this sword, of which he was as worthy as I am, shall be buried with him.*"

"This trait of character, so touching and so noble, is far from being the only one that history can furnish of Russian magnanimity; and if the horri-

the waters from having no outlet, have formed impassable marshes, and as it is necessary, of course, to skirt them, marches are rendered doubly fatiguing. In the heart of the country, where there never existed any regular police as the constitution itself prevented it, the population is scattered, the communication uncertain and hazardous, and the land reduced to cultivation but a small proportion of the whole, when compared with its extent, and the fertility of the soil. Subsistence is of course difficult to be procured. From these circumstances we may easily imagine the embarrassment of an army moving with all the equipage of war in the pursuit of light troops who could collect every day in small bodies, threatening a number of points at once. To prevent them from assembling their forces was the object of the assailants. Notwithstanding the hardiness and obstinacy of the Russian troops, the only ones perhaps in the world who could force these wild asylums, the Poles ought to have made it a work of enormous labour to surmount so many obstacles; but the impartiality of history, rigidly judging every nation, obliges us to confess, that the disunited and unthinking Poles were probably the only people who could have been subdued in the heart of such retreats.

In this state of things, the numerous re-inforcements of excellent troops which count Weymarn received, would or ought to have decided the question in favour of Russia by merely shewing themselves; but a circumstance easy to foresee, obliged the government to weaken its forces in Poland, and of course increased the strength of the confederates, and raised their hopes to the highest pitch.

All the great powers of Europe were attentive and interested spectators of a train of events, which would end in

ble crime of violating tombs is not renewed upon the earth, the sepulchre of the princes of Repnin will never be despoiled of this monument of glory with which fraternal tenderness has so nobly enriched it."

making Poland subordinate and tributary to Russia, or in its incorporation as an integral part of the empire. In either of these cases the resources of Poland would pass into the hands of Russia. This formidable acquisition of power by one of the states could not be viewed with indifference by the rest. The manner in which the different cabinets contemplated this transaction is a convincing proof of the progress which a selfish system of politics had made in Europe. Governed by this fatal sentiment, which is the fruitful source of melancholy catastrophes, each one was anxious for the ruin of its neighbour; until by a just punishment, each one lost in the accomplishment of its desires the power of preserving its own existence.

England did not make the least opposition to the designs of Russia upon Poland, because she wished an intimate alliance with the empress, and really cared little about the independence of a state, buried in the continent of Europe, which had no political influence, no marine, no colonies or commerce, and whose friendship or enmity were of little consequence. France, whose interest it was to preserve the integrity of Poland, as its severance would necessarily augment the power of her three continental rivals, was governed at this time by an able minister, but was led astray by a great delusion.* She neglected to send timely succour to Poland, either by sending her own forces, or by stimulating her allies to avert the threatened ruin. Austria and

* The duke de Choiseul was at this time the principal minister of France. He was bent upon reducing the power of England, which had just before dictated an humiliating peace. This motive was praise-worthy no doubt. But M. de Choiseul thought that one of the means of accomplishing his purpose, was to keep up the troubles in Poland: for he considered this war as employment for the forces of Russia, which would otherwise have been occupied in furthering the views of England. His plan was therefore to give the confederates just as much assistance as would prevent the being crushed by the Russians without its being sufficient to enable

Prussia, calculating upon their position, their troops, and the respect which Russia would be obliged to pay them, soon conceived the idea of partaking in the booty which the latter power wished to reserve entirely to herself. The Ottoman empire alone, actuated by a regard for its own interest, and generosity towards an unfortunate people, resolved to protect the Poles against their oppressors, and declared war against Russia.

As the empress could find sufficient employment for the forces of the Turks to prevent them from sending a numerous army to the relief of the confederates, she did not regard

them to succeed. But M. de Choiseul was badly informed both as to persons and things. How could he be so ignorant of the character of Catherine, as to suppose that in any situation she would have subjected her projects and resources to the disposal of England? and how could he have believed that the Poles would not be ultimately subdued, if they were not assisted with money and officers? He ought to have looked a little less at the present and a little more to the future; he ought to have saved Poland for he could have done it. He had the means of organizing the confederation so as to make it extremely formidable. Sweden and the Ottoman empire would have stepped forward at the demand of France, since the latter did so of its own accord. The united squadrons of the house of Bourbon could have prevented the Russian fleets from annoying the Turks in the middle of their empire. The Tartars of the Crimea alone, led on by French officers, who would have infused courage into them, and taught them the stratagems and resources of European tactics, would have been able to drive back the Russians into the centre of their dominions; and lastly every thing induces us to believe that Austria and Prussia would have remained inactive spectators of the struggle. They had no deep interest in the destruction of Poland; they partook in the spoil when they discovered that Russia would seize the whole, unless they secured a part. It is presumable that they would cheerfully have sacrificed these fragments, if by this means they could have avoided the contiguity of Russia as a neighbour. When we reflect on the state of things at this period, and with what dexterity Catherine avoided the blows that might have been given her, we shall justly appreciate the genius of this illustrious woman, and the strength of her empire.

the danger from this side as very pressing, and sent a part of the troops originally intended for the subjugation of Poland, into the Ottoman provinces. Those which remained were not strong enough to break down the confederation immediately, but sufficiently powerful to prevent the number of its adherents from increasing. To do this more effectually, the Russians continually traversed those parts of the country in which fresh assemblages were most likely to be formed, and endeavoured to diminish, in little daily skirmishes, the troops which the confederates already had. The smaller the force of the Russians was, the more it required talents to direct it; and this war which required, above all things, great activity and the art of surprising the enemy, appeared to be made expressly to give Souvarof an opportunity of displaying his characteristic qualities. Almost all the important operations of the war were directed by him.

During the year 1770, there continued a sort of calm between the confederates and Russians, arising from the attention with which they regarded the movements of the two empires. The Poles, sanguine in the hope that the assistance of the Turks would be efficacious, waited anxiously for their success, to shew themselves with invigorated boldness. The Russians watching the operations of a war whose result was so important for the interest and reputation of their country, disdained in some measure the trifling advantages which they might have gained in Poland, whilst their brethren in arms were in a situation to obtain the most precious and brilliant victories. But the Poles soon discovered from the multiplied defeats and unpardonable conduct of the Turks, that they had calculated too largely upon Ottoman aid; while the Russians saw their highest expectations confirmed by the flight of the Turks across the Danube, the conquest of Moldavia and Wallachia, the conflagration of the Turkish fleet in the Archipelago, and all those celebrated exploits which opened to them a prospect of overthrowing

an empire, whose power their ancestors had often acknowledged. Souvarof, covetous of glory, must have wept with regret at not being able to take a part in these memorable achievements; and he was compelled to call to his recollection the severity of military rules, to prevent himself from abandoning the fields of Poland, barren in laurels, to fly to those where they could have been gathered in abundance. His exploits during the campaign of 1770, were confined to skirmishes with Miaczinski, the leader of the confederates, whom he always beat.

But in 1771, Souvarof had an opportunity of displaying his talents against enemies worthy of him. France alarmed at the progress of Russia, had at last perceived the necessity of administering more effectual relief to the Poles than she had hitherto done. Still however she did not abandon her system of avoiding all new wars. She did not succour Poland by sending armies to her assistance, but by considerable subsidies regularly paid, and by lending her a few chosen officers to put the confederate troops upon a respectable footing. The officer who was pitched upon to manage the relations between Poland and France, was the celebrated Dumouriez.* He had scarcely arrived in the country when

* There was at that time in France (and particularly during the ministry of M. M. de Belle-Isle) a crowd of *men of systems*, who incessantly advanced projects for the regeneration of their country and overthrow of Europe. A reasonable man cannot imagine how these two events are connected, or why it was necessary for other nations to suffer that ours should be renewed. But this was the temper of the fermentation which prevailed in France long before the revolution. It was generally thought, that nothing was as it ought to be, either at home or abroad; and no better employment of the immense powers of France could be conceived, than in overturning the world that it might be rebuilt according to the plans which a number of individuals had provided. These individuals led the minister astray, by offering to do the greatest things with the smallest means, as their genius was to supply the deficiency. Such proposals were very acceptable to a government

every thing felt the influence of this energetic and intelligent but versatile and turbulent character. He communicated to a general council of the confederates, his plan of making all operations conduce to a common end, in directing them by a fixed and uniform system. He introduced discipline among the troops, exercised them, and habituated them to the performance of manœuvres; and was seconded by many of the confederate chiefs in his efforts to give a new aspect to the affairs of the confederation. This union of true patriots, the last hope of Poland, had never been better commanded. Among the leaders of the band, Casimir Pulaski may be especially distinguished. He was a young man, of daring spirit, fertile genius, and intrepid bravery, united to the constancy and warmth of heart of a Sertorius, a Pelagius, or a Scandeberg; characters among the most interesting in history, as nothing can be more worthy of admiration than firmness under misfortune. Casimir Pulaski, the only one remaining of a numerous family, who had flown to arms in the cause of the nation, had retired, after their loss, to almost inaccessible rocks, where he inured himself to a hardy life by the most violent exercises. The address which he acquired in the management of every species of arms, added to his natural strength, made his personal prowess formidable in battle; and this captivating quality so inflamed the youthful warriors who had again flocked to his standard, that he could exact prodigies from them, and rely with the utmost security upon their devotedness to his person. When the

which had at that time little money and few troops. These political partizans were accordingly employed, who had no more effect in deciding the fate of nations, than military partizans have in deciding a campaign. Dumouriez was deeply infected with this strange spirit of the times; and abounding in plans of improvement and organization, would have thrown all Europe into disorder, if his influence had been extensive enough.

found himself sufficiently strong, he descended from the mountains, attacked the Russians to advantage; forced many of their posts, and even threatened Warsaw itself; vigorously sustained a siege in Czenstokow, and at last compelled them to relinquish it; repulsed Souvarof himself at the attack of Landskron, and increased the number of the confederates in all the provinces, as well by adroit and bold emissaries, as by the ardour which his successes had created. By his attention and talents he had already placed the confederation in a formidable attitude, when the presence and counsels of Dumouriez and the money which he brought, completed the organization of this party and gave it the appearance of regular authority.

Such were the two adversaries whom Souvarof had to combat in the campaign of 1771. He believed that promptness in his operations could alone maintain his equality, as the Russians received no reinforcements, and the number of the confederates was augmented every day. Their boldness increased with their numbers. Sava, one of their marshals* had made in the winter of 1771, an incursion into Lithuania. Souvarof had not been slow in pursuing him; but as this country was covered with forests and favourable to the confederates, Sava had been able to escape from the Russian general by dispersing his army into small bodies. The spring was more decisive. Souvarof having fewer natural obstacles to surmount, again pursued Sava. He overtook him on the 26th of April near Schrenski, and defeated him in a bloody battle, in which Sava was wounded. This Pole soon afterwards fell into the hands of the Russians, and was put to death by the soldiers. Souvarof, in the mean time, had pursued his corps, and dispersed or cut in pieces every man.

* This title of marshal, does not, as in the grand armies of Europe, designate a commander in chief. In Poland every man is called so who commands the noblesse and militia of a canton or starosty.

Pulaski advanced to sustain his companion in arms. Souvarof marched against him with three thousand men, routed his troops, and carried off his artillery. Pulaski, rendered furious, summoned all his intrepidity and communicated it to his soldiers. After a terrible combat, he re-took his cannon and retreated, followed by Souvarof. As courageous and active, and almost as accomplished as his adversary, Pulaski manœuvred with dexterity and avoided another engagement. The Russians, seeking battles and victories, did not lose sight of their enemies. Their marches and countermarches, their windings and their feints, would be remarked in history if each one had commanded thirty thousand men. At last Pulaski was deceived by false information, and entangled himself imprudently in a narrow pass. His corps was partly destroyed and he himself obliged to fly with the few who were left.

Dumouriez, in the first impulse of rage which this disaster occasioned, threatened to accuse the brave Pulaski of cowardice. He assembled the wreck of his little army, and united to it all the additional force he could collect. While he was preparing to advance upon Souvarof, the latter had already marched against him, and pressed him so closely as to oblige him to retire under the cannon of Landskronn. This fortress is situated on the summit of the Carpathian mountains, and commands the plain of the Palatinate of Cracow. Behind the height on which it is placed, there is a gentle declivity. In front and on its right flank, are two impregnable precipices thickly covered with wood. Dumouriez occupied this position; resting his right upon the wood, which was defended by two hundred chasseurs with two pieces of cannon. His left was covered by Landskronn. The cannon of the fortress bore upon a height which was at some distance in its rear. Souvarof arrived at this height, having with him three thousand horse, and two thousand five hundred infantry. On an inspection of the ground and position of the enemy, he resolved to attack them, and did not hesitate long about his plan. He

made his cavalry descend into the hollow, to be out of the reach of the cannon of the fortress, and remained with his infantry on the hill to march as the movements of the enemy should require.* Astonished at this bold manœuvre, the Poles, as Souvarof had foreseen, did not dare to attack the Russians in the valley, who then mounted and formed on the hill. The enemy thus attacked in the centre had not force enough to charge this body of cavalry, especially as the infantry was at hand to support them, but abandoned the field. The Cossacks pursued them briskly, took the two pieces of cannon that were in the wood, and made a number

* This narration is taken, in a great measure, from the account which Dumouriez gives, in the 8th chap. vol. 1st of his Life, written by himself. He pretends that Souvarof ought certainly to have been defeated, and that if his troops had charged the Russian cavalry as they ascended from the hollow, before they had time to form, they must have been destroyed. But he adds that he was deserted, and that the different corps to which he had given his orders, instead of fighting, fled away like cowards. We do not undertake to contradict this; but the manœuvre of Souvarof may be justified. It is probable that if eight thousand good troops, protected by good artillery, had occupied the position of Dumouriez, Souvarof, even had he been superior in numbers, would not have begun the attack with his cavalry, at the risk of seeing them destroyed by the cannon, nor would he have attacked such a position in front with infantry. But he knew the sad state of the Polish cavalry and artillery. Hence his manœuvre was bold but not rash, for it facilitated the employment of all his troops. Had he sent his infantry first, the cavalry would have remained idle on the height or in the valley, until the enemy were dislodged from their position. But the ease with which infantry could move their station from place to place, made it proper for them to act behind the cavalry, and they could have poured a destructive fire upon the troops of Dumouriez while advancing against the cavalry in the valley. The assertion of Dumouriez relating to the Poles, who fled when their dearest interests were at stake, an assertion corroborated by many similar events during the war, proves the little reliance that ought to have been had upon that nation, where the gentleman is too free to submit to discipline, and the peasant too much a slave to be a man of courage. When we reflect on the character of the nation, we need seek no further for the causes of their fall.

of prisoners. Damouriez at the head of a small French squadron retreated through the wood of Sucha. The Russians respected this brave little troop and permitted it to escape. They were content with dispersing the Poles, and abandoned the field of battle, which the propinquity of the fortress made untenable. Souvarof, satisfied with having dislodged the enemy, thrown them into confusion, and killed or taken a number of their men, quitted the environs of Landskronn, which he could not besiege for the want of artillery, and flew to perform other exploits. He made himself master of Osvienin and Bolbreck, and renewed the pursuit of Pulaski, who had again appeared in the field. Souvarof chased him from one defile to another, until he was obliged to shut himself up in Czenstokow. This brave confederate could not continue his good fortune, but he preserved his reputation ; and Souvarof himself passed high commendations upon his intelligence and activity. His own activity was almost inconceivable. During the space of seventeen days, after the battle of Landskronn, he passed over an hundred leagues, and never spent forty eight hours without fighting.

Oginski the grand marshal of Lithuania, a man of merit and exceedingly rich and powerful in his country, had not yet openly declared for the confederation. When this party was verging to its ruin, he was earnestly solicited to join it, not only by the confederates themselves, but also by France and Austria. The menaces of Russia at last armed him against her. After speedily collecting a body of two thousand men with some artillery, he attacked on the sixth September, a Russian corps at Radzica, and defeated them entirely with the loss of their commander. But Souvarof was approaching. This last hope of the Polish confederation was destined to be soon destroyed. By the rapidity of his march, he surprised Oginski at Stoulavies, routed his troops and compelled him to fly to Dantzic. This was the last action of importance during the campaign ; but the time that was not employed in

fighting was spent in negociation. The promises of peace and security were urged with such adroitness, that the greatest part of the confederates of Lithuania returned quietly to their homes. Faithful to his promises, Souvarof treated those who submitted with a respect which gave them no desire to resume their arms.

Dumouriez had quitted Poland and was succeeded by the count Viomesnil, in 1772. This skilful and estimable officer, relying more upon the French troops, who were as auxiliaries to the confederates, than the Polish army, was anxious to secure a position with his little corps which should protect them from disasters, and at the same time serve as the foundation of more solid success. He surprised the fort and town of Cracow ; but the confederates were so weakened by the losses of the preceding year, and the Russians had become so strong, that with his small force Viomesnil could not hope to retain the possession. Souvarof had received a supply of artillery, and laid siege to Cracow in the month of March. The confederates and French were soon obliged to evacuate the city ; but they retreated to the fort, where they sustained a siege of six weeks. Want of food and the impossibility of succour at last constrained them to surrender. The same causes, together with the weakness of the garrison successively reduced the towns of Czentokow, Tirnick, Landskronn, &c. to the power of Souvarof.


All the confederates were now dispersed. The chiefs disappeared and retired into other countries. Russia, Prussia and Austria declared, that for the future they would consider the Poles who assembled in arms, as robbers, assassins and incendiaries. The confederation was annihilated ; all hope of independence was lost, and unfortunate Poland waited for the decision of her fate, by the surrounding states.

This decision came speedily enough. On the 5th of Au-

gust, 1772, a treaty between Russia, Austria and Prussia, was signed at Petersburg, by which these states divided a third part of Poland among them, each one according to its convenience; and left this kingdom in such a state of imbecility and degradation that the inhabitants were compelled to look forward to a final and total partition as a probable refuge from interminable evils. Thus was consummated one of the foulest political crimes that history records. Thus two courts, who, as parties to the great confederation upon which the equilibrium of Europe rested, ought to have ranked a respect for the privileges of people and princes among the fundamental maxims of their policy; and who were deeply interested that the balance of power should not be broken down, as their existence might have depended on its preservation, united themselves, to violate the most sacred rights, with a third power, whose ambition and strength might one day menace with the fate of their common victim, those who were now its accomplices.

At the termination of the war in Poland, Souvarof returned to Petersburg, whither his reputation had preceded him. Already he was considered one of the most distinguished officers in the Russian army. His firmness and foresight, the justness of conception with which he had seized the proper manner of making war in Poland, the correctness of his manœuvres, the rapidity of his marches, the ardour which he infused into the soldiers in the midst of fatigues or dangers; in a word, the art of injuring and crippling the enemy, without resorting to the harshness and cruelty which many Russian officers permitted, indicated a genius which could extend the honourable reputation of the Russian arms. The empress regarded Souvarof with a favourable eye. She conferred on him the second class of the military order of St. George, a reward which flattered him more than any other. Throughout the whole of his life, this general had a fondness for decorations and marks of honour; and this ceases to be a frivo-

lous taste when they are really deserved. Souvarof had too lofty a soul to be ambitious of distinctions, which he thought were not his due ; but he had a spirit of emulation which made him desirous of being conspicuous, by rendering useful services to society ; and this feeling, when it exists in a number of individuals, is the most solid foundation of the social state, and the source of its perfection.



CHAPTER III.

Campaigns of Souvarof against the Turks—Rebellion of Pougatchef—Annexation of the peninsula of the Crimea to the Russian empire—Expedition into the Kuban.

NEITHER the profession nor the disposition of Souvarof would permit him to repose in inactivity. He had scarcely arrived at Petersburg when he expressed a desire to be employed in the war which still continued between the Russians and Turks, and not to lay down his arms whilst there was a possibility of using them. The empress perceived that action would prevent his zeal from abating, and attached him to the army of field marshal Romanzof for the campaign of 1773.

This was the fourth year of the war which was undertaken by Turkey to impede the subjugation of Poland, but which ended in opening paths to Russia for the future subjection of Turkey itself. By it the frontiers of Russia were pushed forwards toward the Black Sea, the road of the Kuban and Georgia was opened, and the Tartars of the Crimea prepared by protection for a final reduction to obedience. The Greeks disseminated through all the provinces of European Turkey, were inspired by this war with a hope of deliverance, which thus secretly attached one half of the subjects of the Grand Signior to the cause of Russia. The Turks were led to fear an engagement with their ancient adversaries; and the Russians became persuaded of their superiority. By a necessary consequence, the former would apprehend more danger than really existed, whilst the latter would feel assured of victory when marching against enemies whom they held in contempt.

The enmity between the Russians and Turks may be traced up to the subversion of the empire of Constantinople by the Ottoman sword, and of course the first appearance of the Turks in Europe. The Russians never ceased to consider them as spoilers, who snatched from them the prey to which they were naturally entitled. Ever since the establishment of the Selavi in those immense countries situated between the Danube the Black Sea and the Frozen Ocean, they had unceasingly disturbed the empire of Constantinople by their predatory incursions, for they coveted this rich inheritance as an appendage to their vast domains. These barbarians could be restrained from plundering, only by their conversion to the Christian religion, which was performed by Grecian missionaries. The two nations then became connected by the strongest tie which could at that day bind man to man; and the schism of the Greek and Latin churches confined the adherents of the former to only two classes, those who followed the laws of the emperors of Constantinople and those who obeyed the grand dukes of Russia. Of course when Constantinople fell into the hands of the infidels, the dukes of Russia considered themselves as the legitimate directors of a flock, which would be otherwise isolated and abandoned.

But although the grand dukes of Russia might have avowed this pretension, their power was not great enough to make it a dangerous one to the Turks. It would have been difficult for them to shake off the yoke of the Tartars descendants of Gengis-khan, who had reigned for a long time on the banks of the Volga, and whose posterity occupied the Crimea in the time of Catharine. These Tartars had embraced Mahometanism. Their number and warlike disposition made them formidable to the Russians and the position of their country made it an intermediate tract between the new conquests of the Turks and the territory of the Czars. The emperor of the Turks was considered by these Tartars as the head of their faith since he had succeeded the caliphs in their posses-

sions and their dignity of vicars of Mahomet. By this title they recognised his right of ordering them to assist whenever he intended to wage war against the infidels; so that far from its being in the power of the Czars to take advantage of their being the only protectors of the Greek church, to make partizans in the territories of the Grand Signior, and thus eventually succeed the emperors of the east, it was in fact the Grand Signior who menaced the Czars with subjection by the aid of a warlike people, who were devoted to his cause from his title of chief of the Mahometan religion.

The attention of the Russians was therefore turned towards the defence of their frontiers from the incursions of the Tartars of the Crimea, who could at almost any moment penetrate into their fairest provinces, and carry desolation into the heart of the empire. It became a part of the policy of the Czars, as soon as they had any policy, to reduce these terrible enemies to subjection by force, or to profit by their divisions among themselves and disputes with the Divan, and overcome them by stratagem. Peter I. attempted it, but failed. The project of seating himself upon the throne of the Sultans has been attributed to this prince, when, in truth, he owed the stability of his own to the effeminacy and degeneracy of the Turkish emperors. Peter was never in a situation to dream of the conquest of Constantinople. The first person who conceived the possibility of it, and calculated the means by which Russia might succeed, was field marshall Munich.* This great man saw in a moment that one part

* This general was born in the Dutchy of Oldenburg in the Circle of Lower Saxony, and entered the Russian service during the reign of the empress Anne. His victories over the Poles, the Turks, and the Tartars are sufficiently well known. He united to his military talents a mind of bold conceptions, a passionate love of glory, an austerity of manners, and a cruelty of character, which neither good or bad fortune could destroy or weaken. He approaches nearer to the character of Hannibal than any other celebrated modern. He had the fertile, daring, and inflexible genius of the Carthagi-

of the means was wanting, without which all the rest would be useless—the conquest of the Crimea. He saw that Russia could never be a compact empire, that she could not act upon a regular plan of aggrandizement, and possess permanent sources of internal prosperity, without the possession of the Crimea. All that military tactics could suggest was employed by Munich to effect its reduction; but led away by his fierce and austere disposition, he mistook the proper method. It was not by force that the Tartars could be reduced; they could be conquered but not subdued. After many bloody campaigns, Munich found himself obliged to evacuate the Crimea, and accordingly withdrew from it, with less than a third part of the army which he had conducted thither.

In the war which broke out in 1769, between Russia and Turkey, the latter proved to her rival how deep an injury could be inflicted by directing the Tartars against her. At the first signal from Constantinople, the Khan of the Crimea invaded New Servia, set fire to the villages and gathered crops, massacred the inhabitants, drove away the cattle, and left not the least trace of vegetation or mark of a human dwelling in this unhappy country. The subsequent multiplied victories over the Turks had not sufficient influence to enrol the Crimea on the list of the Russian provinces; for

nian hero; but it was this very inflexibility that prevented him from subduing the Tartars of the Crimea. He could not stop to negotiate or intrigue, but depended solely on the sabre and cannon. The result was that he beat the Tartars in every engagement: but fatigued with the obstinacy of these people, and worn out by the unconquerable perseverance with which they returned to the combat after so many defeats, and at last obliged to stop short through the failure of his means of subsistence, Munich evacuated the Crimea, and led back into Russia an army which was not in a state to act against any other enemies. We shall see in the sequel how a man, less perfect though more adroit than Munich, seized the true method of subjecting the Tartars to the yoke, and effected that important revolution which Munich attempted in vain.

even a formal cession by the Grand Signior would not have induced a country which recognized him only as lord paramount, and not as its immediate sovereign, to have submitted without resistance. All that the empress could obtain was a peace, which stipulated that the Tartars should be entirely independent of the Porte, which had for a long time been endeavouring to enslave them; that the election of the Khan should not require the confirmation of the Divan, and that they should pay no more tribute. By this apparent kindness for this people, and the dissimulation of a profound policy, which forgot present outrages in the prospect of future advantages, Catharine weakened the Tartars by detaching them from a powerful protector. On the other hand, by the acquisition of a part of Bessarabia, she in some measure surrounded the Crimea, and impeded its direct communication with Turkey.

In the relative situation of these two empires every circumstance seemed to predict, that the one which possessed all the vigour of youth was about to triumph over the other, which was declining into the infirmity of age, through the vices of effeminacy and luxury. The struggle had been long continued, but appeared about to terminate, when Souvarof arrived to assist in the exertions of his countrymen, and to contribute by his efforts to stamp a superiority upon the arms of Russia, which afterwards proved the source of his fame.

Souvarof intended to join the army which was in Moldavia, but first visited Jassy, the head quarters of marshal Romanzof. A few days afterwards he received orders to join the division of the army which was in Wallachia, under the command of general Soltikof. He was attached to this corps, and the command of a detachment consisting of four battalions of infantry, eight squadrons of cavalry and several hundred Cossacks, was entrusted to him. He was stationed at the convent of Nigojeschti, on the left bank of the Danube, which is

at that place very broad. The Turks occupied the little village of Turtukay, on the right bank. The possession of this place was important to them, as it prevented the Russians from crossing, and kept open the communication with the sea, from which all their supplies were drawn. They had therefore a flotilla at Turtuka. Their camp was strongly fortified, and batteries of heavy artillery defended the bank of the river. Souvarof resolved to destroy the flotilla and the town. After reconnoitering the country, he found that about a mile from his post down the river, there was a convenient place for crossing, and immediately opposite to it, an eminence which commanded the Turkish camp, and which they had neglected to occupy. This place was pitched upon for the passage, and the better to conceal his design from the Turks, Souvarof embarked his troops on the little river Artieh, which runs into the Danube, and made them descend in the night to the appointed spot. The next morning the troops were wafted across the river and effected their landing in spite of the fire of the Turks, when Souvarof ordered one of his colonels to march with some companies of infantry, to destroy the flotilla, and detached another to seize upon a redoubt which protected the town; hastening himself with the main body to secure the height from which he could observe and assist both detachments. Every thing succeeded to his wish. The flotilla and the magazines in the town were burned, and fourteen pieces of cannon which could not be carried away, were thrown into the river. Souvarof re-embarked his troops and resumed his former position, having lost in this enterprize only sixty men.

The extreme anxiety of Souvarof to keep the enemy in continual alarm, and the fatigue that he suffered by accustoming his troops to a habit of unceasing activity, so inflamed his blood, that it brought on a fever which obliged him to leave his detachment. In the interval of his absence, the grand army under the orders of marshal Romanzof, made

but slow progress, from the failure of their provisions ; for hunger was a more cruel enemy to them than the Turks. This deficiency of subsistence may be easily supposed to have occurred in a country so miserably cultivated as Moldavia, and which besides, had been desolated for three successive campaigns, by the necessity of furnishing supplies for two great armies. It was this circumstance which rendered the posts communicating with the sea so important. For this reason the Turks had again occupied Turtukay after the retreat of the Russians, and had strengthened the ruins of the town by additional fortifications, during the absence of Souvarof. He was no sooner informed of this proceeding, than he resolved, feeble as he was, to return immediately to his detachment. He found it increased by two battalions. The Turks had formed on the banks of the river below Turtukay, an entrenched camp, which extended in the form of an amphitheatre, and embraced in its range all the surrounding eminences. Souvarof examined their position, and resolved to drive them from it. He divided his flotilla into three parts, and gave the command of the one which was to pass the river first to colonel Batuvin. These troops landed successfully, and possessed themselves of many of the outward redoubts of the Turks. Souvarof followed his colonel with the second division ; but the current of the river carried his boats considerably below the place of landing, and when he succeeded in regaining it, he found that Batuvin was stopped by the whole Turkish army, which appeared determined to defend its entrenchments. Souvarof determined on the other hand to carry them, marched against the enemy in three columns. The battle was terrible—the ground disputed inch by inch. Souvarof who possessed already the art of inspiring his men with confidence, moved from place to place, animating them by his presence and exhortations, and sustaining their ardour by promises of a rich booty. Intrepidity was at last rewarded. The entrenchments were carried, and a thousand Turks bit the dust. Eighteen cannon, twenty-four boats, and the entire

camp of the enemy fell into the hands of the conquerors. The Turks attempted no more to fortify Turtukay, and were thus deprived of a post of the most material importance.

After this advantage was gained, the presence of Sourarof was thought necessary at the head quarters of marshal Romanzof, and he received the command of a corps of the army, encamped at Chirschowa on the right bank of the Danube. The main body was on the same side of the river, and the sole object of the rest of the campaign was to retain this position. Innumerable engagements were the consequence of this plan; for the Turks multiply their attacks more than any troops in the world, and are perhaps the most difficult to be entirely destroyed. The reason of this is, that they fly into the fields at the first encounter, so that their loss is not as great as it would be, were the battle more obstinately contested. Thus they are always in a situation to return to the charge with fresh troops, and in two or three days after a defeat, their numerous squadrons astonish their adversaries, who had supposed them entirely dispersed. The greatest losses sustained by the Turks in the two last wars with Russia, were in the defence of fortified places, which were at last carried by perseverance. The only way to disperse the irregular bands of Turks who hovered around the army, would have been to press them warmly and unceasingly. But the face of the country, and the impossibility of procuring subsistence for men or horses, prevented the Russians from pursuing this plan; for the Turks in their flight devastated the country through which they passed, and thus opposed an insurmountable barrier to the progress of their conquerors. For this reason, the first war which Catharine carried on against the Turks, was not productive of any decisive result, although brilliant victories were gained by her generals, and she herself conceived hopes of the most extensive success. As Russia did not possess Oczakof or the Crimea, the position of her armies on the banks of the Danube became untenable.

All that could have been expected from the peace which terminated this war, was leisure to digest plans, and prepare the means of future conquests. The second war of which we are now treating, then became necessary, to carry these schemes into effect; and another war will at some future day be undertaken, for the purpose of deciding the fate of the Ottoman empire on both shores of the Euxine; but the issue cannot be foreseen by human eye.

The health of Souvarof was at this time so shattered, that in order to restore it, he was obliged to spend the winter in tranquillity at Kiow. In the beginning of April, 1774, he rejoined the army, with the rank of lieutenant general, to which the empress had promoted him as a reward for his services. He commanded a division of twelve thousand men. The campaign passed away like the preceding one, without any great military events. The only action worthy of being mentioned was, the victory which general Kamenski, strengthened by Souvarof and a part of his corps, gained over the Turkish army commanded by the Reis-Effendi and the Aga of the Janissaries, near the little town of Kosloudje. The object of the Turks was to drive the Russians to the left bank of the Danube. The battle was well contested; but the valour of the Russians, and the energy and precision of the orders of their generals, at last decided the contest; for skilful manœuvres were impossible in a broken country, against enemies who fought in a confused and irregular manner. Souvarof and Kamenski were at first attacked, but they soon repulsed the Turks, and became the assailants in their turn. They had only fifteen thousand men; the enemy had forty thousand. Notwithstanding this disproportion the Russians routed the Turks completely, chased them from one post to another, seized their artillery and their camp, killed three thousand of their men, and made a prodigious number of prisoners. The Empress, however, became alarmed at the consequences of the war. The disordered state of her financ-

es, and the clamour of her subjects plainly pointed out the necessity of peace. She had gained by the war a fair portion of the territory of Poland and an unlimited influence over that whole kingdom. She had made the Turks renounce the protection of that ill-fated State. She had made them cede to the Russians the territory of Asoph, and the right of navigating the Black Sea, with a free passage of the Dardanelles. She had forced them to acknowledge the disputed privileges of the Tartars of the Crimea and the Kuban, and to recognize their independence. Catharine ought to have thought herself fortunate in being able to terminate hostilities on such favorable terms. Peace was concluded at Kainardji in the year 1774.

This appeared to be a time of rest for Souvarof; but fortune ministering to his wishes had thrown him in the midst of an age fertile in great events, to give him an opportunity of displaying his persevering activity. Before the conclusion of the Turkish war, the internal commotions in the provinces of Russia had proceeded to an alarming height, and she was soon obliged to resort to her best troops and best generals, in order to appease them. Souvarof had acquired a title to be ranked among the latter. In Turkey as in Poland he evinced an acuteness in discovering the proper points of attack, and the important positions to occupy, a flexibility which enabled him to profit by the faults of his enemies, or to lead them into errors, an intrepidity in battle and animation in the pursuit of the fugitive foe, which marked him as one of those men to whom fortune yields every thing, because they assume the same ascendancy over her, that she does over the generality of mankind. Catharine was too well acquainted with the characters of her subjects to lose an opportunity of employing Souvarof, in the increase of her glory or the defence of her crown. As the peace enabled her to dispose of her armies, she hastened to send him with the division which he commanded against the celebrated Pougatchef.

The rebellion of this Cossack was an extraordinary event, which furnished instruction to Europe, and even to the court of Petersburg, in relation to the true state of the interior of the Russian empire. It proved that the clergy were even more discontented than the nobles, that the people were harassed and weary of the government, and that Catharine did not reign over the hearts of the Russians, but was considered by them as a stranger, while Peter III. was regretted as a lineal descendant of Peter I. It demonstrated that in the vast solitudes in the interior of the empire a party can be formed and organized, can approach the populated provinces and unite them to it by force or persuasion, and spreading with the rapidity of a conflagration over an immense tract of country, threaten to overwhelm the throne and empire with ruin, before the account of its existence has reached the distant court. But Europe might have learned at the same time how necessary and precious to a state is a disciplined army attached to its leaders; and how powerfully habits of obedience and regularity, the principal virtues of a soldier, become the pledge of public tranquillity and safety. If the Russian army had been less inured to discipline; if, from living at home, they had contracted more of a civil and less of a military temper, there would have been an end of the reign of Catharine, and of the existence of Russia as a civilized country. The troops, from being in the same class of society as the peasants, and destitute of the spirit of a military life, would have been gained over by the rebels, and Russia rent to the centre by licentious bands of her own children, would have fallen into a state of barbarism, worse than that from which she had just emerged after a night of ages. The danger from this source has attracted the attention of the government, and since the revolt of Pougatchef, a better division of the troops, and the erection of numerous fortresses, have secured the interior of the empire from similar disasters in future.

Pougatchef was a Cossack of the Don. After having serv.

ed fifteen years in the Russian army, at first as a private and then as an officer, he felt an inclination to retire, and demanded his discharge. This was refused, and he fled and concealed himself in a convent of monks in Little Russia. His person is said to have resembled that of Peter III. the dethroned husband of Catharine II. The clergy were at this time exasperated against the empress, who had deprived them of many of their privileges, and the reciprocal communication of their dissatisfaction, nourished and increased the resentment of all. The monks with whom Pougatchef had taken refuge, finding him to be a man of enterprise, and willing to profit by his resemblance to the late emperor, thought to confer a benefit on the clerical order, by making him pass for that prince, and by creating a party under this pretext, after the example of many impostors, who had already made the experiment since the tragical death of the unfortunate Peter. They instructed Pougatchef accordingly, and furnished him with money to support his assumed character. His first effort to obtain followers was made among the Cossacks of the Don, a great number of whom were seduced by his arts. He then passed over with them to the wild country on the other side of the Volga in the government of Orenbourg, where his partizans were increased every day by the accession of all the discontented vagabonds and desperadoes. Having thus acquired strength to enforce his claims, he sallied forth from the desert, and after gaining many advantages over the Russian troops, found himself able to lay siege to Orenbourg. He did not succeed in making himself master of this place, but the garrison were obliged to shut themselves up in their fortifications, and consequently left the whole country open to him. Advancing as a Conqueror, Pougatchef saw whole tribes of hunters and shepherds flock to his standards; and the agriculturists soon abandoned their villages and rustic employments to arrange themselves under his banners. The insurrection gradually became more formidable. The garrisons of all the towns

were confined to their forts, through fear of the prodigious number of the rebels. Pougatchef had already advanced to the heart of the empire, and menaced Moscow, which contained only six hundred troops, and where he would have found a hundred thousand slaves who would gladly have joined him, when the empress yielded to the necessity of opposing the most urgent danger, and resolved to weaken her army in Turkey, by sending a detachment under general Bibikof to oppose the progress of Pougatchef,

As soon as the troops of the empress were collected in sufficient numbers to take the field, affairs wore a more favourable aspect. But during this interval the force of the rebels was so prodigiously increased that it required many obstinate battles to break their power. The generals Gallitzin and Potemkin, and colonel Michelson were successively employed in this important service. The last gained many victories over Pougatchef and at length compelled him to re-pass the Volga and take refuge in the deserts, accompanied by only three hundred Cossacks. But fresh partizans came in, and a little time put him again at the head of a considerable force, on the left bank of the Volga. Almost the whole of the Russian army was at this time employed against the Turks. The generals who had been detached against Pougatchef had received no reinforcements, and their heavy losses of men disabled them from undertaking any important enterprise. Pougatchef profitted by their weakness, and spoke frequently and familiarly of marching to Moscow; and the troops of Catharine would probably have been obliged to bend to the storm. But just at this momentous period, peace was concluded with Turkey; and Catharine, perceiving the necessity of crushing a revolt which had already cost the lives of four or five thousand of her subjects, and laid three hundred villages and towns in ashes, dispatched count Panin, who had just taken Bender, with a sufficient number of troops to put an instant termination to this horrible war.

The division of Souvarof was part of the army destined for this purpose ; but he had no opportunity of adding to the fame that he had already acquired. Michelson, to whom count Panin had sent a supply of fresh troops, renewed the pursuit of Pougatchef with such vigour that the rebel, after having seen almost all his adherents cut to pieces, and the remainder dispersed, was obliged to fly for his personal safety, and pass the Volga by swimming. He found shelter in the heaths of Oural where some few of his friends joined him ; but his misfortunes converted even these into traitors to his cause. Seduced by the gold and the promises of the Russians, three of the Cossacks who had been most faithful to his interest, seized him and delivered him bound to Michelson, who sent him immediately to general Panin. In a short time afterwards he was executed at Moscow, and the rebellion ended with his life. Souvarof retired from this campaign with the satisfaction of being able to say, that there had not been a single event in the reign of Catharine, in which he had not been personally engaged for the benefit of his country.

After this expedition the army was placed in winter quarters at Sinbirsk near Moscow. The division of Souvarof was stationed in the governments of Penza and Casan. This interval of quiet afforded him an opportunity of arranging his domestic affairs, and his presence was frequently necessary at Moscow. In the course of the winter of 1775, he there espoused the princess Barba Ivanovna, daughter of the prince Ivan Prosorovski, a general of high character, with whom Souvarof had been intimately acquainted in Poland and Turkey. This alliance, flattering for both, was the result of a mutual esteem ; but Souvarof had arrived at a time of life, when a sober calculation of the chances of happiness, tempers and directs in some measure, the feelings of the heart. The event did not equal the expectations he was led to form. Whether it was his fault or not, will be discussed by and by, when we speak of the consequences of his marriage.

In the mean time Catharine, who had only assented to peace, that she might arrange, more at leisure, the preparations for a more successful war, did not lose sight of her claims upon Turkey, and was perhaps stimulated to enforce them by the difficulty of success. She had freed the Tartars of the Crimea from the protection of the grand signior, and given them independence only to further the project of subduing them; for this plan was carefully and continually encouraged by her principal minister and highest favourite, who had such an influence over her resolutions, that he shared her authority in the empire. This minister, who possessed a character so bold, that he thought nothing impossible, and so flexible, that he could employ various means to arrive at his ends, had distinctly perceived that the Tartars could not be subdued by braving their ferocious courage; but that it was a surer method to ensnare their ardent and unwary tempers, and to make them throw themselves into the trap, by feigning the utmost regard for their welfare. For the success of this scheme he was personally responsible.

It is here that we find the well known Potemkin first appearing in the political drama; a man at the same time so extraordinary and common, so great and contemptible, so active and indolent, so persevering in some of his plans, so irresolute and ridiculous in others, so disproportioned in all; this character incomprehensible to other nations, but a finished model of a genuine Russian, with all his virtues and all his vices; this person, in fine, who played such a part in Russia during twenty years, that he must be considered as the second ruler of its destinies. He will make a conspicuous figure in this history, not only on account of his influence over the transactions of the Russian empire generally, but from the peculiar situation in which he stood with regard to Souvarof, whose genius, bravery, and originality he could not help esteeming.* Our hero becoming every day a more

* He was jealous nevertheless of the decision which marked the cha-

distinguished character developed more and more that systematic and studied singularity, for which he was afterwards so remarkable, and which, as it was founded upon a deep acquaintance with the national character, became the means of conducting the Russians to surprising triumphs.*

racter of Souvarof. Like all ambitious men who surround a court, enjoying favour and power, Potemkin disliked whatever was brilliant enough to outshine his merit, or too stubborn to bend to his will. Potemkin could not conceal from himself the military superiority of Souvarof; nor could he like a man who claiming no title of advancement but his sword, ever fawn, upon greatness. But justice to the character of Potemkin requires it to be mentioned, that he constantly employed Souvarof, and preferred him before all other candidates to conduct important expeditions. This celebrated favorite, amidst a crowd of faults, had the remarkable quality of being passionately devoted to the glory of his country and sovereign. History will pardon many of his vices for the sake of this one virtue. He is somewhat excusable for entertaining sometimes a little jealousy, of a man whose merit would have inflamed the hatred of most favorites. "He plays the fool sometimes," said he to the Austrian general Jordis, speaking of Souvarof, "but with all his follies he is full of spirit and versed in statagem." "He deserves to be noticed."

* All the sources of information that we have examined in Russia and elsewhere, on the subject of Souvarof, and our own reflections upon his conduct in the most important parts of his life, lead to this result, that his originality and uncouth manners, although sometimes extravagant, were purposely adopted. So far from degrading his character as some splenetic writers have thought, this circumstance affords a new proof of his penetrating genius. The same person from whom we received the note upon prince Repnin, inserted in a preceding chapter, has transmitted us an interesting one upon the origin of the singularities of Souvarof. We are persuaded that it narrates one of the principal causes, if not the only one, of those singularities, about which so much has been said. We insert the note entire, because it mentions some circumstances relative to Catharine II. which the admirers of that great princess will perhaps read with pleasure.

"Souvarof animated, like Themistocles, by the glory of those who had gone before him, and tormented by an excessive anxiety to acquire renown, had too much sense to neglect the preliminary step of attracting the atten-

The character of Potemkin, is liable to the strange reproach, of having augmented himself the obstacles to the execution of his own plans : for his impetuous temper precipitated or *multiplied* his measures : but we cannot refuse him the glory of having conceived brilliant and useful schemes for the advancement of his country, and comprehended with justness the manner of their execution. He was at this time entirely occupied with the dazzling idea, of wresting the domination of Greece from Ottoman hands, and conferring it upon Russia. He wished to restore this enchanting country to a degree of civilization, which might again light up its ancient splendour. He was anxious that an intimate connexion between Russia and Greece might excite a happy emula-

tion of his sovereign. Placed in a country where favour, was often and easily bestowed upon the first orders of nobility, the desire of becoming useful, made him study how to distinguish himself from his numerous rivals, the greater part of whom were of higher rank than himself. The empress furnished him with the opportunity which his zeal and conscientiousness of his own powers, made him seek with avidity. He had observed that Catharine was fond of drawing around her all her subjects from whom she expected to derive any assistance, and that to enable herself to understand their characters more intimately, she frequently laid aside the majesty of the throne, to mix with them as a friend to whom they might freely express their opinions.

“ It is known to every one who was honored by the familiar conversation of this princess, that she had the great art of never allowing herself to be interrogated, and that even during the moments of utmost freedom no one could even turn the conversation from those subjects, on which she wished it to remain. On one of these occasions, after citing a long list of illustrious names, she remarked that almost all the greatest men, who were spoken of in history, had some peculiarities in their habits, which neither their own exertions, nor their great reputation, nor time itself, could ever destroy. She added, that a man of a great soul, deeply occupied with his designs, no doubt, disdained to labour seriously in the reformation of slight shades of character, which were not of much consequence, and which served to distinguish him from the croud.

tion between the two nations, and he was desirous of obtaining for his sovereign an empire the more compact, as by their junction the most formidable enemy of Greece would become its most powerful protector, and no foreign state would be able to break the ties which connected them, or disturb their harmony. This noble project fired the soul of Catharine, AS TENDERLY SENSIBLE of glory as her minister. All their conversation, all their correspondence, related to this one subject. The treasures and the soldiers of the Empire were appropriated to this object alone, and the greatness of the remuneration which they had in view made no sacrifice appear difficult or costly.

“ But Potemkin knew perfectly well that the Crimea was the key to the Ottoman empire, the road to its capital, and that the crown of the ancient eastern empire was reserved

“ This remark of Catharine, casually made, became for Souvarof the subject of profound thought. He reflected that if great actions alone are able to attract the attention of kings and nations, a man who felt himself zealous and able, should yield to the desire of being conspicuous, even from his singularities, after having resolved never to employ these means to arrive at any but great and useful ends.

“ Constancy in their pursuits is the characteristic of great minds. From the moment that Souvarof adopted his resolution until his last sigh, he was faithful to the system he had chosen. His prophetic mind foresaw, that as soon as success had crowned his efforts, the singularity which at first excited the astonishment, would acquire for him the confidence of his soldiers. Experience soon established what his genius had predicted, and confirmed him in his system, by showing the influence which it produced.

“ Such is the origin of those peculiarities by which Souvarof acquired over soldiers who scarcely knew any thing but how to obey, an ascendancy which irresistibly led them to victory. If history could reveal all the anecdotes of this illustrious man, philosophers would applaud him for often taking shelter under his singularity; in order to present to view, strong and unwelcome truths, which a fear of offending the majesty of the throne, had buried in a timid and respectful silence.”

for the person who held the sceptre of that country. To obtain this sceptre for his sovereign, he pretended to hold it by permission of its actual possessors. The Tartars were divided into three parties ; one wished to seek the protection of Russia, another that of the Porte, and a third was in favour of entire independence. The reigning Khan Devlet Guerai, a zealous mahometan, was at the head of those who wished to put themselves under the protection of the chief of the mahometan religion. Against him the enmity of Potemkin was particularly directed. He established himself at Cherson, within reach of the Crimea. Under the pretence of exercising his troops, he formed various camps, assembled a considerable army, built fortresses and strengthened those places where fortifications had been already erected, without ceasing for a moment to foment the mutual animosity between the parties in the Crimea. Intrigues were carried on at the same time, both in that country and the Kuban.* He succeeded in gaining over many petty Khans and Myrzas in these countries, by magnificent promises, and persuaded them to submit voluntarily to the authority of the empress of Russia, to whom they swore allegiance. By these means he augmented the Russian party, and diminished the others in proportion ; and when the favourable moment arrived, alledging that his sovereign had just cause of complaint against the Khan, for inordinate partiality to the Turks, and for having neglected to perform the stipulations of the last treaty, he suddenly

* The Kuban is a vast province, one side of which is washed by the sea of Asoph and which extends from the Don and Caspian Sea to the mountains of Caucasus. This country is inhabited by tribes of Tartars of the same great family with those of the Crimea. The incursions of these Tartars were extremely dangerous to the governments of Asoph and Astrachan, as the Kuban is situated behind those provinces. The possession of it, moreover, assured to Russia the entire command of a Sea, over which she already exercised some controul, and gave her natural boundaries of impregnable force in the mountains of Caucasus.

ordered his troops to enter the Crimea, but at the same time commanded them to be content with intimidating the Khan, and to connive at his escape. This prince, either too weak for resistance, or badly advised, took advantage of the opportunity afforded to him. Immediately after his flight Potemkin affectedly alarmed at their armies being without a chief, made them elect in his place Shaim Guerai, a prince of the house of Gengis Khan, but entirely devoted to the interests of Russia. His first act of authority was to send an ambassador to Catharine, soliciting her protection for his people. The request was graciously granted; the designs of the Russians acquired a colour of justice, and they became more than half masters of a country, where they had a legal pretence for continuing their troops. Souvarof was among the number of the generals chosen by Potemkin, to occupy the Crimea, and watch the motions of the Tartars.

But the ambition of Catharine was not satisfied. Shaim Guerai, though but the shadow of a sovereign, had the name of king, and Catharine aspired to the name as well as the substance of power. To gratify her, Potemkin renewed his intrigues which he seconded by menaces, and the terrified Khan consented to yield up his crown and acknowledge the empress as his sovereign, on condition of receiving a pension of two hundred thousand roubles. Catharine immediately issued a manifesto in which, under the pretence of assigning fixed and visible boundaries to her empire, and of maintaining perpetual peace (a specious argument, but in this instance destitute of truth or justice) she annexed to her territories not only the Crimea, but also the island of Taman, and the Kuban; for the latter had been ensnared like the Tartars of Crimea. Her troops finished the affair by penetrating into all parts of the Crimea, and the other countries which Russia had resolved to possess. They occupied the fortresses, and each chief of the different divisions of the army was invested with the power of receiving the oath of fidelity from the Tar-

tars. Souvarof was sent into the Kuban with this commission, and made commander in chief of all the troops stationed in that country.

It was a memorable day that saw the fierce descendants of Gengis Khan, the conquerors of half the world, the ancient masters of the Russians, whose prince was obliged to bow the knee when he presented the yearly tribute to the Tartar Khan, reduced to the necessity of prostrating themselves before their former slaves, and compelled to become the humble subjects of a colossal empire, whose grandeur had been swelled by the domains of their ancestors. It was a day worthy of being cited from a host of years, when a christian people, avenging the long misfortunes of their brethren, planted the standard of the cross in the face of a hostile religion, and in this menacing attitude which pointed out to the enemies of the faith the fate that awaited them, announced to the world a revolution, which at some future day would change the appearance of Europe and of Asia. If there ever was a conquest that could exalt the hopes of the successful party, weaken the courage of the vanquished, attract the notice of the nations of the globe, and open an unbounded field for the meditation of philosophers, it was the conquest of the Crimea and the Kuban by the Russian armies.

After the entire submission of the people of these two countries and the conclusion of the ceremony by which they acknowledged themselves subjects, the different corps of the Russian army were dispersed into various posts. Souvarof remained in the Kuban. He had administered the oath of fidelity with the utmost solemnity, and spared no pains to attach the inhabitants to the Russian cause ; for he wisely supposed that though their resistance had been crushed, their friendship had not been conciliated. But he carefully provided every method of security, in case his efforts to gain their hearts were unsuccessful. The troops under his command

consisting of five regiments of infantry, ten squadrons of dragoons, twenty of hussars and twenty-five of Cossacks, were distributed in various quarters; part of them in the environs of the ancient fort of Koppil, part in the entrenchments near Taman on the Black Sea, and the rest were stationed in the plains of Taman near Asoph, occupying lines defended by redoubts and little forts constructed many years before, to protect the government of Asoph against the plundering incursions of the Circassians. These lines now became useful to the Russians on another account, as they were the key to the Kuban, and secured this new possession from the insurrection of the Tartars. Souvarof repaired and increased them; and under his directions the forts became so strong as to be out of all danger of attack, from a nation who were ignorant of the use of artillery. During the winter of 1777, and the spring of the following year, Souvarof employed three thousand men upon these works, and pushed them forward with such vigour, that the general who succeeded him had scarcely any addition to make. In the summer of 1778 Souvarof was ordered to repair to the Crimea, to supply the place of Prince Prosorowski, and the command of all the troops in the Crimea, even to the Dnieper, was bestowed upon him. The whole consisted of about fifty thousand men, forming the most advanced division of the grand army, under the orders of field marshal Romanzof.

In the month of August, the Turkish fleet, of a hundred and sixty sail, appeared off the Crimea, and although war had not been declared between the Russians and Turks, the latter thought themselves as much entitled to the Crimea as the former, and prepared to affect a landing; having first sent a formal protest to general Souvarof against the occupancy of that country by the Russians. The danger was urgent. The Turks had a formidable force, and the Russians had not completed their plans of defence. The genius

of Souvarof extricated them from their embarrassment. He replied to the protest by immediately transporting his artillery to the threatened points, and placed behind it lines of infantry, ready to fire upon the enemy if they attempted to land. The Turks had no orders to fight. It must be presumed that they only intended to intimidate the Russians, and thus acquire a footing in the Crimea. The bold aspect of Souvarof on the contrary, intimidated them ; and they retired. Thus our hero, to whom all nature furnished not a single object of fear, conquered without a battle.

He would in all probability have repulsed the Turks, had they attempted to force a landing. The empress, to testify her satisfaction, conferred on him the order of S. Alexander, and a snuff-box enriched with diamonds, which she had herself used.

Souvarof returned some time after this to the command of the Kuban ; whose refractory inhabitants required the controul of an officer of genius. He gave two grand entertainments to the hordes of Nogay Tartars. Three thousand of them attended the first, and nearly six thousand the second. A hundred oxen, eight hundred sheep, and thirty-two thousand pints of brandy, were prepared for this feast. During the height of their festivity the animated Tartars were unbounded in their professions of attachment. All the chiefs, at the suggestion of Souvarof, swore upon the Koran to observe good faith and obedience to the Empress, whom they acknowledged to be their sovereign. But the fumes of the liquor had scarcely evaporated, when they repented of their oath. An insurrection broke out in the hordes who had been just subdued, and symptoms of dissatisfaction appeared among the Tartars of the Crimea, and the island of Taman. The Russians endeavoured to arrest many of the Khans, accused of being the authors of these troubles ; but they escaped, and retired to the mountains of the Kuban, where they increased

the number of the discontented. The court of Petersburg concluded that some decisive step was necessary to reduce these people, who seemed determined that the Russians should never be peaceable possessors of their country. Souvarof therefore received orders, to pursue the rebels into the interior, and subdue them effectually, either by carrying them off, dispersing, or destroying them. In the execution of these orders, his march was equally bold and painful. He passed the Kuban river, and bent his course towards the mountains of Caucasus, where the Nogays had taken refuge. The difficulties which he had to surmount are almost inconceivable. There was no road ; and the torrents which obstructed his progress in their descent from the mountains, the steep rocks surmounted by thick woods on one hand and marshy vallies on the other, added to scanty means of subsistence, all contributed to render the march fatiguing. It was necessary, moreover, to move with precaution, lest the Nogays should suspect and discover them. Nevertheless, the patience and hardness of the Russians, stimulated by the example of their general, overcame every obstacle. Constantly in the midst of his soldiers, Souvarof followed the system which he had adopted in his youth, and which he persevered in even at the head of an hundred thousand men, by partaking of the toils, the dangers and the food of his troops. He encouraged them by gay conversation, and even by those buffooneries with which strangers have acrimoniously reproached him : forgetting that what might have appeared gross to them, must have appeared natural to the Russians, whose lower classes were yet comparatively uncivilized. Always full of conversation, familiar and jocular with the soldiers, whose disposition to gaiety he knew, Souvarof was stern and severe to the officer whose conduct tended in the least towards insubordination. No General was ever more gracious to his troops ; no one was ever more feared and respected ; no one ever exacted more or was better obeyed. The polished inhabitant of a city may ridicule the character of Souvarof, but the experienced

soldier will admire it ; for he knows the price of military success, and that too much cannot be done to secure it. The plan of Souvarof succeeded. His expedition was crowned with the most favourable result. The Nogays were surprised in retreats which they deemed inaccessible. As they made a vigorous resistance, numbers of them were slain. The Russians took many prisoners, and carried off all the women and children. The remainder of the tribe was dispersed ; but they were so few that they were no longer dangerous. Souvarof repossessed the Kuban river, and sent his troops into winter-quarters.

In 1783 the empress of Russia undertook a remarkable enterprize, worthy of her vast genius. War existed in India between the English and French. Hyder Ali, who was on the side of the latter, and then in the height of his success, had advanced beyond the Orixa. The people to the north of Bengal, driven from their usual channels of commerce by the war, conceived the plan of carrying the iron which they had to sell to the frontiers of Siberia. This circumstance suggested a grand scheme to the mind of Catharine. She caused a fleet to be equipped at Astrachan, the command of which she gave to Souvarof, with orders to seize upon Astrabat on the northern side of the Caspian sea, and to form an establishment there, from which the Russians might penetrate at some future day, into the interior of India. As there was a communication from Astrachan by the Volga, the Mita, Lake Yemen, the Vologda, the canal of Ladoga, and the Neva, to Petersburg, the consequence of success would be, that the sovereigns of Russia would see the riches and precious commodities of Indostan brought to the walls of their palace, without danger and with little expense. This project failed, through the intrigues of the British, and the fortunate turn of the war in India, which restored the commerce of Bengal to its usual channels. Souvarof quitted Astrachan and took the road to Petersburg, and was attached to the division of troops

stationed in that government. This was in 1784 :—Three years were then spent in unavoidable quiet ; for Russia enjoyed a profound peace, until Turkey declared war against her in 1787. If, however, the tented field was abandoned by Souvarof, during this interval, it was only that he might return to it with renewed fame. The time which was lost to practice was spent on theory ; and this general, who by a false prejudice has been esteemed illiterate, because, by a prejudice equally absurd, all Russian gentlemen are thought to be ignorant, was in reality, the best informed general in Europe, with regard to the history and principles of his profession:

CHAPTER IV.

Souvarof is made commander in chief—Journey of the empress into the Crimea—Second war with the Turks—Campaigns of 1787 and 8—The Turks often defeated by Souvarof—Campaign of 1789—Battle of Rymrick—Campaign of 1790—Taking of Ismail—Peace of Jassy—Reflections.

WE are now about to witness the entry of Souvarof upon a more extensive field of action, than that in which he has been hitherto engaged. We are about to see him honored with the confidence of the supreme head of the empire, and absolved from the necessity of accounting to a rigid superior for every movement. As it was thus in his power to direct his own operations, and dispose of his own means, we shall be able to form an accurate opinion of his merit, and to cast a merited censure upon him, if his conduct as a commander in chief does not equal the expectations, which his conduct as a subaltern officer excited. At the same time, we may be permitted to add to our commendations, if all these expectations are fulfilled.

A biographer is generally disposed to become an enthusiast in favour of his hero. We shall strive to avoid this fault with the same care that we have hitherto exercised. If Souvarof has been constantly praised, it was because we found no occasion for censure. We have seen him a zealous, assiduous, intrepid and indefatigable soldier, simple in his manners and devoted to his profession. Not one of his actions discovers avarice or ambition, nor have we ever found him forgetting his duty to attend to his pleasures. We have seen him a stranger to gallantry and love, which he probably considered as a weakness in a warrior charged with the guidance of others, and no less a stranger to court intrigues, so common

in his country, and especially in the reign of Catharine. He has now arrived at the age of fifty-six years, nearly forty of which have been spent in the army. He has fought the Prussians, the Poles, the Turks, and the Tartars. Against the first he did more at the head of a few hundred men, than the generals of Russia at the head of eighty thousand. He overcame the most adroit leaders of the second, disconcerted their measures and destroyed their hopes. He conquered the third in battle after battle, and already inspired them with a portion of that terror, which they afterwards felt at the mention of his name. He has subdued the most refractory and savage hordes of Tartars, and at last reached the high rank of lieutenant-general. This elevated station could not, after such exploits, have been conferred upon him from favour alone. We do not pretend to say, that the character of Souvarof was entirely free from defects; but then these defects had no influence upon his public character. His singularities now began to be known in the world. Perhaps they might have made him unsociable and even dull in private life, as there they were out of their proper sphere of action. We admit that our researches to invalidate or confirm this suspicion, have not been very profound. But of what importance is it? It is not a hero in his morning gown that we wish to represent to the public. History is no comedy intended to depict the ridiculous traits of private life. Its representations are intended to instruct, and should be introduced with a solemnity which will cause them to be respected. The object of history is not to teach men that a hero, composed of the same frail materials as themselves, is subject in private life to their follies and weaknesses. It is to give them useful lessons: to show them the faculties of this hero on important occasions, where moral agency is alone employed.

As soon as the Crimea was subdued, the prince Potemkin attached to his work, and perceiving the importance of the acquisition, in a political, military, agricultural and com-

mercial point of view, wished to throw a splendour over the country, which would hasten its civilization, and develop its resources. He prevailed on the empress to verify it by her presence, in order to let the inhabitants and the world know the value which she attached to its crown, by taking possession of it in person. The celebrated journey was then decided on which exhibited to the eyes of astonished Europe, the pomp of fabled conquerors. Potemkin, whose ideas were as remarkable as they were great, conceived plans and details which nothing but the political constitution of Russia, and the natural appearance of the country where they were to be performed, could have enabled him to realize; and which the other nations of Europe, judging from the state of things among themselves, thought almost incredible. The whole Russian army was destined to swell the train of the empress. It was posted in divisions from Moscow, even to the Crimea; so that each step would evince proofs of her power, and show her thousands of arms ready to push that power still further. The best generals were stationed at those places, where the empress intended to remain for some time, and were taught to prepare the troops to appear with proper splendour. Souvarof was honourably treated by Potemkin. He received the command of the division at Kremenschuck, a town at which the empress was to embark on the Dnieper. This division, composed of twelve thousand infantry, the choicest troops in the army, and three thousand Cossacks, was equipped anew, and was destined to perform some manœuvres in the presence of the empress, in order to amuse her during her stay at Kremenschuck. Souvarof set out for this place in November, 1786, and before his departure was appointed commander in chief.

The empress commenced her journey from Petersburg on the 18th January, 1787. But owing to her delay in many of the towns through which she passed, she did not arrive at Kremenschuck until the end of April.

Every thing was ready for her reception. Souvarof had not passed the winter there in vain. When the empress (for whom Potemkin had built a palace and superb garden) had recovered from the fatigues of her journey, the manœuvres commenced. They were executed not only with precision, but with that sprightliness of which the Russians had been hitherto destitute. Souvarof was delighted with an opportunity of exercising them in the representation of war, so that his evolutions might be comprehended in the hour of battle; and rejoiced that the applauses of his sovereign sanctioned the innovation. Catharine was surprised and gratified in the highest degree, as well as all the court. On the evening before her departure, this princess, who wished to make her journey a time of rejoicing to her subjects, by scattering rewards and benefits around her, distributed her favours to those in the neighbourhood of Kremenschuck. She promoted a number of general and subaltern officers. She bestowed crosses, and ribbons, and diamonds. A croud of soldiers and courtiers were advanced, in proportion as they merited her favour. The name of Souvarof alone did not appear upon any list. When the empress, surrounded by her court, acquainted each one with the marks of approbation which he had received, Souvarof stood apart, seeming to be satisfied with the portion which had already fallen to his share. "And you general," said Catharine, turning towards him, "do you ask nothing?" "Madam," replied the stern and sarcastic warrior, "I request you to pay for my lodgings." It amounted to three roubles. This laconic reply, delivered in a style little known at the Russian court, proves the disinterestedness of Souvarof; but it proves also the contempt in which he held the avarice of courtiers, and the rude freedom with which he spoke his sentiments, however harsh might be their application.

The empress embarked at Kremenschuck, to descend the Dnieper to Cherson. That no accident might happen upon

the river, the bottom of it had been searched, and all impediments removed, with incredible labour. Enchantment seemed to have waved its wand over the banks. Nature has lavished her bounties on this fertile country, but the assisting hand of man has not drawn forth the hidden treasures, owing to a scattered population, as rich and productive land as any in the world was lying neglected and waste. Potemkin remedied this defect, by artificial means. He made all the peasants in the neighbourhood remove to the river, with their cattle and their wooden cabins, which are easily transported. He made them build villages upon its borders, which added beauty to the prospect. The cattle were spread through the fertile meadows; trees newly planted gave a freshness to the landscapes; and the reflection forcibly occurred to every one, how delicious a country it would be, if the population equalled the luxuriance of the soil. The strangers who accompanied Catharine, or who afterwards pursued the same route, adopted lofty ideas respecting the Ukraine and Little Russia. They disseminated them through Europe, and it is owing to the journey to the Crimea that the empire received accessions of numerous colonies of Germans, of Swiss and of Poles, who established themselves in these southern latitudes, and whose efforts are contributing to make it one of the most opulent countries in the world.

At Cherson a spectacle of another kind suggested reflections to the commercial man, similar to those which struck the mind of the agriculturist, in the Ukraine. From the position of this port, and its astonishing increase since its recent foundation, he might easily have calculated how favourable it was for commercial speculations. The Crimea now thrown open for the first time, showed Europe a sort of terrestrial paradise, of which they had been ignorant since the Genoese were driven from it by the Turks, and the fortunate inhabitants of which had nothing to desire but peace and tranquility.

We may now see how politic in every point of view, was this journey to the Crimea; which people at that time affected to consider as a sort of juggle, by Potemkin. The empress and her minister had one common object. They both knew the advantage that would accrue to Russia, from the possession of the Crimea, in the event of a war with Turkey. They both wished to re-commence a war with this power; because they were certain that it would be a glorious one, and because they hoped to attain the grand object of subverting the empire of Constantinople. They were both, in fine, persuaded, that although it might be a cause of exciting the jealousy and hostility of the Turks, *yet it would carry a show of ostentation to resist them in provinces which they had not yielded without trembling*, and the loss of which they regretted every day. This was precisely the result. The empress had scarcely returned to Petersburg, where she arrived in the latter part of July, when the Divan often having remonstrated and demanded explanations from the Russian minister at Constantinople without waiting for the reply of the cabinet of Petersburg, but inflamed with a desire of vengeance, declared war against Russia, and imprisoned her minister in the Seven Towers. This happened on the 18th of August, 1787.

Souvarof had followed the empress to Cherson, while she was in the Crimea—as she returned he preceded her. By the instructions of Potemkin he repaired to Pultowa in the Ukraine, to assemble a corps of the army, which, as the empress passed through the town, exhibited an exact representation of that celebrated battle, in which Sweden, through the folly of her monarch, lost perhaps for ever, her influence in the affairs of Europe, whilst Russia, through the sagacity of hers, laid the foundation of that power, which sixty years afterwards astonished the world. At Pultowa Souvarof took leave of the empress, and received from her a box enriched with diamonds, as a testimonial of her gratification.

He then proceeded to pass some time with Potemkin, at an estate which the latter had purchased from Prince Lubomirski, on the frontiers of Poland. Here they concerted at their leisure the plans of the war. Potemkin had received the command of all the Russian forces, that there might be no impediment to the execution of his vast projects ; and he felt the necessity of being assisted by generals of the temper of Souvarof. The Turks were at this time in the possession of Oczakof, where they had a considerable fleet. It was easy to foresee that they would sally forth from this place, insult the coast of the Crimea, harass it by attempting descents, and endeavour to revive the party which supported their cause. Potemkin resolved to lay siege to this fortress in the ensuing campaign, after having driven the Turkish armies, by manœuvres and battles, from the vicinity of the place and from the banks of the Danube. But as it was necessary to protect the town of Cherson and fortress of Kinbourn, as these places covered the Crimea, and as the whole maritime force of the Russians was there assembled, Potemkin induced the empress to entrust their defence to Souvarof. He accordingly set out in the latter part of August, to assume the direction of the troops who were collected about Cherson.

Each of the two empires evinced by its preparations, the deep interest which it had in the event of the approaching struggle. Turkey did not conceal her intention of destroying Russia ; nor did Russia less unhesitatingly avow that her object was to crush her enemy, and build up her own glory on the ruins. According to established usage each published a manifesto, in support of the justice of its cause. Both abounded with the common complaints. Russia accused Turkey of seeking to elude the last treaty ; whilst Turkey with more justice alledged, that Russia violated every article of it every day. It was not the pen, however, that could decide the dispute. These insignificant pieces, fit only to amuse the loungers of the two capitols, are not at the present

day even documents for history. Besides, where is the necessity of appealing in support of their rights to the tribunal of the public, which neither party recognizes, whilst each one has its force at its own disposal, and each one constitutes itself the judge in its own cause? The Turks and Russians placed no great confidence in the efficacy of such an appeal; for each one put two hundred thousand men in motion, for the support of its manifesto. Eighty thousand of the former marched through Moldavia to Oczakof, to prevent its being besieged. A hundred thousand under the command of the grand Vizier approached the borders of the Danube, to defend its passage; and sixteen ships of the line and eight frigates, with a great number of galleys, entered the Black Sea, under the command of the Capudar Pacha.

The Russians presented an aspect equally formidable. The declaration of war had occasioned (contrary to the usual effect of such a circumstance) an extraordinary joy. Victories and triumphs appeared certain, and the power of Russia seemed to verge towards a point of grandeur, of which the Roman empire alone afforded an example. Where was the Russian unwilling to lend his aid, in shedding such glory round his country? Potemkin was named generalissimo of the forces, and he had under him the generals Repnin, Paul Potemkin, Souvarof, Galitzen, Koutousof, Kaminski and a number of others. The troops were spread from the Ukraine to the Kuban.

The army of this last province was only intended to defend it from invasion, to keep the Tartars in check, and prevent them from making diversions in favour of the Turks. For the same purposes the Crimea was strongly garrisoned. But the two active armies were that of Bessarabia destined to drive away the Turks from Oczakof and take the town, and that of Moldavia whose movements were intended to assist the operations of the preceding, by dividing the forces of the

Tarks and confining them to the Danube. Potemkin took the command of the army of Bessarabia in person, which amounted to upwards of a hundred thousand men; the command of the other was confided to general Count Soltikof, who was assisted by the prince of Saxe Cobourg at the head of thirty thousand Austrians.

We have not yet mentioned the coalition which existed between the two imperial courts of Russia and Austria, for the destruction of the Turkish empire in Europe, and the partition of its vast provinces. This arrangement was meditated for a long time and finally concluded during the journey of the empress to the Crimea, in which she was accompanied by Joseph II. the emperor of Austria. The two sovereigns readily agreed to the war which they were to carry on in common. Joseph was no less ambitious or enterprising than Catharine.* He saw many opportunities of aggrandizing

* This singular prince possessed great talents, but knew not how to use them; he was passionately desirous of the prosperity of his subjects, and yet all his life tormented them; he conceived grand designs and always executed contemptible ones; he was anxious that his reign should make the Austrian monarchy formidable and united, and yet sowed such dissention between its component parts that the mischief is perhaps irreparable; he was intended by Heaven to be the benefactor of his people, but became their scourge, because he was led astray by the false spirit of the times. Had Joseph II. lived sixty years sooner or ten years later, he would have fulfilled the designs of Providence. But living when he did, he failed in the performance of his part, because he thought, unfortunately, that it was a mark of wisdom to reject the experience of ages. Seduced by the ideas of philosophy at that time prevalent, he had a mania for reforming and perfecting every thing, and thought, like the unthinking writers whose systems he adopted that to order a reform would be to effectuate it, and that perfection must follow of course, from the establishment of new laws, apparently better than the old ones. This erroneous opinion (which may be branded as mad, in as much as it rejects the experience of ages, and disdains to employ time, the most powerful instrument that nature has put into the hands of men) became unaccountably fashionable in the

himself at the expense of his weak or distracted neighbours, and he thought himself obliged to subdue them to make them more happy; believing the measure perfectly consistent with justice and humanity. Such was the strange confidence of the two courts, that adopting the sweeping phrases of certain declamatory writers, they did not hesitate to say in their manifestoes that it *was the duty of christian princes to suffer the Turks to be in Europe no longer*; so that while sharing the spoils of these infidels, they had the appearance of avenging the cause of religion and oppressed mankind. To secure this end Joseph II. beside the corps which he sent into Moldavia to join the Russians, laid siege to Belgrade and invaded Servia with an hundred thousand men.

rulers of nations in the last century. Its effects have been beneficial nowhere but in England, where philanthropy, a branch of the philosophy, tempered by a firm, prudent, and stable government has really ameliorated the condition of men in the social state. But in France and Spain where these notions were adopted by the ministers, and in Austria, Prussia and Sweden where they infected the throne itself, they only occasioned a relaxation of the bonds of society, a corruption of the public morals, a diminution of respect for ancient institutions and with this a loss of national spirit and energy. It is remarkable that Catharine II. who maintained an intimate correspondence with cotemporaneous philosophers and in her letters appeared to be their disciple, manifested in her conduct the entire reverse of their principles and counsels. During this time, this woman, who set kings an example, made herself feared and honoured through Europe and exalted her subjects to an elevated rank among the nations of the world. It is admitting a false and pernicious principle, to believe that nations can be regenerated by new constitutions, or that more just and advantageous relations can be established by fresh partitions or new distributions of territory. Combinations of this sort cannot revive public happiness. In days of old, before the institution of christianity, when there was no law of nations or common system of morality, a legislator discovered truths hidden from the vulgar and made them the foundation of his legislation, correcting morals by laws. By introducing new forms of polity he gave more consistency and power to the state, secured it against invasion, bent the inclinations of the people to one particular object and extending his regulations even to the common details of life, directed them

Every thing prognosticated the ruin of the Ottoman empire. Without allies, without assistance, relying upon itself alone, it had only its own undisciplined and ignorant bands to oppose the best troops in Europe. The Turks, however, had the boldness to strike the first blow, and Souvarof had the honor of repulsing them. They profitted by the forces which they had at Oczakof, whose position favoured their plans against the south of Russia, to make an attack on that side. They supposed it would be easy to surprise the little fortress of Kinbourn* and capture it before any succours could reach it. The Pacha of Oczakof embarked six thousand men in shallops and directed them to land on a little tongue of sandy ground which makes out into the sea at some distance from

according to his wishes, like children in leading strings. But all this was only partial : nations were then separated from each other by insurmountable prejudices, their opinions were contradictory, their differences of character marked. Now on the contrary every thing tends to unity. There is but one religion and this religion is the basis of morality ; this morality is again the foundation of opinions, of laws, of manners, of civil and political rights. It regulates the relations of individuals with one another by the same principles that it does the concerns of nations ; it is the same for all, known equally to kings and shepherds ; no man devised it, none can change it, for its assistance is not from the earth. This morality draws men together ; they resemble each other now, as much as they were dissimilar before. They see a common tie, a common object, and one grand rule of conduct, stronger than all the little differences in their usages and institutions. Whether the world is divided into great or small states, whether these states are circumscribed in this way or in that, whether the inhabitants are divided into a greater or less number of classes is all a matter unconnected with human happiness or the perfection of the social state. Once let morality become universal, bringing with it its inseparable companions, humanity, toleration, liberty and peace, and every thing will do well : the duty of a king will be easy, and politicians and legislators become superfluous.

* Kinbourn is built on a peninsula in front of Oczakof and its position is such that it commands the entrance to the harbour. It was therefore as necessary to be taken by the Turks as preserved by the Russians.

the fort. Souvarof happened to be on this spot which he had visited to prepare against an attack. Behind the fortress there was a body of troops encamped : orders were given to them as well as the garrison of Kinbourn to throw no obstacle in the way to hinder the Turks from landing. Persuaded that they should find the Russians unprepared, the Turks disembarked from their boats, a great number of which, by order of the commander, returned to Oczakof for reinforcements. Six thousand then advanced towards the town to carry it by assault ; but the Russians were ready to receive them. At a given signal, three regiments of Cossacks issued from the camp and a regiment of infantry sallied from the fort and impetuously charged the Turks, who were astonished at finding themselves attacked, instead of being the assailants. But depending on their numbers they stood firm, and a bloody contest commenced, which seemed to threaten the defeat of the Russians, notwithstanding their unyielding courage. Surrounded by enemies, overwhelmed by numbers, they could scarcely keep their ground. The superiority of their tactics was at this moment of no service, for every manœuvre was impracticable. Croud was opposed to croud : the intrepid Souvarof fought in the midst of his soldiers sword in hand. His horse was killed under him and he himself at last received a musket ball in the shoulder—the wound was washed and bound up by a Cossack and he returned to the battle. His aspect, his voice, inspired his sinking troops with fresh courage : re-animated by his presence they persisted in the fight, until time was afforded to a reinforcement of ten squadrons of light dragoons and some infantry who had been sent for by Souvarof to arrive upon the field of battle. The cavalry decided the contest. The Turks already in confusion were not able to sustain the shock of a body of horse, who charged them in column without giving the smallest time for preparation. Flight was impossible and they fought in despair, dying bravely on the ground. The few who escaped to the water-side, not being able to find their boats, were driven by

the Cossacks into the waves, or cut to pieces on the shore. The loss of the Russians was of course considerable and an immense number of them were wounded. On the occasion of this victory, which was the first in the war, the *te deum* was solemnly chaunted at Petersburg, and the empress wrote with her own hand a flattering letter to Souvarof. This severe check disgusted the Turks with descents; but they continued to cruise around the peninsula and occasionally to harass it with the cannon of their vessels. To drive them off and guard against any future surprise, Souvarof, who happily soon recovered from his wound, caused a battery to be erected on the side of the peninsula next to Oczakof. This battery sometime afterwards greatly assisted the prince of Nassau, Siegen, commander of the galleys at Nicotaef, in an attack upon the Turkish fleet, which had entered the Linian. The prince burned a part of this fleet, as the squadron of Oczakof restrained by the battery of which we are speaking, could give them no assistance.

During the spring and part of the summer of 1788, the Russian fleets under the command of the American Paul Jones, and the prince of Nassau, obtained many victories over the Turkish fleet of Oczakof. Indeed it was almost entirely destroyed, and this misfortune, added to the loss of six thousand men killed or taken prisoners at Kinbourn, who were the flower of the garrison of Oczakof, had considerably weakened that place, when prince Potemkin came to besiege it, at the head of a formidable army, on the 29th of August. The garrison yet consisted of about thirty thousand men, added to which the inhabitants all became soldiers when the town was to be defended against their most bitter enemies. The safety of Oczakof excited all their zeal: they justly regarded it as one of the ramparts of the empire and knew that its capture would rivet the Russian yoke upon their allies the Tartars, whose only communication with Turkey was through Oczakof. This was precisely the reason why Potemkin was

so anxious to reduce it. He was convinced that until he was master of this fortress, the possession of the Crimea and of the rivers Kuban and Dniester which he had acquired for Russia, was held by a frail tenure, and of course the grand operations which he had meditated against the Ottoman empire must be totally relinquished. Every movement in the campaign was therefore directed with the view to the siege of Oczakof, and hitherto every one had succeeded. On the left of the grand army, the generals Godovitch and Tekeli had kept the Kuban Tartars in check, and prevented them from aiding the Turks on the right, the generals Soltikof and Cobourg united, had taken Choczim the key of Moldavia, and driven back the Turks to the banks of the Danube. In the centre, the victories of Souvarof and Nassau had cleared the sea of Mussulmen; and general Ribas had lately seized upon the island of Berezan at the mouth of the Dnieper, the only shelter which remained for the Turkish vessels carrying succours and supplies to the besieged place. By all these successes, Oczakof was entirely surrounded, and prince Potemkin pressed it still more closely with eighty thousand men.

The prince ordered Souvarof to join him, who instantly left Kinbourn and assumed the command of a corps before Oczakof. The garrison of this place, finding themselves thrown entirely upon their own resources, so far from being intimidated were more obstinate in their defence. Occasional sallies had been made from the fort since the commencement of the siege and they now continued them with fresh vigour. On one of these occasions, Souvarof rushed forward almost alone to prevent a regiment from flying, which was exceedingly pressed by the Turks, and was exposed to a severe and close fire of musquetry—he received a ball in his neck and was carried from the field. From his repugnance to submit to a regular course of medical treatment, the wound assumed a dangerous appearance and he was obliged to be removed to

Kinbourn : there he was seized with a violent fever. Every day's dressing discovered extraneous substances which were necessary to be removed with excessive pain, and this occasioned a considerable inflammation. The gangrene spread, and the knife was constantly resorted to. The wound at length brought him to the very gates of death, and Russia was in danger of lamenting the loss of one of her bravest defenders as well as most affectionate sons. But the strength of a vigorous constitution that riots and debauchery had never impaired, at last triumphed over the fever, and at the end of a month he was declared out of danger. But his convalescence was long and the surgeons were rigorous in excluding every thing relating to military fatigue before he was thoroughly cured. On his bed he heard of the fall of Bezakof, which had been taken by his companions on the 6th of December after a terrible assault. The chagrin of not being able to bear a part in this brilliant exploit, would have caused his relapse, if it had not been merged in the joy which he felt at the triumphs of his country,

In the early part of 1789, Souvarof, now perfectly restored, made a journey to Petersburg. He was graciously received by the empress, who, as she could not raise him in military rank, presented with a plume of diamonds for his casque, having the letter K as a cypher alluding to his exploits at Kinbourn. After having spent the winter in the capitol whose delights could not overcome his regret at being absent from the army, he returned to the scene of action in the first month of spring. Jassy was at this time the head-quarters of Potemkin, Souvarof was instructed to take the command of a corps of the army which covered his operations in Moldavia and co-operate with the prince of Saxe Cobourg the Austrian general, who again assisted the movements of the grand army in Servia under field-marshal Laudon. The object of the campaign was the conquest of Belgrade and Servia, then of Wallachia by the Austrians and that of Mol-

davia and as great a portion of Bulgaria as the season would permit, by the Russians. Neither of these plans succeeded, and the Austrians are perhaps indebted to the Russians and Souvarof, for the preservation of their army and security of their own provinces from the invasion of the Turks.

The spectacle presented by Austria to a contemplative mind is exceedingly strange. It is an empire which embraces a vast territory and opulent possessions ; whose numerous population is composed of robust, brave and loyal people, capable of being made the best soldiers in the world ; whose means of aggrandizing itself are formidable, and whose policy is founded on ambition ; yet there has been a perpetual contradiction between its desires and actions ; it has aspired periodically to dominion for four centuries and only exposed itself to humiliations and danger of dismemberment by neighbours less powerful than itself. This is the part that Austria has been acting since the death of Charles V. It has encountered disastrous wars, sustained bloody defeats and rarely obtained success for itself, though generally benefitting by the assistance of allies or foreign generals. It did not acquire the hundredth part of its territory by force of arms, for policy and alliances were the means of augmenting the ancient dominions of the house of Austria, and yet this state wished to be engaged in every war, to partake in every distribution of spoil, to be the master or protector of every surrounding nation. It felt its powers and at first always assumed a menacing attitude, but soon fell into a sort of lethargy and depended upon the force of craft and cunning to extricate itself from difficulty. The solution of this strange conduct may be found in the phlegm and jealousy which are the basis of the Austrian character. Its phlegm serves to conduct to a happy issue the negotiations which contribute to its importance ; whilst its jealousy of other nations is the only passion which can rouse it, inspiring a constant wish that nothing shall transpire in the world without its assistance, and that no

nation shall exceed it in strength. But the Austrian government unfortunately extends the operation of this sentiment of jealousy to the agents of its own purposes ; and for fear that they should not thoroughly understand its views, it directs every trifling movement. Thus the generals are obliged to demand fresh instructions in the most insignificant as well as the most important transactions. The national sluggishness interfering with the issuing as well as the execution of orders, the military operations are consequently destructively slow, and in an offensive war their armies are ruined by irresolution.* In the last Turkish war, as well as in all the preceding ones, this defect may be distinctly perceived. The Austrians acted with so much fridity and circumspection, that they always gave the Turks time to assemble or to rally after defeats ; and the Turks counting securely upon their so doing, never failed to return with obstinacy to the field, and often revenged themselves upon the Austrians for the misfortunes they had experienced at the hands of the Russians. It was doubtless the security which they felt when opposed to the former and the dread which they entertained of the latter, that induced the Turks to turn their attention and efforts towards the Austrians, in the campaign of 1789. They were even determined to act on the offensive. Since the declaration of hostilities their army under Brahilof had been considerably augmented, and having learnt that the prince of Cobourg, whose corps had been weakened by large detachments, was encamped only twelve miles from Forhani with eighteen thousand men, they marched against him to the number of fifty thousand, of whom half were cavalry, to surround and anni-

* As on the other hand their cool indifference does not abandon them in bad fortune, they are the most proper troops in Europe for a defensive war ; and their extensive country well watered and abounding in productions of all sorts, and being admirably calculated for a defensive war, seems to indicate that the hereditary dominions of the House of Austria cannot without the utmost difficulty be brought under the yoke of a foreign power.

We may now see how politic in every point of view, was this journey to the Crimea; which people at that time affected to consider as a sort of juggle, by Potemkin. The empress and her minister had one common object. They both knew the advantage that would accrue to Russia, from the possession of the Crimea, in the event of a war with Turkey. They both wished to re-commence a war with this power; because they were certain that it would be a glorious one, and because they hoped to attain the grand object of subverting the empire of Constantinople. They were both, in fine, persuaded, that although it might be a cause of exciting the jealousy and hostility of the Turks, *yet it would carry a show of ostentation to resist them in provinces which they had not yielded without trembling*, and the loss of which they regretted every day. This was precisely the result. The empress had scarcely returned to Petersburg, where she arrived in the latter part of July, when the Divan often having remonstrated and demanded explanations from the Russian minister at Constantinople without waiting for the reply of the cabinet of Petersburg, but inflamed with a desire of vengeance, declared war against Russia, and imprisoned her minister in the Seven Towers. This happened on the 18th of August, 1787.

Souvarof had followed the empress to Cherson, while she was in the Crimea—as she returned he preceded her. By the instructions of Potemkin he repaired to Pultowa in the Ukraine, to assemble a corps of the army, which, as the empress passed through the town, exhibited an exact representation of that celebrated battle, in which Sweden, through the folly of her monarch, lost perhaps for ever, her influence in the affairs of Europe, whilst Russia, through the sagacity of hers, laid the foundation of that power, which sixty years afterwards astonished the world. At Pultowa Souvarof took leave of the empress, and received from her a box enriched with diamonds, as a testimonial of her gratification.

He then proceeded to pass some time with Potemkin, at an estate which the latter had purchased from Prince Lubomirski, on the frontiers of Poland. Here they concerted at their leisure the plans of the war. Potemkin had received the command of all the Russian forces, that there might be no impediment to the execution of his vast projects ; and he felt the necessity of being assisted by generals of the temper of Souvarof. The Turks were at this time in the possession of Oczakof, where they had a considerable fleet. It was easy to foresee that they would sally forth from this place, insult the coast of the Crimea, harass it by attempting descents, and endeavour to revive the party which supported their cause. Potemkin resolved to lay siege to this fortress in the ensuing campaign, after having driven the Turkish armies, by manœuvres and battles, from the vicinity of the place and from the banks of the Danube. But as it was necessary to protect the town of Cherson and fortress of Kinbourn, as these places covered the Crimea, and as the whole maritime force of the Russians was there assembled, Potemkin induced the empress to entrust their defence to Souvarof. He accordingly set out in the latter part of August, to assume the direction of the troops who were collected about Cherson.

Each of the two empires evinced by its preparations, the deep interest which it had in the event of the approaching struggle. Turkey did not conceal her intention of destroying Russia ; nor did Russia less unhesitatingly avow that her object was to crush her enemy, and build up her own glory on the ruins. According to established usage each published a manifesto, in support of the justice of its cause. Both abounded with the common complaints. Russia accused Turkey of seeking to elude the last treaty ; whilst Turkey with more justice alledged, that Russia violated every article of it every day. It was not the pen, however, that could decide the dispute. These insignificant pieces, fit only to amuse the loungers of the two capitols, are not at the present

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to call in his advanced guard. As if he had a presentiment of the approaching triumph, Souvarof only replied, "*I am coming.*" In an hour afterwards his army was on the march. His expedition was as great as usual, and at the end of two days he joined Cobourg who was much gratified at seeing him. The rapidity of the marches of Souvarof always led his antagonists into error. Perhaps if the Turks had known that he had united his forces to the Austrians, they would have renounced their project of attacking them. So far from giving it up, however, they reached the river Rymnik four miles from the place where Cobourg was encamped, with more alacrity than could have been expected.

After having reconnoitred the position of the enemy, Souvarof decided that he ought to be attacked, and he induced Cobourg to adopt the same opinion, for the latter was full of confidence when he had the intrepid Russian by his side. It is remarkable that the Russian general acted with the Austrian soldiers just as if they were his own, and inspired them with an energy which is no where to be seen in their ordinary transactions. The same phenomenon occurred afterwards in Italy. We must conclude from this, that the Austrian soldier is not deficient in warmth and resolution of soul, but that the fault lies in the officers, who in the lower grades have no patriotism or zeal for the glory of their sovereign, and in the higher grades are too much restrained and kept in check by the jealous temper of the cabinet.

The first care of the Turks before the commencement of offensive operations, had been to fortify their camp, in which they intended to deposit all their baggage, stores and heavy artillery, in order that their march might be as little encumbered as possible. This was one of the reasons which induced Souvarof to decide upon attacking them, in which case, he would also have the advantage of surprising them before the completion of their works, while every thing was in a state of

disorder. On the 21st of September, towards the close of the day, the allied army was put in motion and advanced towards the Rymna, on the other side of which, between that river and the Rymnik the Turks were encamped, having in front the village of Boseha which they had furnished with artillery, and on their right an extensive wood, rather thick, where they had begun to erect fortifications and where their heavy artillery was posted. The Austrians and Russians crossed the river without pontoons as it was not deep. They then advanced in the most profound silence,—the order of battle differed a little from that of Forhani, for the Russians, when they arrived, had naturally taken their station on the left. The Austrians formed the centre and right wing—the infantry of each was formed in small square battalions, as this size enabled them to move with greater facility, and allowed room for the cavalry to pass between the intervals. Experience had pointed out this disposition of the troops as the best to resist the impetuosity of the Turkish cavalry. The invention of it is attributed to marshal Munich, who at the same time surrounded the squares with a sort of chevaux-de-frise ; but since the Russians, in imitation of the rest of the European troops, had raised the regularity of their fire and the fabrication of their arms to a higher state of perfection, the chevaux-de-frise were rejected as superfluous from the embarrassment they produced.

Owing to their negligence in not sending out patrols, the Turks were a long time without the least suspicion of the approach of the allied army. A Russian lieutenant sent out on a reconnoitering party, at last fell in with an advanced guard of the Turks who made him prisoner : they carried him to the grand Vizier, who refused to believe his assertion, that Souvarof was with the Austrians. “ It must be another general of that name,” said he, “ Souvarof died of his wounds at Kinbourn.” He was soon however, convinced of the contrary ; the Russians soon after attacked his advanced guard,

and in despite of the artillery, rapidly chased the Turks from many of the hills, over which their immense army extended. Disorder began to prevail, and after a short resistance the scattered troops sought refuge in the middle of their camp. The Turks soon discovered how small a number of men they had to oppose and resolved to surround and overwhelm the Russians. Fifteen thousand chosen cavalry were detached for this purpose from the centre, where the grand Vizier had stationed himself. Happily however, the army of Cobourg had at this time joined Souvarof. The Austrian artillery made such dreadful havoc among the Turkish cavalry that they retired with precipitation.

The allied army now approached the corps commanded by the grand Vizier in person. Supposing that his movements were covered by the village of Boscha and that his right flank was secure, he brought all his disposable force against the Austrians and charged them impetuously, but they sustained the shock with heroic firmness; they lost not an inch of ground; and the good reception of the infantry having prevented the Turkish cavalry from breaking their battalions, this cavalry suffered excessively from the fire of Austrian artillery and musquetry, as every shot had its effect.

In the mean time Souvarof, by a bold and rapid movement had turned the village of Boscha. He had separated the Turks who occupied it from the main body, and rendered useless the formidable train of artillery which had been collected in this place. On his entrance into the plain, the Turks already intimidated by the Austrians, fled before him and precipitated themselves into the wood on which the right of their camp rested. Souvarof saw that it was necessary to force this last asylum and that then the victory would be complete. After having requested the prince of Cobourg to incline gradually towards him to second this attack, he marched directly to the wood where the Turks thought themselves secure.

The infantry formed in many columns and animated by the presence and voice of their general, advanced with rapid steps to the entrenched front of the wood to carry it by assault. "My friends," exclaimed the intrepid Souvarof to his soldiers, "look not at the eyes of your enemy, look at his breast; it is there that your bayonet must rest." As his intention was not to lead his troops to be massacred, he had ordered the cavalry to assist the attack, to pass through the intervals between the columns of infantry, and whilst the Turks were engaged in repulsing the infantry, to penetrate into the wood through the accessible parts of the entrenchments and scatter terror and death among the enemy. It was practicable to execute this order, because in many places there were only sketches and outlines of entrenchments, and behind the wood the view was open. The Austrians had, meanwhile, become united to them by having marched obliquely to the left. The simultaneous attack of the two armies was made with vigour. The Turks in confusion in the wood, being unsupported by any troops who could harass the flank or rear of their enemy were defeated in about an hour. The carnage that ensued was horrible, for it was not attempted to be stopped, as it was necessary to diminish this swarm of enemies, who would otherwise soon return to the combat. The pursuit of the Russians was checked at last only by the multitude of the dead and dying, the artillery, ammunition and baggage waggons which filled the road. The grand Vizier attempted in vain to rally his soldiers; they were deaf to his voice, and *his exhortations would perhaps have been fatal to men, governed only by fear*, if he had not fled himself and precipitately crossed the Rymnik, abandoning his camp to the conqueror—the booty was immense. The Turks lost ten or twelve thousand men killed or drowned in the Rymnik, besides their camp, their baggage and their cannon. The number of wounded was prodigious. The rest of the army was driven far away. In this action the Turkish

army consisted of a hundred and ten thousand, while the Russians and Austrians together, amounted to no more than thirty thousand.

As the corps of Souvarof and Cobourg were not intended to perform operations depending upon themselves alone, but were on the contrary, subordinate to the views of their respective principal armies, the consequences of their brilliant victory were confined, as to them, to the important advantage which they obtained on the field of battle. They separated at the end of a few days; Souvarof resumed his position at Berlat and Cobourg his at Forhani. The necessity of subduing the fortified places held by the Turks on this side of the Danube, thus progressing with certainty to the conquest of the Ottoman empire, was the circumstance which occasioned sieges to be the principal operations of this campaign.* But the victory obtained by the two generals was followed, as to this point, by the most important consequences. On the reception of the intelligence, communi-

* Perhaps it will be said, that [they might have left these towns in the rear and marched their armies rapidly into the heart of the country, in which case, as these places would be in some measure isolated, they would be obliged to surrender. But this plan of operations is not practicable in Turkey. In this uncultivated country, where subsistence is difficult to be procured, and where the roads are so detestable that carriages move slowly and with difficulty, fortified towns are necessary for magazines and places of deposit in which all that is indispensable to the existence of an army may be safely stored. Besides the Turks had provided numerous stores and immense garrisons for their fortified places, so that it was as dangerous for the Russians to leave them in the rear, as it was to venture with slender means of subsistence to send strong armies into the interior. As degenerate as the Turks are, their country is not as easily conquered as is generally supposed. It is on the contrary, admirably defended by the nature of the soil and character of the people. The plan of intrigue and corruption which the Russians have resorted to for many years past, will conduct them to the end in view with more certainty than force of arms. But to the eyes of posterity it will not appear so honourable, nor will it meet with equal approbation.

ating the account of the disaster of their army, the Turkish garrisons of Bender and Belgrade capitulated ; the first to prince Potemkin, the second to the Austrian field-marshal Laudon.

The glorious exploit of Souvarof was duly appreciated. The empress gave him the surname of Rymnikski, as the battle was fought near the Rymnik. She presented him with a splendid sword and with a branch of artificial laurel composed of diamonds, having upon it these words, "to the conqueror of the grand Vizier." She conferred upon him the title of count of the Russian empire ; and prince Potemkin, in the capacity of minister of war, sent him on the part of his sovereign, the grand military order of St. George.* The emperor Joseph advanced him to the dignity of count of the empire of Germany. The presents of the two sovereigns were accompanied by the most flattering letters. The empress distributed rewards in profusion through all the corps of Souvarof.

The troops were soon afterwards placed in winter-quarters. The count Souvarof did not quit his army, but spent the season at Berlat. In the month of April, 1790, the prince of Cobourg who had cantoned his troops in Wallachia assembled them, upon hearing that the efforts of the Turks would be directed principally against Bucharest, where he had established his head-quarters. The destination of the count was, as in the preceding year, to assist the Austrians, watch the motions of the Turks and prevent them from send-

* This order is not conferred according to the time of service, but only for great actions. Long-tryed bravery will entitle a soldier to the small cross ; but the grand cross is conferred only for the capture of an important place, or the gaining of a battle. Catharine was by no means prodigal of this favour, as the battle of Forhani and the other exploits of Souvarof had not entitiled him to it. Potemkin, favourite as he was, did not obtain it until the capture of Oczakof.

ing succours to the besieged places. He had already taken measures to effect this object and directed the movements of his troops on their coming out of winter-quarters, when the policy of Austria underwent a radical change, by the death of Joseph II. and accession of his brother Leopold II. formerly grand duke of Tuscany. This wise prince would have been pacific from calculation and necessity, even if he had not been so by nature, had he examined the situation in which his brother had left the inheritance of their House. Brabant was in open insurrection ; Bohemia was murmuring loudly ; Austria was dissatisfied ; the army had been diminished one half in the war with the Turks, and the finances were exhausted. The revolution already begun in France had deprived Joseph of the assistance of this kingdom, and the intimacy of his connexion with the old government made him for this very reason an enemy of the new. Prussia saw with discontent the progress of the two imperial courts in the Turkish war, and had it in her power to become a dangerous enemy to Austria, as her army and treasury were in a good condition. England was as little satisfied as Prussia and had a thousand ways of inflicting the most serious wounds upon the Austrian commerce. In this state of things Leopold could not do otherwise than wish for peace ; he did not hesitate therefore to suspend the hostile movements of his troops, and he opened negotiations which were soon followed by a definitive peace.

The absence of the Austrians, the immense losses that the Turks had experienced, which prevented them from showing themselves in the field, and the losses of the Russians, which were so heavy as not to permit them to profit by the despondency and weakness of their adversary, all contributed to render the campaign of 1790 imbecile and languishing. For seven months Potemkin had been besieging Ismahil,* and this

* Ismahil is situated on one of the mouths of the Danube. Its position

strong place remained as firm as it was the first day. The garrison was numerous and amply provided with stores. The Turks justly regarded this place as the last bulwark of their empire on that side; and patriotism, religion, honour and interest all united in forbidding them to surrender this important post and in inducing them to conform to the instructions of the sultan who had formally commanded them never to give up Ismahil. The autumn had now passed away and all the attempts of the Russians to obtain possession had been thwarted by the Turkish garrison. The Russian troops were about to retire into winter-quarters when Souvarof suddenly received orders from Potemkin to move to Ismahil with his corps of the army, and uniting it to the besiegers to reduce the fortress at every hazard.*

The count who was at Galaz, prepared instantly to obey. He set out with his detachment, passed the Pruth, and whilst he was advancing towards Ismahil, sent orders to the different

and importance both in war and commerce, concurred in adding interest to its capture in a double point of view; both as to its own consequence, and the opening which it would command into the interior of the Turkish empire, of which it is one of the keys. Its garrison, strengthened by those of Bender and Akermann and the remnant of the troops defeated at Rymnik was a perfect army.

* It is said that a woman in amity with Potemkin (who was at Bender, living like an oriental satrap) predicted to him, after an examination of the map, that he would be master of Ismahil in three months; and that Potemkin a little piqued, replied that he had a more certain way of succeeding, and that he immediately issued an order to Souvarof to take the place in three days. This story of the map may be true without its having decided the sudden resolution of Potemkin. The fact was, that it was highly necessary for the glory of the Russian armies to terminate the campaign with a brilliant achievement, and as the Austrians were no longer parties to the war against the Turks, the reduction of Ismahil was a matter of imperious necessity. If they had waited until the ensuing campaign, the Turks, who would have been able to turn the whole of their attention to this fortress naturally strong, would have rendered it impregnable.

corps stationed in the vicinity of that place to approach and join him. The same injunction was given to general Ribas, who commanded the Russian flotilla at the mouth of the Danube. The latter took possession of an island in front of Ismahil from which he prodigiously annoyed the town by the fire of his fleet and powerfully seconded the operations of the army on land. To conform to the orders of Potemkin and the views of the empress, and accommodating his plans to the lateness of the season, which would not allow him to conduct a siege by rule, Souvarof made every arrangement for an assault, as soon as he had collected his forces, which amounted to thirty-five or forty thousand men. He began by encouraging his soldiers and familiarizing them to the idea of mounting those untouched walls, which presented apparently no vulnerable point, and which were defended by a garrison as numerous as the besieging army. Souvarof exalted the temper of his troops by appealing to their feelings of honour, by seasoning his discourse with sallies of sprightliness which inspired them with gaiety and confidence, and by calling up to their recollection the rewards that attended the brave and the chastisement and disgrace with which cowards would be overtaken. This moral feeling of the soldiers could alone decide the issue of a contest where military science was useless. At the voice of their general, the Russians suffered present hardships with patience and looked forward with fearlessness to those that were to come. The endurance of hunger and cold was among their calamities. "My friends," said Souvarof to them, "provisions are dear, we are falling short; the merry fellows shut up there (pointing to Ismahil) are rolling in plenty: let us go and take it from them." The soldiers answered with loud huzzas.

Whilst the fascines and ladders were preparing and the troops in a state of training, Souvarof, to deceive the enemy and conceal his real project, erected batteries before the place and seemed to evince an intention of commencing regular

works. When every thing was ready, on the 9th of December he summoned the pacha who commanded in Ismahil to surrender the place : the pacha in reply, advised the Russians to retire and not expose themselves to the inclemency of the season. On the following day the count sent another summons to which the pacha replied " that the Danube should stop its course and the heavens bend to the earth, sooner than Ismahil would surrender to the Russians." The count immediately sent word to the pacha that if the white flag was not hung out that very day, he pledged his honour that the place would be taken by assault, and the garrison put to the sword. To this menace, the pacha preserved a disdainful silence. Souvarof then assembled his generals with a great number of officers, and declared his purpose, adding that the execution of it could be no longer delayed : he expatiated on their past exploits, the glory with which they would cover themselves in the present war, and the just contempt in which they might hold their enemies. He enjoined them to repeat his words to the soldiers, and to inform them that the approaching night was fixed on for the attack.

Accordingly on the 11th, at 3 o'clock in the morning, a musket was fired from the tent of the general ; it was the signal to prepare for the assault.

At 4 a second musket was fired ; it was the signal to form.

A third was fired at 5 o'clock ; it was the signal to march.

In an instant the whole army was in motion in six columns. The fleet commanded by rear admiral Ribas and formed in three lines, approached the town at the same time. Three of the columns who were to attack by land were under the orders of lieutenant-general Potemkin, a cousin of the favourite. The three others were commanded by lieutenant-general

Sanroilof. Souvarof was in the centre to observe and direct the movements of all. As the number of infantry was not sufficient, Souvarof dismounted twelve thousand Cossacks, who were employed in this expedition. Eight thousand (five thousand of whom were newly raised levies) were dispersed among the fourth and fifth columns ; the other four thousand were on board the fleet. Many strangers of distinction were with the fleet ; among them were the prince de Ligne, the count de Laugeron and the duke de Fronsae, afterwards duke de Richlieu. The two latter, who were French colonels, sustained in this assault the glory and reputation of their ancestors and nation.

The different columns approached the town in the best order, for the Turks permitted them to advance. But when they arrived at the distance of a hundred and twenty yards from the place, they were saluted with a general discharge of grape-shot. This made dreadful slaughter among them, but did not stop their march. In spite of the fire of the Turks they arrived at the banks of the ditch, which was filled with water, threw in their fascines, crossed it and reached the foot of the rampart : the cannon of the fortress was now useless. The Russians planted their ladders against the rampart, mutually assisted each other, and aiding themselves by the means of their bayonets which they stuck into the interstices between the stones of the wall, they mounted with a fierceness and intrepidity which intimidated the Turks and made them strike at random.* The second column, commanded by

* Ismahil had only a plain circumference of wall as a fortification, without any projecting angles from which the outside of the wall could be raked. Had it been constructed in this form we can easily imagine that it could not have been taken by assault or in any other way than by making regular approaches and erecting heavy batteries. Fortified places in the modern art of war cannot be reduced without the assistance of science, and are therefore, whatever may be said against them, the true defence of a country. They will always stop the progress of an invading army, when they are commanded by men of spirit.

major-general Lasey, was upon the rampart at half after 5 o'clock; and at 6, the first and third had also succeeded in mounting it. The sixth, commanded by major-general Kutusof and composed like the three former of veteran troops, would have attained their object in the same space of time, but it was obliged to assist the fourth and fifth, which were formed of raw Cossacks badly armed and equipped. Besides they were most of them young men by no means robust, who having never been in an engagement, were cut to pieces in the ditch by the sabres of the Turks. Having obtained an advantage, the Turks had sallied out and killed a great number of them, already thrown into confusion. A part of the sixth column ran to their relief and after a terrible combat beat back the Turks and enabled their discomfited friends to renew the assault. The second attack of the Cossacks was more successful than the first. At 8 o'clock, all the columns were firmly fixed upon the rampart. Those on the side of the water had likewise forced the barriers and gained a footing in the place.

A novel kind of warfare now commenced, peculiar to the wars between the Russians and Turks, where national hatred is strongly shewn by both parties. The Russians experienced within the walls of Ismahil a more obstinate resistance than they had yet felt. They were obliged to gain ground inch by inch. The Turks defended themselves desperately in the streets and in the houses. Even the women armed with pignards mingled in the ranks, and many a robust soldier received his death from their delicate hands. The fury of the Turks was so great, that the Russians were detained till noon. They arrived at last over heaps of bodies and through streams of blood to the centre of the town, and thought their enemies entirely subdued; but in the principal square they found a body of the Tartars of the Crimea, commanded by a brother of the last Khan, who could not be vanquished until every man of them was killed. At two o'clock the Russians

were completely masters of the place. The governing pacha was dead ; nearly all the generals and three-fourths of the garrison had experienced a similar fate. Souvarof ordered the cavalry to enter and scour the streets, that all resistance which despair might yet create should be utterly crushed. At 4 o'clock the carnage had ceased, after prodigies of valour on both sides. But according to promise the town was given up to pillage for three days, and as this could not take place without occasionally renewing the scenes of slaughter, a multitude of the inhabitants became victims to the cupidity of the soldiery.

The first care of the count after having taken the necessary precautions for the security of the place, was to return solemn thanks to the Almighty for his brilliant victory. Immediately after the assault he despatched a courier to the empress with this message, "The haughty Ismahil is at your feet." To Potemkin he wrote, "The Russian flag is waving on the ramparts of Ismahil." These accounts written in the manner of Turenne, prove how much the fierce and haughty mind of Souvarof disdained to expatiate upon his own bravery, and how firmly he relied upon his real merit. He reviewed his army in form, related every act of courage, returned thanks to his brave troops, and promised them a more solid reward than thanks when their sovereign should be acquainted with their determined conduct.

It appears from the official details which the count transmitted to his court a few days after the assault, that the loss of the Turks amounted to thirty-three thousand men, killed or mortally wounded. Besides this, the Russians took ten thousand prisoners, among whom were a number of eminent personages. The Russians had two thousand killed and two thousand five hundred wounded.

Six thousand women and children and two thousand chris-

tians of Moldavia and Armenia, were carried away from Ismahil to augment the population of the Russian empire. They found in the place two hundred and thirty-two pieces of cannon, and an immense quantity of provisions and military stores. They obtained possession, moreover, of ten thousand horses, almost all of high blood. In a word, the wealth of Ismahil was estimated at more than sixteen millions of roubles. Faithful to his principles, Souvarof gave a strict account of every thing that escaped the rapacity of the plunderers and reserved nothing for himself.*

When this inventory was finished, he made the necessary dispositions for the departure of the troops and removal of the prisoners. Previously, however, to their removal, he employed them in clearing the streets of the town and throw-

* As Souvarof began to be celebrated throughout Europe just as the revolution broke out in France, and as the noble and loyal warrior declared himself firmly opposed to the principles of the revolutionists, it is amusing to contemplate the rage of their writers against him. If we credit their account, he was a barbarian, a cannibal with the manners of a Calmuck, who obtained his victories merely by a profusion of blood. They say that he was guilty of so many cruelties at Ismahil that he received the appellation of *Muley Ismahil*, in allusion to Muley the emperor of Morocco, the most cruel of men. But we should like to hear their reply, if they were asked to relate some instances of his cruelty. What! is a general cruel because, to excite his troops to perform an action requiring almost supernatural courage, he promises them the plunder of a town, and keeps his word? Is he cruel because he cannot, in an instant, arrest the fury of his soldiers against an enemy who had just exposed them to a thousand dangers? To whom can such idle tales be told? Not to military men; not to men acquainted with the history of all ages; not to philosophers. All these will tell you that war is a scourge, and that if there is any way to alleviate its horrors, it is by carrying it on with energy. This cruel savage, this Tartar had really a thousand good traits of character. He treated his prisoners with humanity; he was adored by his soldiers; he was religious, frank, honest, magnanimous and above all, disinterested. But he had one inexpiable fault; he despised the new constitutions and new men of Poland and of France.

ing the dead bodies into the Danube. General Kutusof was appointed by the count to the situation of governor of Ismahil, and three regiments of infantry with four of Cossacks were left to defend it. He then returned to Galaz to place his army in winter-quarters, after which he repaired to Petersburg, to enjoy his triumphs, where he arrived in the month of January, 1791.

It is easy to imagine the reception which he met with from the empress. Some days after his arrival, he was appointed lieutenant-colonel of the regiment of guards of Preabojenski, of which the sovereign is colonel by an article in the constitution of the empire. She caused medals of silver and gold to be struck, in memory of the important victory obtained by her arms, under the guidance of Souvarof.

This success was the last that Souvarof was to obtain from the Turks. Although the war had been continued without interruption during the year 1790, negotiations had not been intermitted for a moment. In 1791 they were renewed. The loss of Ismahil made the Turks more tractable and might have had some influence in extending the pretensions of the Russians. But the most brilliant success is often an obstacle to the attainment of further advantages, from the high price at which it is purchased. The Russians desired peace no less than the Turks. We have seen the point of view in which the other powers of Europe beheld this contest. It was time that it should cease. The new position in which Europe was placed, and the losses of men and money experienced by Russia, loudly demanded that an end should be put to the war. In vain Potemkin, who had been the most ardent promoter of the war, resisted the plans of peace; in vain the Russians in the early part of 1791 obtained considerable advantages over the Turks, under Kutusof and Reprin, in Bulgaria and Godovitch in the Kuban. In spite of these apparent obstacles to peace, the necessity of things was victo-

rious. The most reluctant were obliged to yield to public opinion, now no longer dazzled by successful battles. Catharine partook of the feelings of her subjects. She was excessively irritated against Poland, and meditating the demolition of that kingdom, she wished to have the whole strength of the empire at her disposal to effect this conquest. Just at this time Potemkin died, and the last obstacle to peace was removed. The preliminaries having been signed by prince Repnin and the grand vizier Yuzuf, peace was definitively concluded at Jassy in December, 1791.

By this treaty the Kuban, the Crimea, Oczakof and the territory to the Dniester were yielded for ever to Russia ; so that she added to her dominions all that formerly composed little Tartary. This was doubtless an immense acquisition, but it was nothing when compared with the hopes and pretensions which Russia had declared at the commencement of the war. The Dniester was very far from Constantinople. It would even have required as great exertions to extend the sway of Russia to the Danube, as it had done to extend it to the Dniester. And after being established upon the Danube they would be masters of but a small portion of their course ; for they would see an immense country before them to traverse, before they could arrive at the capitol of the Turkish empire. They would have been obliged to leave on their right a large extent of territory which did not acknowledge their supremacy, and they would see before them from Constantinople to the Morea an extended and broken country, difficult of access, where their adversaries could have opposed a formidable resistance, as the Russian line of operations would have been inconveniently long. When to these military impediments we add the moral obstacles which a difference of national character and a hatred always generated in the minds of a conquered people, would have created ; when we consider the diligence with which the other powers of Europe would have thwarted the views of Russia upon Constanti-

nople, we may be permitted to doubt whether Russia could have maintained her ascendancy in this celebrated city. Constantinople was built by a man of uncommon genius, in the most beautiful and advantageous situation in the world, to be the capital of a great empire. It has always been such, it is such at present, and according to all calculation, it will always remain so. We might perhaps affirm for a number of reasons, that the day is not far distant when it will assume a prouder station in the estimation of the world than any that it has heretofore occupied. Constantinople never will be the modest capital of an humble province. If the Russians had become masters of it, Russia would have been converted into a colony. The possessors of Constantinople would have removed the seat of their empire to the banks of the Bosphorus and left the north wind undisturbed ruler of the shores of the Neva.

In all wars undertaken since the invention of gun-powder, the powers of Europe, deceived by their ambition, have never been able to reduce their expectations to a degree of moderation which the modern manner of making war requires. They entertained the most gigantic projects. They thought of nothing less than treating nations in the manner of Alexander or Gengis-Khan; and after advancing some leagues into the country, concluded a peace, almost as much enfeebled as their adversary. The reason of this is discovered by examining the military system of the present day; the wants of a modern army and the numerous equipage that follows in its train, on account of the artillery and stores, require that its movements should be made with a view to supplies of subsistence, forage, cannon, powder and bullets. Hence it must always be near its magazines and fortified places. If the extreme folly of some kings and generals, in the defence which they have opposed to an enemy, have given some occasion to doubt the truth of this observation, it must be considered as an exception which does not affect the validity of the rule.

But there is another principle of a higher order and no less indubitable : it is, that nature herself has circumscribed nations within certain limits and that it is one of her laws that the human race should be composed of many families entirely independent of each other. Ambition has attempted to overcome this principle ; but by a natural elasticity, it renews and extends its operation. This idea is carefully cherished by different nations and its influence is stronger in proportion as a people become enlightened, because they then understand their interests and are more capable of reasoning justly upon the ambitious projects of their government. It was this eternal principle that gave birth to the plan of preserving the balance of power in Europe ; and by the kindness of Providence, this system has in its turn received a new force from the invention of gun-powder and the difficulty which the use of fire-arms opposes to rapidity of conquest.* It is to be hoped that these truths will be one day understood ; that men will not attempt to deny them by words or actions ; that they will preserve the tranquility of nations, and with their tranquility their happiness.

If there ever was a striking illustration of the truth of these remarks, it was in the last war between Russia and Turkey. All the chances of war were against the latter. Russia had a decided military superiority, not only in the tactics and discipline of her troops, but in her position, which since the invasion of the Crimea had become extremely dangerous to Turkey. She had also the recollection of former victories and her army was as full of confidence as that of her rival was of despondency. The alliance and co-operation of Austria, the neutrality of France, the luke-

* We have demonstrated the truth of these observations, from the evidence of history and experience of all ages, and applied them to the examination of the future state of Europe in a work entitled "*The art of war among the most celebrated nations of antiquity or modern times,*" or "*Inquiries into the true theory of war,*" printed at Paris, by Cordier and Legras, in 1805.

warmness of Prussia and England, who by the contrivances of the empress, were content with offering their mediation, without backing their offer by menaces, all conspired against Turkey. Relying upon herself alone, having a bad army and worse generals, reigning over subjects, some of whom were in open rebellion in the heart of the empire, others secretly corrupted, and an immense number of the rest entirely indifferent, Turkey seemed to be an edifice of loose stones, which the least push would overthrow. How did it happen then that Russia did not tumble it to the ground? We answer, because she herself prevented it. Turkey was preserved by the weakness of Russia and not by her own strength. The armies of Russia could not advance, because they did not know how to supply their wants, nor how to secure their operations from dangers resulting from a defect in the operations themselves. At last the interposition of the other European powers, which might have been expected sooner or later, actually occurred. It was necessary that she should abandon her prey, and Turkey was saved without being able in any manner to attribute her preservation to herself. The Turks from the natural state of their empire, might have adopted an admirable plan of defence against the Russians; that is, by shutting up the infantry in fortified places, and keeping the field with the cavalry alone. If the cavalry had then conducted with sagacity the war of light troops (which they have never done) they would have so fatigued and injured the enemy, inflicted so many evils upon him by creating a privation of every necessary article, that it would have been impossible for him to have made further progress. The Russians would have been obliged to act in small bodies, whose number would be in proportion to the means of subsistence. These small armies would then be formidable on this ground, that their number was adapted to the situation and resources of the country ;*

* This is a copious subject, and one which we dare to pronounce new ; if it has been touched upon, it has by no means been thoroughly analyzed.

but on the other hand their weakness would expose them to the danger of being crushed by the multitude of their enemies. The perfection to which the art of war has arrived at the present day thus furnishes an obstacle to the overthrow of empires, and to revolutions by force of arms ; a species of revolution the most protracted and disastrous that a nation can possibly experience.

But the hazardous projects and speculations of a government do not detract in the least from the merit of a soldier, who, without embarrassing his mind with reflecting whether the designs of his cabinet are just or not, ought to employ himself in their execution as far as it respects himself with zeal, intelligence, courage and patriotism. Did these virtues ever shine more conspicuously than in the conduct of Souvarof, during the war, of which we have just given an account ? How noble was his devotion to the interests of the allies of his sovereign, with what bravery did he succour them in embarrassing circumstances, with how much skill did he extricate them from critical situations, without making them solicit his assistance or without exaggerating his value, without any delay, objection or jealousy, and by his modest and unaffected conduct after a victory, leaving the honour of it to others ? In a military point of view, what vigour in his movements, what fire, what courage, what justness of reasoning, what method in attack, what influence over his soldiers, who counted not their enemies nor thought victory doubtful when he was with them ? These rare qualities, the prudence of Souvarof, which equalled his boldness, his wisdom in providing the means of

Its importance requires that it should be made the subject of a separate work. This book will throw a new light on the theory of war. We can there see the cause of many surprising disasters and the reasons of many successes which appear to be equally unaccountable. We shall discover new motives to military expeditions and a likelihood of success in many of them which appear to be entirely destitute of it. We shall learn too, that great armies are not always the cause of great success.

success, his brilliant victories won by his foresight, activity and genius, so many skirmishes and two grand battles gained, an assault like that of Ismahil, all concur in proving, beyond the possibility of a doubt, that Souvarof was a most consummate general. We place him, from this time on the list of great commanders, and our opinion will be confirmed by every profound observer.

CHAPTER V.

Last war in Poland—Souvarof, commander in chief of the Russian armies in that country, totally defeats the Polish confederates—Rapidity of his conquest—Poland is subdued and definitively partitioned—Reflections upon the war and its consequences—Souvarof is created field-marshal.

AFTER he returned to Petersburg, Souvarof re-visited Turkey no more. During the campaign of 1791 he was employed in Finland, where he had the general command of the land troops and flotilla stationed on its borders. The object of his mission was to inspect the frontiers of Finland on the side of Sweden, and to suggest a plan of fortification which should effectually secure this country against a sudden invasion by the Swedes, similar to that which had taken place at the commencement of the war which had just terminated.* Souvarof completed his plan and returned to Petersburg to lay it before the empress. As she approved of it, he soon returned to superintend its execution. Finland was placed by him in such a respectable posture of defence, that Russia was for the future in no danger of receiving insults from that quarter.

* In 1788 Gustavus III. suddenly declared war against the empress Catharine II. and appeared almost at the same time with an army and fleet before Fredericksham, a fortress of Russian Finland. It was the only one which protected Petersburg on the side of Sweden. This fortress was at that time in a deplorable state, and unprovided with artillery. If the Swedish officers had not been discontented with their king or gained over by Russia, if they had done their duty, Gustavus would have carried Fredericksham by a coup-de-main and arrived at Petersburg without any further impediment. At least this would have been the result of the state of things, as all the Russian troops were then employed against the Turks. The Swedes have usually more to fear from the Russians for their part of Finland, than the Russians have cause

Although peace had not given to the Russians all that they flattered themselves they would obtain by the war, it still placed them in a formidable and menacing attitude to their rivals. Turkey humiliated, weakened and divided, could not help sinking deeper into that state of languor which had been creeping over her for a century. Russia on the contrary, triumphant and strengthened by an acquisition of territory, which considerably augmented her power, had been obliged to yield to a number of circumstances which united in compelling her to relinquish her great projects; but nevertheless she still entertained the hope of being able to resume them with advantage at some future day. In the prosecution of extensive views, it was necessary to make these new acquisitions the powerful centre from which the bolt that would crush Turkey, should be hurled. The situation and fertility of these provinces were both favourable to the improvement of agriculture, commerce, and of course population; and it only required the steady action of an intelligent administration to make them a source of increasing prosperity to Russia and an arsenal of destruction for her enemies. Catharine, convinced of this truth, and seriously anxious to render these countries flourishing, imagined that it was necessary to commit this trust to the most able hands in her empire. As it was of the highest importance that the military should be in good order, she thought she could not do better than confide its direction to Souvarof. She accordingly appointed him commander in chief of all the troops included in the three governments of Ekaterinoslaf, the Crimea and Oczakof, as far as the mouth of the Dniester. The count departed and

to dread an attack from the Swedes. The position of Swedish Finland is such that it is untenable when Russia invades it with a strong force. This is fully proved by Lloyd in the chapter of his "Political and Military Memoirs," in which he examines the frontiers of the different countries in Europe. Thus the occupation of Swedish Finland by Russia, can never prove the superiority of the latter over the former, but merely the infallibility of the principles of the system of modern warfare.

established his head-quarters at Cherson, where he remained for two years, employed in fortifying the frontiers, introducing a higher discipline among the troops, and arranging every thing in such a way, that in case of another rupture, Russia might be ready to invade the territory of the enemy. Thus the life of Souvarof, in time of quiet and peace, offers nothing very interesting or varied ; but it shews us the pleasing and rare spectacle of a man, who devoted his life to the performance of his duty, and whose enjoyments entirely consisted in rendering services to his country.

In the mean time the Poles, who notwithstanding the treaty and apparent amity which connected them with Russia, had not ceased to regard that power as their worst enemy ; who had not forgotten the outrage that had been committed by the partition of their country and the blows aimed at their liberty ; who hoped to free themselves from all foreign influence by taking advantage of the commotions which agitated Europe, of the Russian war against Turkey and Sweden, of the revolution in France and the employment that this strange event furnished to the courts of Vienna and Berlin, had annulled by resolutions of the diet, since the year 1788, and the commencement of the Turkish war, the constitution which the empress had forced them to accept in 1775. As Catharine had enough to attend to just at this time, she dissembled ; but she reserved her vengeance, until a favourable moment for inflicting it. In 1791, the Poles tried her patience still further. The mania of making constitutions then infected every head in Europe, and the Poles proposed one to their chief to which all the nation acceded. By an article in this constitution the crown was made hereditary. This wise measure tended to give their monarchy the same stability which the other monarchies of Europe enjoyed. Actuated by a sound policy, or by a jealousy of Russia and anxiety to prevent her aggrandizement, or perhaps by a wish to deceive the Poles with regard to his real designs, the king of Prussia approved

of their conduct and seemed to witness without repugnance, the escape of this people from the anarchy to which they had been long condemned, and their approaches to a stable and regular government. Besides, Prussia already meditated war against France, and Pilnitz had seen within its walls William and Leopold, who forgetful of the quarrels of their fathers; had united themselves by a treaty, which was a master stroke of policy, since it drew together all the powers of the German empire. Nature had destined this people to be indissolubly united and this treaty made the steady, wise and peaceful nation of Germany the director of Europe and pælladium of its liberty. Happy would they have been, if the ulterior views of ambition had not misguided them, and introduced among them a want of unanimity, then a separation of their forces, and finally conducted all of them to their ruin.

Austria was governed by the same reasons as Prussia, in refraining from interrupting the Poles in their creation of a constitution. Whilst the event of the projected war with France was uncertain, and it was as yet impossible to calculate the number of forces which its continuance would require, it was more advantageous for Austria to see Poland erected into an independent monarchy, than to see it pass under the yoke of Russia. But the ambition of Russia was stimulated by precisely the same motives with the others. Catharine wished to revenge herself and to subjugate Poland as by this means she gratified two favourite passions of her heart; and occupied with this project, she perceived that Europe was in such a situation, that it could not throw the least impediment in the way of its execution. This circumstance alone was a powerful excitement. The comprehensive policy of Catharine, moreover, could not permit her to allow Poland to be organized, and to be put into the way of becoming a strong and formidable state. What would she not then have had to fear? With what care would she not have been obliged to watch it? What plan could she have adopted to calm or seduce this

exasperated people, who finding power in their hands and being assisted by the troops of France, of Turkey, of Sweden, and perhaps of Prussia, would have afforded a passage to all the enemies of Russia and put themselves at their head? It was impossible that Catharine should expose herself to this danger. If her policy had been less passionate and more prudent in the commencement of her reign, the relations between Poland and Russia would not have been in such a situation in 1791. But the work was of such a nature, that as it was once begun it was necessary to finish it to prevent it from being fatal to its author. The first partition of Poland was an act of horrible iniquity; the last was, at least on the part of Russia, a necessary injustice.

The conduct of the Poles was such as to excite no more sympathy for them in this new crisis than in those into which they had before been thrown by fortune or their enemies, or themselves. We dread being unjust, but we must avow, that it is impossible for us to see in what point of view this frivolous and inconsistent nation can inspire an interest, (we must be understood as speaking of an interest for their political destiny.) In the last struggle which Poland maintained for its independence, she manifested her levity, her imprudence and her usual precipitation. How could she hope to overawe the Russians by publicly declaring herself opposed to them, and how could she hope to resist their numerous and warlike armies which would soon be poured in upon her territory, by a conduct so little concealed, so foolishly open as that which she pursued? Catharine, who wished for nothing better than to be provoked, pretended to be exasperated, because the Poles had violated the constitution which she had guaranteed, and because they had dared to make a new one for themselves. Finally, in order to have a pretext for playing the part of a conqueror, she solemnly declared war against Poland, through her minister at Warsaw. The diet received this declaration with an air of calmness and grandeur. But it

resembled a scene in the theatre, where all the sentiments are fictitious, and it deserved to meet with a similar result. In reading the Roman History we are struck with seeing the Senate receive with mild dignity, the intelligence of the most overpowering disasters; but in the most eventful times of the Roman senate, their virtues, the recollection of their triumphs, the esteem and confidence of their subjects remained; it could be calm, tranquil, and grand under misfortune, without being accused of ostentation. But whence was derived the title of the Polish diet to imitate the Roman senate?

If this title was unfounded, the powers of the diet were no less so. Instead of foreseeing the part which Russia would act and endeavouring to avoid the danger, the diet waited for the ultimate decision of its enemy, before it adopted any measures at all. When this decision was made known, an army was hastily levied; and to insure the effect of this multitude, precipitately and tumultuously assembled, against victorious and veteran bands, they gave the command to prince Joseph Poniatowski.* But before this army was collected, the Russian troops returning from the frontiers of Turkey, penetrated into Poland in different corps and at different points, and threatened the dispersion or destruction of the patriot forces.

As Catharine well knew, both by celebrated examples and her own experience, that policy has produced greater changes in the world than war, and that its influence when brought to assist the force of arms, gives them a double efficacy in their operation, she carried on intrigues in Poland to attach partizans to her cause, and negotiated at the same time with the courts of Vienna and Berlin, to induce them to co-operate in

* Nephew of the former king of Poland; less handsome, less amiable, less sprightly and less interesting than his uncle in private life; but equally as frivolous and inconsistent in his public life.

the grand work that she meditated. From the manner in which she prosecuted her schemes, she succeeded with both courts. The lure of a fair portion of Poland was held out to seduce them, and to the effect of this motive we may add the inquietude which they felt, lest the empress should execute the project alone, if they refused to join her. Besides, Prussia and Austria began to apprehend that the revolution in Poland, from the appearances which it exhibited, would be only a powerful diversion in favour of the French and the new principles which they had adopted; they feared that Europe, pressed upon the east and west by two numerous, celebrated nations, carrying the spirit of innovation even to fanaticism, would see its ancient social edifice overthrown, falling amidst the ruins of crowns and broken sceptres. The fear arising from this source, the prospect of augmenting their dominions, always alluring to kings, and the authority of Catharine, whose opinions possessed great influence in the cabinets of Europe, were motives more than sufficient to determine the conduct of the inexperienced monarchs who governed Prussia and Austria.* Under the protection of the first of these

* These were Frederick William II. and Francis II. Frederick William had reached a mature age, but not having taken any part in public affairs during the life of his uncle, Frederick the great, he had had no opportunity of acquiring information before his reign, and he was not long enough upon the throne to obtain it. This prince, who was ambitious and anxious to distinguish his reign, unfortunately for himself and his people, was fond of the pleasures of luxury, the greatest defect that a king of Prussia can possibly possess. It was not necessary that Frederick the great should have a successor like himself; (far if it was necessary to sustain a monarchy, that two Fredericks should follow in succession, what monarchy could be continued?) it only required a wise, economical and moderate prince, who would not depart from the circle traced out by his predecessor. The *status quo* of Europe should be the basis of the politics of Prussia, for no other power can lose as much as she by alterations and revolutions. Frederick William thought the contrary, and died without being convinced of his error; but his son paid dearly for his mistake. Frederick William II. by his example, introduced fashionable frivolity among the Prussians, and

princes and Russia, a confederation assembled at Grodno, in the month of April, 1793, the object of which was, to revoke every thing that had been done by that of Warsaw, in 1791. This confederation was composed of partizans which Russia had been able to gain over to her side during this interval. Among them may be observed some of the first names in Poland, having at their head the king, that old automaton of Catharine, who had not been able to detach himself from the hand, by which he had been so long guided. The empress, by her minister, declared to this confederation, that she incorporated with her dominions all that part of Poland occupied by her troops. In the mean time the troops of the king of Prussia had occupied another part. As the confederation

frivolous Prussians would lose in one campaign what Frederick the great had gloriously and with difficulty acquired in twenty. We will be so bold as to say, that this intelligent monarch who had assisted in the first partition of Poland, would not have consented to the last. The dismemberment and annihilation of Poland were two different things. As to the French revolutionists Frederick would not have made war upon them, but would have been content as long as they remained within their ancient limits. By this prudent conduct he would have made himself respected in Europe, and would have held the balance of power in his hands. He would at the same time have husbanded his resources, and become the arbiter of the quarrel between the Russians and Poles. He would have prevented the latter from creating a revolution at home, dangerous to themselves and their neighbours; and he would have prevented the former from taking advantage of this crisis to destroy the monarchy of Poland. This, which was the true interest of Prussia was equally true as to Austria, but in a less degree. The Austrian monarchy possesses more stability than the Prussian, and can sustain many more shocks without being overthrown. It has not so much reason as its neighbour to dread the agitation of Europe and the ambition of other powers. At the same time we think that the father and grand-mother of Francis II. would have adopted a different line of conduct from the one which he pursued, in the same circumstances. This monarch, easy in his disposition, has been frequently led into error by bad counsels. But his goodness atones for the absence of many brilliant qualities; and cherished by his people, whom he has made happy, he performs, in the view of a philosopher, the duty of a king upon the earth.

opposed no obstacle to these invasions, but consented to them by their silence and submission, these foreign troops were established by a sort of legitimate authority upon the Polish territories.

This was not conformable, however, to the views of the nation and this dissent was soon apparent. Mutinies and partial insurrections occurred every where. The Russians were obliged to be guilty of outrages to repress these excesses. They mercilessly treated Poland as a conquered country, and made her feel all the heaviness of their yoke.

The principal chiefs of the insurgents, the authors and supporters of the constitution of 1791, had been compelled to fly into foreign countries. Kosciusko may be distinguished among them.* This celebrated officer, who had recently signalized himself in various skirmishes with the Russians as commander of the advance guard of the army of prince Joseph Poniatowski, had been forced to quit Poland in consequence of the confederation of 1793, and the occupation of the country by the Russian armies, and had retired into Germany. But he was soon recalled to the Polish frontiers, by a deputation of his compatriots who had induced him to put

* Thaddeus Kosciusko was a gentleman of Lithuania. After having commenced his career in the service of Poland, he served his apprenticeship to war in an excellent school of patriotism and military virtue—the school of Washington. Returning to Poland, he enjoyed the reputation of a good officer, and was designated by public opinion, to be one of the leaders of the first army of the insurgents, the supreme command of which was given to prince Joseph Poniatowski. He originated, and after many varieties, ended the insurrection of Poland; for after the Russians took him prisoner at Matcheviz, the affairs of Poland constantly declined. He was treated with severity in his prison at Petersburg, during the life of Catharine. Paul the first restored him to liberty. He then repaired to Philadelphia, but soon returned to Paris where he remains at this time. We shall have occasion to speak of his services, and to appreciate his military talents.

himself at their head and deliver them from their enemies. The motions of a man so well known as Kosciusko could not be kept secret. The offended Russians adopted measures to counteract them; and Kosciusko, fearful of being carried off by force, and seeing that things were not ripe enough for a general insurrection, made a journey into Italy. His stay there was not long. Other chiefs of the insurgents, less conspicuous than himself, collected a party sufficiently numerous to commence operations. As the Russians became more secure, they became less watchful. They had neglected to compel colonel Madalinsky to disband his regiment, according to the orders which he had received. This regiment was destined to be the germ of a new army in favour of Polish liberty. It was in garrison at Cracow. This spot had been selected, because it was so remote, that the Russians would probably feel no inquietude, lest it should be the rallying point of a new party, and they hastened to write to Kosciusko to join them there. He did not require much persuasion, and in the month of March, 1794, he joined his companions in arms, who elected him their commander in chief. Five thousand men, composed of infantry and cavalry, with several hundred peasants constituted the force with which he commenced his noble but arduous career. His first trial of strength was fortunate. All the Russians who were cantoned in the Palatinata of Cracow, were collected to crush this new insurrection at its birth. Kosciusko attacked and put them to flight after a bloody combat. This success increased the confidence of the troops in their leader, and perhaps a little too much his confidence in himself.

As soon as the news of this victory was spread through the country, the Poles became, as it were, inebriated. They no longer regarded danger: they forgot that they were surrounded by powerful and valiant enemies; they rose on all sides, without reflecting how they could sustain this moment of effervescence. At Warsaw, the Russian general Igovestroom

adopted vigorous measures to repress the commotion, but they were not successful ; his force was not equal to the occasion. The garrison, amounting to two thousand men, was massacred and the general obliged to fly with precipitation. The example of the capital was imitated by the provinces, and the capture or massacre of the Russians was every where multiplied. The imprudent Poles, thus in some measure, made the vengeance legitimate, which was preparing to overwhelm them. The thunder of the storm began to rumble.

Souvarof had received orders to quit Cherson, to disarm in the Ukraine and Red-Russia the Polish regiments which had passed into the service of Russia, since the declaration of the empress to the confederation at Grodno. These regiments, which violence alone had enlisted under any other banners than those of their country, were roused as soon as they were apprised of the insurrection of their fellow-citizens. Their revolt would have been exceedingly dangerous, as they were armed, and if they had re-entered the territory of Poland and joined the insurgents, they would have augmented their number and power. The number of the Russian troops was trifling, in the part of the country which these Polish regiments occupied. This circumstance rendered the process of disarming them more difficult, and the accomplishment of it required an officer of great capacity, great prudence and great courage. Catharine knew where to find a man in whom these qualities were united ; she charged Souvarof with the execution of the commission.

The count set out from Cherson in the month of May, 1794, with a corps of ten thousand men, and proceeded by forced marches into Red Russia. When he arrived there he formed his plan to surprise the Poles, surround and disarm them without being obliged to shed blood. He communicated to the generals who served under his orders, the dispositions which he had made, the principal of which were these ; to march

on the same day upon given points (the day appointed was the 26th of May;) to arrive at these points, after occupying all outlets, so that the Poles could not escape; to employ gentleness and persuasion to induce them to surrender their arms without opposition, by promising to restore them to all those who would enter the service of Russia; to send off immediately, all who chose to do so, under an escort, that they might be incorporated into different regiments; to give passports to those who wished to return to their homes; to pay what arrears might be due, and form them into small bodies so that they might be carefully escorted to the place of their destination; finally, to display the greatest firmness in case of resistance. There was no resistance; the measures were so proper and executed with so much precision, the officers who served under Souvarof were so accustomed to follow his orders throughout their whole tenor and extent, and through every difficulty, that the operation of disarming the Polish regiments was completed without violence and without delay. In less than fifteen days, Souvarof disarmed eight thousand men, in a circuit of nearly two hundred leagues, without spilling a drop of blood.

The count having thus by his vigilance, his prudence and his vigour, happily executed the important and perplexing commission with which he had been entrusted, immediately received another more important and more analogous to his bravery and talents. The insurrection had become general in Poland: and although the Russians under the orders of the generals Fersen and Derfelden had obtained many advantages over the insurgents; although the king of Prussia, who had advanced in person at the head of his troops, to sustain the Russians after the massacre at Warsaw, had gained conjointly with them, an important victory over Kosciusko at Zakrorzim; yet the celerity of the Polish commander, in restoring his losses, and the resources which he found in the confidence of his nation, had enabled him to re-appear upon

the scene of action in a respectable condition. Every thing seems to announce, that the patriot party in Poland would have maintained itself for a long time, and disputed fiercely the possession of the tattered remnant of their country with its ravishers ; if the assistance of one of those men, before whom every thing bends, because they have on their side the irresistible force of perseverance and genius united, had not been called in to triumph over the number, the courage, the exaltation and the despair of a whole people, and to overcome obstacles which common prejudices would deem insurmountable. Unfortunately for Polish liberty, Souvarof was one of these men, and was instructed by his sovereign to terminate this war.

He was at first enjoined to set out with the few troops which he had around him ; but the general command of all those in Poland afterwards devolved upon him. In consequence of this, Souvarof sent to the chiefs commanding the different corps scattered through the provinces in which the Poles had been disarmed, commanding them to march immediately ; and pointing out the route which he wished them to take, he designated as a place of rendezvous the town of Varkovitz, situated on what, by the first partition, became the new frontiers of Poland. He himself, departed from Niemerof on the 14th of August, 1794, having with him eight thousand five hundred men.

Conformably to his favourite principle (a principle which belonged to his character, and which all the wars that he conducted gave him an opportunity of displaying with great success) Souvarof marched with extreme diligence, knowing that the event of this war, more than any other, depended upon the vigour with which it was carried on. In spite of the continual rain which had deepened the roads and rendered the passage of rivers excessively difficult, he moved over in eight days, the eighty-four leagues which separate Niemerof

from Varkovitz. To keep up the courage of his troops in these extraordinary fatigues, he himself set the example of enduring all sorts of hardships. Always at the head of his army, lightly clad, mounted on a little Cossack horse, eating what his soldiers ate, and lying in the midst of them, he taught them that it was necessary to brave every difficulty for the service of their sovereign and the honour of their country, and that this duty was so imperious that their general did not think himself exempted from fulfilling it in all its severity.* This devotedness of a general, which necessarily draws after it that of all the other officers, is more certain of producing the intended effect upon an army, as the soldiers know that their commander has every means of moving with convenience in his power and thus the merit of subjecting himself to the fatigues which they are obliged to support, appears full and

* Hannibal mounted upon an elephant in the day of battle, but in marching he was always on foot at the head of his troops. Cæsar constantly did it. It was the custom of Roman consuls, nay, it was even enjoined upon them. Cars were given to them after a victory, but not to go in quest of it. We do not find that the great men of Greece adopted any other usage, from Miltiades to Alexander. Modern times have seen Gustavus Adolphus on horseback at the head of his brave troops; the prejudices of the age would not have permitted a king, nor even a gentleman, to appear in any other way before an army. The infantry were more valued in the time of Turenne, and this great man profited by it, to follow the example of Hannibal and Cæsar, whom he imitated in all other respects. Frederick, the rival of all three, was ignorant of the luxury of carriages. It is a singular invention, which, in an army, forms a ridiculous contrast with military apparatus. There are circumstances where simplicity is enjoined by necessity as well as principle, and generals attach a value, from utility as well as sentiment, to the plan of making themselves personally known to their troops, and of being always seen, that they may be more loved and better obeyed. We believe for example, that Xenophon wisely followed this maxim in the retreat of the ten thousand; Alexander in leading a handful of men to the conquest of an immense empire; Hannibal in his celebrated march from Spain into Italy; Cæsar in hastening from Africa against Pharnaces, and Frederick from Rosbach to Leuthen.

entire. Souvarof, like a great warrior, knew the advantage of this practice ; and few generals, ancient or modern, could enumerate as many successes as he, which this mode of conduct had obtained.

The other corps having arrived at Varkovitz, in a very few days after Souvarof himself arrived there, he gave some repose to his army. He employed this interval in repairing every damage which had been occasioned by the rapidity of his march, and making his troops bake bread enough for a month, as they would find in advancing into Poland a ruined country, destitute of provisions. After having taken these precautions, the count made every arrangement for marching forward, expecting (and with some degree of certainty) that this reinforcement of twelve thousand men with himself at their head, united to the troops which the Russians and Prussians already had in Poland, would speedily effect the entire reduction of the country ; when he suddenly received intelligence that the king of Prussia, who had laid siege to Warsaw after his victory over Kosciusko, had been obliged to leave that place with precipitation and hasten to the south of Prussia, where a dangerous insurrection was bursting forth. To add to the misfortune, general Fersen, who seconded the operations of the Prussian monarch, not being able to carry them on alone, had also been obliged to raise the siege. Since that time he had been lying at some distance from the city, on the left bank of the Vistula, from which place it was impossible to give the least assistance to Souvarof ; for he had in front of him a numerous army of Poles, placed there for the special purpose of preventing him from crossing to the right bank.

Events so unexpected would certainly have induced any other general than Souvarof to stop short, without being subjected to censure. He would have acted on the defensive, demanded reinforcements and fresh instructions, and would not have endangered the safety of an army, who might be

ruined by pushing forward. Souvarof in this critical position, when fortune seemed determined to retard his victory, resolved to accelerate its approach. As obstacles multiplied in his path, he increased the rapidity of his march. He came as an auxiliary to others, but he fought without assistance. Not one could co-operate with him in the conquest of Poland, he then completed it alone; and posterity cannot say that the least part of the work which Souvarof was called to execute remained unaccomplished.

He instantly formed his plan; for his conduct from the time of his entering Poland to the assault of Praga proves that we do not attribute to him more reflection than he really entertained. This plan consisted in approximating towards his corps, all the Russian troops who were scattered through the country, so as to form one entire body, and in the mean time to continue to advance with confidence and boldness. By ordering all the different corps to join him, Souvarof collected a respectable army which might intimidate the enemy; he acquired the means of undertaking something decisive; and he drove his enemy by this manœuvre to the necessity of uniting his forces also, in which case, one battle would decide the fate of Poland. By adopting the bold resolution of continuing his march into the interior of the country, he astonished the enemy and kept them in suspense; he allowed no time for reflecting upon the advantage which they had gained by the relinquishment of the siege of Warsaw; he kept them in uncertainty with regard to the number of his troops; he prevented them from sending detachments or occupying positions which might impede the junction of the Russian troops, but on the contrary, he facilitated their union, which when once effected, assured him the superiority which he desired. We may readily imagine, that a man of the temper of Souvarof, was essential to the conception and execution of this plan. An ordinary general, who would not have been so sure of his own powers

and his ascendancy over his soldiers, would have been in danger of being surrounded, by acting in this manner. He might perhaps, have obtained some victories, but even these victories would have wasted his strength. His march, which would have been uncertain and slow, would have given time to the enemy to rally after a defeat, and return continually to the combat; and in proportion as the enemy would have received fresh courage and confidence, the troops of this general would have experienced lassitude and despondency. In admiring great men, it is necessary to reflect deeply on the example which they afford, and not imprudently attempt to imitate them; for they sometimes engage in enterprizes, in which no one else could succeed.

This undertaking of Souvarof was a model of vigorous conception and vigorous execution united. It is impossible to divine what would have been the result of the insurrection in Poland and its influence over the fate of that country and of all Europe (especially since the Russians, escaping from massacre, had since acted on the defensive, and the king of Prussia so far from assisting them was obliged to support himself against his own subjects) if Souvarof, reasoning according to the prudence and circumspection of a common man, had permitted himself to stop for an instant. We will say more; generals as able and experienced as Souvarof, but devoid of his resolution and inflexible courage, which, during fifty years of war had been intimidated by nothing, but which on the contrary, increased by opposition;—generals upon whom heaven had not conferred an energy of character independently of talents and genius, to the same degree that it had upon our hero, would have failed in the conquest of Poland, because it would have been impossible for them not to have hesitated upon the means of effecting it. Like Souvarof, they would, doubtless, have seen that these means consisted in the prompt defeat of the Poles. But Souvarof saw more; he saw the certainty of vanquishing them, because he felt himself

invincible ; and this new Achilles advanced, sure that his aspect alone would intimidate his enemies. When the empress Catharine, at the conclusion of this war, set no bounds to her gratitude to her general, it was because, that, independently of the pleasure which she received from the possession of a new crown, she knew how imminent was the peril from which Souvarof had delivered the throne of Russia.

The count upon leaving Varkovitz, repaired to Kovel, at the distance of eighteen miles, and was there joined by the last divisions for which he waited. His corps after this junction amounted to twelve thousand men. He knew that the Polish general Sirakovski, who was at the head of twenty thousand combatants had pushed his advanced guard as far as Kobrin. He resolved to go in search of him and signalize his entry into Poland, by a victory over this chief, one of the principal insurgents.

After having exhorted his troops not to be disheartened by fatigue, or the number of the enemy, Souvarof moved forward determined not to stop until he had destroyed or dispersed the troops of Sirakovski. Eight hundred Cossacks preceded him, who had orders to charge the enemy as soon as they came up to them, without waiting for the infantry.* These

* Souvarof had a particular esteem for the Cossacks. He evidenced it by often adopting their costume, by riding horses similar to theirs, by speaking their language and by being constantly surrounded by some of them. Souvarof, who profoundly understood modern war, and was deeply versed in the knowledge of mankind, had his reasons for being fond of the Cossacks. These devastating plunderers, who are more expensive than useful when they make war according to their ancient mode, in independent bodies, unite in themselves every military quality, and can always be employed with success when they are subjected to the rules of order and discipline. Brave, intelligent, active, robust, patient, zealous, faithful, obedient and ardent, the Cossacks render every service that can be expected from the best troops. They excel especially in the war of light troops. The ease with which they are supported, their indifference to all temperatures which they endure day or

brave men, on whom the voice of Souvarof was never spent in vain, punctually executed the orders which they had received from their general. When they met the advanced guard of the Poles at some distance from Kobrin, they rushed upon them with a precipitation which allowed no time for reflection. The enemy had three hundred men cut to pieces, a hundred taken prisoners, and the remainder were put to flight. By the time the infantry arrived, every thing was finished. At Kobrin, they found a great abundance of corn and forage, which was very a propos to the Russians, as they were in extreme want. Nothing proves the excellence of the system of rapid marches more than the capture of these magazines from the enemy, who had not time to destroy them, and the enjoyment of which refreshed the Russians after their fatigues.

Sirakovski was near Kroupezize with a corps of eighteen thousand men, in a very advantageous position behind a large and deep marsh, two hundred paces over, on each side of which were woody hills. The approach was defended by five heavy batteries. In this state of things, it was necessary either to turn the enemy's flank, and Souvarof had not a sufficient number of troops for that; or to remain in that situation, which time would not permit; or to retreat, but Souvarof

night in the open air, the smallness of their equipage, which is confined to the garments which they have on their body; finally, their skill in horsemanship, added to the diminitiveness and agility of their horses, who with the same ease traverse mountains, plains, marshes and rivers, and eat of every thing which the earth produces;—all these circumstances united, make the Cossacks the best partizan troops in the world, when military discipline arrests their plundering disposition and employs them for the general good of an army instead of their own individual benefit. The injury which can be done to an enemy in the modern system of war, with troops so numerous and little expensive as the Cossacks, is incalculable. Souvarof was convinced of this; he contributed more than any other person, to give them their just value in the Russian army; and more than one foreign army has learned, with sorrow, the part which he instructed them to perform.

never retreated ; or to advance and attack the enemy, which he resolved to do.

He accordingly gave orders for the attack.* The infantry crossed the marsh, in spite of the most disheartening obstacles, and exposed to the constant fire of the enemy. Nothing stopped the progress of the Russians, however great were the difficulties which they had to surmount ; for the general under whom they were accustomed to conquer, was with them. Some made use of beams and planks which they tore from the neighbouring cabins, and threw into the marsh to form a crossing place ; others disengaged themselves by their own efforts. Of all the artillery, only four pieces could be got over, which the soldiers carried on their shoulders. The rest were left behind under an escort. Three squadrons of hussars and all the Cossacks crossed the marsh upon the two wings at the same time with the infantry.

As soon as the troops had crossed the marsh (which occupied nearly an hour) they formed, mounted the little hill, and marched rapidly against the enemy, who received them with a severe fire of grape shot. The Russians discharged only a few shot, and then fell upon the Polish lines with the bayonet. The corps of Sirakovski defended themselves with obstinacy ; but notwithstanding the great superiority of their artillery, they were thrown into disorder and lost a number of men. Sirakovski then began to think seriously of a retreat. He formed a square with three close columns, with the cavalry upon the flanks, and retired slowly. At this time the Russian cavalry arrived, which had made a circuit, and

* This relation of the double victory obtained by Souvarof over the Polish general Sirokovski, is drawn from an abstract of the campaigns of Souvarof, contained in a work, entitled "*Campaigns of the Austro-Russian in Italy, in 1799.*" This work, printed in Germany from official documents, is written with accuracy, by a man of science. It has been, and will be hereafter a guide to us, for the pure and simple exposition of military events.

crossed the marsh upon felled trees, leading their horses by the bridles to prevent them from being mired. This cavalry at the same moment attacked the two flanks of the enemy's column, already in full retreat. The Poles experienced anew a considerable loss; they vainly made every imaginable effort to avail themselves of their numerous artillery; but pressed upon all sides by the cavalry and infantry, they were obliged to fly to the woods. Just at this moment night came on and put an end to the pursuit.

The Poles left upon the ground three thousand men, of whom many were officers. The Russians lost a hundred and twenty-five killed, and had two hundred wounded. The Russian infantry contributed more than any other species of force to the success of the day; for they always attacked the enemy with the bayonet, and always destroyed them. Notwithstanding the immense advantage of the position of the Poles, their superiority in numbers and artillery, they were obliged to yield the disputed ground.

A little before midnight, the Russian army was in motion to pursue the enemy, who had retired in a precipitate manner to Brzescia, about sixteen leagues from the field of battle. When the Russians arrived at Teichin, two leagues from Brzescia, they encamped in a retired valley, carefully avoiding whatever might discover them: At night they resumed their march in the utmost silence, and passed the river Muchavez by two fords, one of which was marshy and difficult to cross. Much time was lost in this passage; so that when they arrived on the opposite bank, it was already day. They were yet a league from the Bug. Before they could reach that river, they heard the alarm sounded from the monasteries and bells of Brzescia, announcing their unexpected approach. The Russians then quickened their steps, gained the bank of the river, crossed it by a ford, and hastened to form in line on the opposite bank.

The Russian general Schewitsch, commanded twenty-five squadrons on the right wing; general Islinief commanded the left wing, composed of thirteen squadrons and the greater part of the Cossacks, whilst general Burhau den was in the centre at the head of the infantry and all the field artillery, consisting of fourteen pieces.

The Polish general being persuaded that the Russians could arrive at Brzescia only by the direct road, had formed a battery on the bridge over the Bug, and stationed a regiment there to defend the passage, and hence imagined himself secure in his position. But as soon as he perceived the Russians defiling across the Bug, he hastily struck his camp, and taking a new position, put himself in battle array, and appeared determined to wait with intrepidity for the attack. Souvarof ordered general Schewitsch to attack the left wing of the enemy, with the cavalry of the right wing, and immediately the whole line began to advance. The Poles did not wait for their arrival, but formed themselves into three close columns, with the artillery in the intervals. Each of these columns had nearly thirty men in front, and a hundred in depth. They were sustained by divisions of cavalry, and began to retreat from the right in perfect order. Islinief received orders to advance at a full gallop upon these columns, with the squadrons of the left wing and the Cossacks. He charged the first near a wood, which had a deep ravine in front. As the Russians rose from this ravine, they were received with a discharge of grape shot, and left many of their men and horses on the field. They returned three times to the charge; at length they succeeded in breaking the column, a great part of which was cut to pieces.

The two other columns had removed behind the village of Koroschin, where they occupied a very advantageous height. The Polish general arranged them in order of battle, and seemed determined to stand firm. His new position was ex-

cellent. His front was covered by the village, and his right flank by a very thick wood, where he speedily raised a masked battery of eight heavy pieces of cannon, which he supported by two battalions of chasseurs.

Schewitsch, with twenty-four squadrons, charged the front and flanks of the column nearest to him. The Russians were received with a discharge of grape shot and musquetry; and experienced a vigorous resistance from the column, which defended itself with desperate courage; for, of three thousand infantry who composed it, and a party of cavalry who supported it, there were scarcely a hundred who asked for quarter; almost the whole of them were cut to pieces on the ground on which they stood.

In the mean time the other column was engaged with a few squadrons, and as soon as the attack became general, they experienced the same fate as the former. More of them, however, escaped, because this column had time to disperse, while the others were defending themselves. At the same time, the cavalry of the left wing approached the masked batteries in the wood, which they carried under a terrible fire of grape shot and musquetry. At last, the Cossacks and the four battalions of chasseurs, cut off the retreat of the Poles, and the action was terminated at two in the afternoon.

This battle, which lasted six hours, happened on the 19th of September, 1794. Of all the corps of the enemy, who had more than thirteen thousand men, (three thousand of whom were cavalry,) not more than three hundred escaped; five hundred were made prisoners, and all the rest were strewed upon the field of battle. All the Polish artillery was taken, consisting of twenty pieces, most of them of brass and of a large calibre; and two standards, the only ones which they had, and which they had received from the revolutionary council at Warsaw. Each one had a device, bearing these

words in letters of gold:—Liberty, Equality, Independence.

The Russian army consisted of eight thousand men, of whom nearly four thousand were cavalry. These were all which Souvarof had under his orders, for he had been obliged to make large detachments. The Russians, in this action, had five hundred and fifty killed, and a much greater number wounded.

There are many remarks to be made upon these two successive battles, both of them extraordinary in their details, and important in their results. We perceive Souvarof following in particular actions, the same system which he pursued in planning his campaigns. The same promptness and impetuosity directed him in both, and succeeded in both equally well. Always inferior in numbers to the enemy, he marched against them without stopping to count them; and yet, it is well worthy of remark, that he was guilty of no imprudence or temerity; for he knew how superior his troops were to the Poles, and how superior he himself was to Sirakovski. Merit supplied the deficiency of numbers. The Poles were a different sort of enemy from the Turks, for they manœuvred in the European manner; they managed their artillery with dexterity; most of their officers had served in regular armies, and they were aided by many officers from foreign countries. Nevertheless Souvarof marched against them as he did against the Mussulmen, and yet committed no unthinking or daring folly. He acted from calculation and necessity; and this is satisfactorily proved by the different manner in which he made the attack. When he was opposed to the Turks, he feared neither their artillery, which they knew not how to use, nor their infantry, which could not be kept firm; he feared only their cavalry. Hence his method of attacking them was by marching up in square columns, which the cavalry could not penetrate, but which the artillery would have

destroyed, if it had been well served. In the hands of the Poles the artillery was formidable. What method did he then pursue? He rendered it useless. He attacked it with his tirailleurs, and especially with his cavalry, because there was no apprehension from the cavalry of his adversaries.* The attack was irregular, and as the cannon were difficult to manage, a great part of their effect was lost. The enemy were astonished, and in a country where they might have occupied formidable positions,† they were pressed with such vigour that they scarcely had time to think of a retreat. Thus harassed, the Poles returned with fury to the battle: but the Russians, who attacked them with more steadiness, and were from habit firm and constant, had only a better opportunity of obtaining the victory. They soon took from the Poles the artillery, upon which their hopes rested, and with which they thought themselves invincible; so that thus losing the strength of their army, and not being able to attempt with success a single plan for retrieving their affairs, they were exterminated, in spite of their courage and their terrible despair. We shall soon see this same Souvarof, whom we now observe adopting such just, though opposite methods, to secure victo-

* Souvarof repeated at Brzescia before Sirakovski, as an old and experienced general, the same manœuvre which he had performed at Landskron, before Dumouriez, as a young warrior entering upon service. It was attended with equal success. This confirms what we advanced in the second chapter, that the manœuvre of Souvarof at Landskron, was not entirely arbitrary, and that Dumouriez was wrong in bringing forward such an accusation in the Memoirs of his Life, and in believing that he was vanquished by any other cause than the skill of his adversary. Dumouriez was guilty of a little, ordinary, subterfuge, that his self-love might not be offended.

† Plains intersected by forests, rivers and large marshes, are, since the invention of artillery, far preferable to a mountainous country as military positions, and of course better adapted to a defensive war. With an active and vigorous infantry, as the infantry of all Europe is at present, it is easy to turn a position in the mountains, where artillery and cavalry are very often useless. On the contrary, it is very difficult to take an army in the flank or

ry from two dissimilar nations, display against the French all the intricacies of stratagem and tactics, and conquer these new and formidable enemies, by resorting to the only method in which they could be conquered. The extraordinary ascendancy which Souvarof had acquired over his soldiers, raises him at once above common men, and places him by the side of Alexander, of Hannibal, of Cæsar, of Gustavus, of Henry IV. and of Turenne; and this ascendancy, the immediate gift of Heaven, explains a croud of phenomena, for which ordinary reasoning is unable to account.

The news of the disaster which had happened to Sirakovski, created the strongest sensation at Warsaw, among the people, and among the chiefs. All eyes were turned upon Kosciusko (who enjoyed already almost all the prerogatives and importance of generalissimo,) as the only man capable of re-establishing the ruined circumstances of their country and arresting the progress of the victorious enemy. Kosciusko, like a devoted patriot, undertook this double duty, and immediately began its performance. He formed his plans like a wise and able statesman. He sent pressing orders to all the Polish corps scattered along the banks of the Vistula, to repair to his standard. At the same time he ordered general Makranovski, who commanded all the divisions of the insurgents in Lithuania, and who was himself at Grodno, to put his troops in motion and place himself in the rear of Souvarof. On the other hand, he sent strong reinforcements to the remains of the corps of Sirakovski, which after the battle of

rear, which is covered by marshes and woods. In order to effect it, immense numbers are necessary, and they must be drawn out in such a way as to be exposed to imminent danger; and, besides, in the plains, the artillery and cavalry of the enemy are always ready to overwhelm them. If Sirakovski had been more perfect, or rather, if Souvarof had been less perfect and less resolute, the Russians must have been lost. If he had amused himself in manœuvring, he would not have remained eight days in Poland; he could not have acted otherwise than he did.

Brzescia had retired to within six miles of Warsaw, and charged this general to stop Souvarof in front. Kosciusko himself took a position before general Fersen, with a corps of ten thousand men, resolved to prevent this general from crossing the Vistula, or to dispute the passage; for he supposed that if he could prevent the junction between Fersen and Souvarof, he would have the advantage of them both, on account of his immense superiority in numbers.

Ever since Fersen had been obliged to retire with the Prussians to the left bank of the Vistula, he had been manœuvring to deceive the Polish corps who were watching him on the opposite bank, and endeavouring to throw a bridge across the river. At last he succeeded in rendering Poninski the dupe of his movements; for whilst he thought that Fersen was attempting a passage at Pulava, the latter actually crossed the river at Kosniza, his old position. Kosciusko, persuaded from the intelligence which he had received from Poninski, that the Russians would cross at Pulava, hastened to that point to oppose them. He no sooner perceived his mistake, than unwilling to engage before effecting a junction with Poninski, he ordered the latter to join him with all possible expedition, and in the mean time took a strong position at Matcheviz, six leagues from the Vistula, which he entrenched and fortified.

Baron de Fersen, informed that the two Polish generals had not yet effected a junction, resolved to prevent it and attack Kosciusko without delay. Having made the necessary dispositions, he fell upon the Polish camp with eighteen battalions, forty squadrons, six regiments of Cossacks, and forty-five pieces of artillery. To see the enemy, and to attack him on every side, was the same thing with the Russians. The victory cost them dear, but it was complete. Six thousand Poles remained dead upon the field; sixteen hundred were wounded and made prisoners; and among them were the

generals Sirakovski and Knechevitch, almost all the superior officers as well as those of the staff, and the general in chief, Kosciusko himself.*

* Here terminated the political and military career of this general. No one will deny that he possessed talents, courage, resolution and patriotism. The last plan which he formed to oppose the progress of the Russians, after the double defeat of Sirakovski, was, in a military point of view, well arranged, and marked with extreme boldness. Never to despair of the public safety in time of extreme danger; to unite with promptitude all his forces, bear first upon the enemy whom there was the most hope of overcoming; to return afterwards upon the most terrible and dangerous, and overpower him by numbers;—all these actions can proceed only from a brave patriot and an able captain. But is not boldness temerity, when it is not founded upon the most rigorous calculation of probabilities? And when we consider the conduct of Kosciusko most favorably, is there not reason to accuse him of having been more enterprising and daring, than wise? Considering it generally, how could Kosciusko and his Polish officers hope, in the commencement of their insurrection, in a country destitute of fortresses, with troops levied in haste and badly armed, to be able to make head at all points and in open hostilities, against the well disciplined and well provided armies of the Russians; against their veteran and intrepid troops and experienced officers; more especially when the Russians already occupied part of Poland, and could penetrate into the other without any obstacle? But in particular, how could Kosciusko presume to believe that he should arrest the victorious march of the terrible Souvarof;—how could he, whose talents had never yet been seconded by good fortune, who had been constantly beaten by the Russians and the Prussians, dare to flatter himself that he should triumph over an invincible warrior, before whom every thing had hitherto yielded, and who did not require to be followed by a great number of soldiers, since each one of his was equal to four? The plan of Kosciusko was doubtless well combined; but with his means, was the execution of it easy? This should be the first enquiry of a general. It is easy to form a specious plan; it is more difficult to carry it into execution; and the schemes of the enemy, as well as his resistance, should be taken into the calculation, more especially if he is headed by a Souvarof. If Kosciusko had vanquished Fersen, and then united with Sirakovski, returned to oppose Souvarof, the only result would have been, that instead of ten thousand, he would have had the pleasure of being beaten at the head of thirty thousand men: But as to his defeat, it was certain. The conduct of Kosciusko was unwise from the commencement of the revolution of his country. Kosciusko was brave and intelligent, but he was a Pole. Had he

At this time Souvarof remained at Brzescia. He preserved this important post, one of the granaries of Poland, from which Warsaw and the army of the insurgents drew their supplies; so that by remaining there he was able to provide abundantly for his own army, and to straiten and harass the enemy. Besides, his army was weakened by the continual combats it had sustained, and by the numerous detachments required to guard and escort the prisoners it had made. Every day indeed detachments were sent out to reconnoitre the country as far even as Warsaw, and to clear it of the numerous parties of Poles, who, divided into small bands, made every effort to cut off the communications of the different Russian corps. Souvarof had obtained the object he had first proposed; he had driven the enemy, struck with terror, before him; had reduced him to the defensive, and placed himself in such a position, that the other divisions of the Russian army in Poland, had but few obstacles to overcome and a trifling distance to march to unite themselves to him. The rules of the art of war demanded therefore imperiously, that he should await this junction, before he left his position and struck the decisive blow.

But as soon as Souvarof received intelligence of the victory

been otherwise, his measures, in the situation in which he was placed, would have been marked by extreme prudence and circumspection. He would have remained at Cracow. As another Sertorius, he would have formed in the mountains of the country, a party less numerous, but more firmly united, and more difficult to vanquish, as it would have been not easily assailable to the Russians; and which, there were many reasons to suppose, would have been secretly protected and encouraged by Austria. This germ, in its development, would have gradually produced a tree, whose fruit would have been the independence of Poland. But a plan systematically arranged, matured with deliberation, and of which the result can only take place with time and patience, is not of a nature to enter into the ardent and impetuous imagination of a Pole. Pulaski had been lost from too much precipitation; and Pulaski was a different man from Kosciusko. Nevertheless, when Souvarof vanquished him, he was not then the experienced warrior that he was in 1794.

gained by Fersen, foreseeing the impression [which this event, and especially the taking of Kosciusko, would have upon the insurgents, he immediately put the army in motion in the direction of Warsaw; dispatching fresh orders to Fersen, and the generals of all the different divisions, to march with all expedition upon the point to which he was himself advancing.

As the defeat of Kosciusko had forced the Polish generals to a precipitate retreat, and all of them endeavoured to take refuge in the capital, the country by degrees was cleared of their troops; the roads were open to the Russians, and their advance to Warsaw was only retarded by the manœuvres by which they attempted to cut off and beat in detail the Polish corps which were endeavouring to throw themselves into that city.

Makranovski was flying before Derfelden, who marched from Grodno upon Bielsk. Souvarof himself marched upon the same point, with the intention of intercepting Makranovski. But the latter had already left Bielsk, and was retiring by forced marches to Warsaw. Souvarof resolved, by advancing further, to cut off his retreat. Approaching Tolkov, he there learned, that there was a body of several thousand men near Stanislavov, composing part of the army of Makranovski. In consequence of this intelligence, he ordered general Fersen, who from Matchivitz had come up the Vistula, and was already at no great distance from Stanislavov, to march directly to that city and attack the enemy; while he should himself await the arrival of Makranovski at Vengrov. The event did not correspond to these measures; no enemy appeared; he had already escaped. Souvarof marched to Stanislavov, where Fersen had arrived the preceding evening, without meeting the enemy. The junction of these two corps was here effected. Fersen brought with him from eleven to twelve thousand men; Souvarof had therefore eighteen thousand under his orders.

The Polish troops who had occupied Stanislavov, and who were not more than two thousand strong (though general report greatly exaggerated that number) had retired to Kobylka, where they were joined by three or four thousand of their countrymen. Souvarof marched upon Kobylka, distant about four leagues from Warsaw. At the approach of his van-guard, the Poles retired in three columns; but were soon attacked by the Cossacks and chasseurs of Souvarof, and in a little time, by the whole of his cavalry. The Poles fought desperately and refused to accept of quarter; they were almost all cut in pieces—four hundred only were made prisoners. On the part of the Russians the loss was very inconsiderable. The infantry was not engaged; not being able to arrive in time on account of the badness of the roads. This corps was found to be one of the columns of the army of Makranovski, commanded by general Mayen. The two other columns, of which this army was composed, had already arrived by different roads at Praga, adjoining Warsaw.

After the battle, which lasted four hours, the Russian troops assembled at and encamped under Kobylka. Souvarof occupied the centre; Fersen the left, and Derfelden, who arrived a few hours after, encamped on the right.

Souvarof now found himself at the head of twenty-two thousand men, of which fifteen thousand were infantry, and seven thousand cavalry. He had eighty-six light field pieces, but no heavy artillery.

He was aware that all the forces of the enemy, and his last hopes were in Praga, where Makranovski had drawn together thirty thousand Poles in a triple entrenchment, fortified with one hundred and four cannon and mortars. Despising this superiority of force, and trusting to his chosen troops who had too often conquered under him not to triumph again,

Souvarof resolved to finish this already protracted war, by one of those brilliant exploits which make a deep impression upon the minds of a whole people, which exhaust the springs of war among a nation in actual revolution, by substituting the icy chill of terror for the enthusiasm of insurrection which animates them; and which for a few thousand victims sacrificed at a blow, arrests the effusion of the blood of millions, whose death would be the inevitable consequence of the horror and carnage of many years.

The assault of Praga was therefore determined on. Praga is an extensive suburb of Warsaw situated on the right bank of the Vistula, opposite to that city. Beyond the works of the city, the Poles had established their entrenched camp; so that when driven from the camp, the fortifications of Praga afforded them a shelter, and consequently a double assault was necessary to become master of this suburb. These difficulties, instead of intimidating Souvarof, stimulated him with a greater desire to overcome them. In a military view he was certain that the Polish troops were not sufficiently organized to defend themselves with the same skill as regular and well disciplined soldiers. From general considerations he felt assured, that there could not be among the insurgents that perfect conformity of views and opinions, and consequently that unity of action which alone ensures success. And lastly, from considerations of policy he could not doubt, but that a vigorous blow, struck at the very centre of the insurrection, would perplex and dismay, and destroy for ever this nursery of revolt. We enter into this exposition of the motives which guided the determination of Souvarof, to disprove the absurd accusations of those who have said that this great general conquered only by dint of the effusion of blood, and disdained to use, or was ignorant of any other means. At Praga, the grounds on which he formed his calculations were completely justified by the event. If Praga, instead of thirty thousand Polish insurgents, had been defended by as many regular

troops, either French, Austrian, or Russian, the most headstrong and inexperienced novice in war would scarcely have been guilty of the folly of attacking it sword in hand. Is it then to be presumed, that Souvarof would have been guilty of that fault?—It is melancholy for an historian to live in an age when public opinion is so abused, that it becomes necessary to enter into a justification of his hero for his most skilful and brilliant exploits.

While Souvarof was arranging his plan, and making preparations for its execution, the Poles throughout the city and the camp, were in the greatest confusion. Makranovski, weary of his post of commander in chief, had sent in his resignation to the revolutionary committee of Warsaw.* This

* The Poles have managed so well in the last days of their political existence, that they finished by legitimating the political annihilation of their country. A revolutionary committee ! Heavens ! and where ? on the borders of the Vistula ; in a country which has not yet passed through the stages of civilization, and which they would initiate already into all its abuses and excesses. And why ? to acquire liberty and a fixed constitution. Is it then from a revolutionary committee that stability for political institutions is acquired ? How many millions of men have attested with their blood, and how many millions by the misery of themselves and their children, the falsity of this doctrine. By such an odious institution the Poles proved themselves unworthy of the liberty they sought. Yes ! even if the destruction of Poland had not been determined on when this committee was established, yet it then became a measure forced upon the neighbouring powers by every consideration of policy, morality, philosophy and religion. Of *policy*, because kings owe it to the safety and tranquility of their states, which a people, who create revolutionary committees would infallibly disturb—of *morality*, because it is the duty of the whole world, but particularly of the rulers of nations to stifle the evil wherever it can be reached—of *philosophy*, because other nations ought not to consent that any one should debase the dignity of man, arrest the progressive improvement of the human mind, and degrade itself to the level of the brute ; of *religion* lastly, because, notwithstanding the declamations of sophisters, man cannot detach himself while on the earth, neither from all connexion with his fellow-men, nor dependance upon the divinity ; because the whole human race must be considered as forming but one family

committee appointed to succeed him, a gentleman named Zeonchik, hitherto very little known, but who was fitted by his infatuation to entomb the liberty of his country. This new general sent an officer to Souvarof, accompanied by a physician, whom he requested the Russian general would permit to visit the wounded Kosciusko. Thus far the request was reasonable and Souvarof would have granted it, had not Kosciusko already been removed to a considerable distance; but Zeonchik demanded besides, that the carriages and equipage of Kosciusko should be sent back, and expressed himself in terms so contemptuous and rude, that the Russian general

and one society. But no member of a society is free in his actions, when they disturb the regular and fixed order of things. The same holds good of one nation or people with regard to other nations; and if society punishes the individual who violates the law, other nations should, in the name of universal justice equally punish that guilty people who despise the dictates of humanity; they should deprive them of the power to outrage, not only nature and humanity, but even the Supreme Being. The existence of the revolutionary committee has, therefore, justified a partition which otherwise is without any legitimate pretext. How then can this nation complain of being governed by others, when it at no time knew how to govern itself? Whilst throughout all Europe, the arts and sciences revived and flourished; whilst all nations, even the smallest, Venice, Genoa, Portugal and Holland, commenced a noble career, and by the development of all their faculties and capabilities, were elevated to the rank of powerful nations, Poland alone, which nature formed to be great and powerful, despising all her advantages, and a prey to a disgustful anarchy, had neither administration of government nor police, or morals, or laws. In vain was the example of others set before her; she was proud in her barbarism, and would not imitate. And when at last she found the necessity of a change, she began by a revolutionary committee! We hope in Heaven, that no one will accuse us of the unworthy intention of blaming the holy and sacred impulse which rouses a people to resist the oppression of another, and throw back the chains which are offered to them. But as this impulse is admirable and sublime in a people who would remain separate and free, and preserve their institutions, their laws, and their independence; so much more terrible is it in a people who plunge into the gulph of faction, and who evidently shew from the beginning, that they will soon destroy all that remains of morality, and the laws, of public opinion, and national character.

thought proper to send him the following answer :—“ The foolish chiefs of the insurrection think to brave the power of Russia with vulgar abuse. Zeonchik has dreamed that his new post exempted him from the common rules of civility. The count Souvarof Rymnisky returns him his Jacobin scribble. Here there is no equality, or frenetic liberty. Hereafter no flag will be received, unless it is in the name of a sincere penitent, imploring forgiveness for the past.” This letter, signed *Souvarof*, a name already so well known in Poland, made a deep impression upon the revolutionary committee, to whom it was communicated by Zeonchik.

Souvarof, having sought all the information which could assist the disposition of his plan, made the final arrangement for his attack,* broke up his camp at Kobyłka, and marched

* The details of this plan merit to be generally known ; to military men they will be useful. They are as follow :

1st. The army will march from Kobyłka for Praga in three different columns, the 22d October, at five in the morning, and arriving by different roads, will encamp in a circular form around the town.

2d. The right wing to be commanded by lieutenant general Derfelden, the centre by lieutenant general Potemkin, and the left wing by lieutenant general baron de Fersen.

3d. In the course of the night after the army shall have formed its encampment, there shall be erected in front of each corps, batteries, which are immediately to play upon the enemy. The object of these batteries is to lead the enemy to believe, that a regular siege is intended, and to afford to officers and chiefs of columns, an opportunity to reconnoitre under the protection of the cannon, the places of rendezvous of the columns, and the points of attack.

4th. The attack will be made in the night of the 23d—24th October, in seven columns. Four columns will bear upon the right ; two on the centre, inclining to the left ; and one column on the left wing to the bank of the Vistula.

5th. Each column shall be preceded by one hundred and twenty-eight sharpshooters and two hundred and seventy-two pioneers. The first will carry the

with drums beating and colours flying for Praga, before which he arrived at eleven o'clock on the morning of the twenty-second of October. On the night following, the Russians estab-

out-posts of the enemy without firing, protect the pioneers, and engage with the enemy on the rampart, while the approaches to it are cleared. The pioneers will clear the way of obstructions, and carry fascines, hurdles, and ladders. Besides these pioneers, about thirty workmen with entrenching tools, shall be attached to each battalion.

6th. The first column of the right wing, so soon as the entrenchments are forced at the point of the bayonet, shall cut off the communication and retreat of the enemy by the bridge.

7th. The second and third columns, as soon as they have taken the batteries and works, will draw up in order of battle in the great square.

8th. The fourth column having overcome all obstacles in its way, and taken the two *cavaliers*, will take possession immediately of the park of artillery.

9th. The three last columns shall attack half an hour later, that the enemy, who is known to be more numerous on his right, may be called off to the other wing, and thus insure the success of the operation. The seventh column is particularly ordered to march to the assault in the direction of the island of the river; and to send a detachment, if it is possible, to the left, along the bank of the Vistula, to aid the first column in cutting off the retreat of the enemy by the bridge.

10th. Immediately upon the columns clearing the entrenchments, they will form on the open space within, and fall upon the enemy with the sabre and bayonet.

11th. The reserves of each column, composed of two battalions and two squadrons, and the conductors of the artillery of regiments forming the columns, will march in line, one hundred and fifty paces in the rear of each column; will form immediately on the parapet of the outer entrenchment, and clear a passage with their labourers and pioneers, for the cavalry.

12th. So soon as the columns have carried the second entrenchment, they will scour the streets of Praga, and disperse the enemy with the bayonet, without stopping for trifling objects or entering houses; at the same time, the re-

lished three batteries, one of twenty-two pieces of artillery on the right wing, one of sixteen pieces in the centre, and another of forty-eight on the left wing. At day-break they began to play upon the enemy, and were answered by a quick and constant fire from the entrenchments, but which did very little injury. On the twenty-fifth, at five in the morning, the Russians commenced the attack in seven columns. The two first were exposed to the cross fire of many batteries, as well as to a fire of grape-shot and musquetry from the small islands of the river, which were upon their flanks. But nothing could stop them; they scaled the entrenchments, threw themselves upon the infantry and cavalry behind them, killed two thousand on the spot, and made two thousand prisoners. At least a thousand men, attempting to save themselves by swimming, perished in the Vistula.

The third and fourth columns were obliged to march up a

serve shall occupy the second entrenchment in the manner and with the same object as directed for the first.

13th. At the same time, all the field artillery, composed of eighty-six pieces of cannon, shall occupy the outer entrenchment, supported by onethird of the whole cavalry; the remainder of the cavalry will be posted on the wings, observing their proper distance.

14th. The Cossacks will preserve the stations assigned them behind the columns. Those between the fourth and fifth columns, at the commencement of the assault will approach to the rampart, shouting *hurra!* And those stationed on the banks of the river, will maintain their respective posts, forming a semi-circle.

15th. It will be necessary to act with great energy against all those in arms; but the inhabitants, all those without arms, and those who demand quarter, must be spared.

16th. As soon as resistance is over, a spot will be selected proper for the erection of batteries, on which the artillery will be mounted, and a cannonade immediately opened upon Warsaw.

small sandy eminence, which presented very great obstacles. Impatient to arrive, many of the soldiers threw away their hurdles and fascines to be able to march more expeditiously in the sand, and keeping their ladders only, assisted each other with the hand to pass the six lines of pits and ditches which the enemy had constructed. The third column took two strong advanced bastions, and notwithstanding a vigorous resistance, penetrated into the interior of the works. The fourth took a *cavalier* and a fort surrounded by a stone wall, with their batteries, which were strongly palisadoed; five other batteries were then carried at the point of the bayonet, and the enemy attacked in front and on both flanks. Two thousand men were here cut in pieces.

Among these was a regiment of the line composed entirely of Jews. They amounted to five hundred, well armed and equipped, and upon the same footing as the other Polish troops, from which indeed they could scarcely be distinguished. They made a most obstinate defence, and were all destroyed to a man, with the exception only of their colonel Hirschko, who had remained prudently in Warsaw.

The fifth column overcame all difficulties with astonishing celerity. It took the batteries, and having penetrated within all the entrenchments, made its way directly to the bridge, and joined the first column in cutting off the retreat of the flying enemy by the bridge of Warsaw.

The sixth and seventh columns met with many obstacles. They took, however, three batteries, and marched forward. The cavalry of the enemy who opposed them were defeated, put to the bayonet, or driven into the Vistula, where there perished nearly a thousand men; five hundred were made prisoners.

Hitherto the columns had fought and repulsed the enemy in the open interval between the outer entrenchments and the

walls of the town; they now penetrated into the town, and began a horrible carnage in the streets and public squares. The most terrible scene was the massacre of several thousand men, intercepted in their flight, on the banks of the Vistula. Three thousand four hundred were made prisoners there, and all the rest put to the sword or drowned in the river, under the eyes of the inhabitants of Warsaw, who vainly stretched their arms to them from the opposite bank. But a spectacle equally mournful for the people of that capital, was the burning of many of the houses of Praga, whose destruction appeared the forerunner of their own approaching ruin. On all sides were heard the rattling of shot, the bursting of bombs, and the cries and shrieks of the dying. The mournful tolling of the tocsin was heard amid the tremendous noise of artillery, and consternation filled every soul.

By the hour of nine in the morning, after four hours fighting, the battle entirely ceased. There are few examples of a military operation so hardy in the conception, so bold in the execution, and so memorable in its result, since by extinguishing in one day the fire of insurrection, it shook to its base a throne, which by its very constitution had excited so many commotions, and destroyed the public tranquillity. It required uncommon intrepidity to give this decisive blow; necessary to carry by main force, a triple entrenchment, fortified with a numerous artillery, and defended by a garrison of thirty thousand men; under the eyes of the capital of the kingdom, whose hopes were all centered in this bulwark, confided to the valour of its bravest warriors.

The Poles left thirteen thousand men dead on the field of battle; of which a third was composed entirely of the flower of the youth of Warsaw. More than two thousand were drowned in the Vistula, and the number of prisoners amounted to fourteen thousand five hundred and eighty three. The same day eight thousand of them were released and set at

liberty, and the rest in a few days after. The Russians lost five hundred and eighty killed, and nine hundred and sixty wounded.

During the assault a shell fell into the hall of the revolutionary committee of Warsaw, in which the members were actually assembled. In its explosion it killed the secretary, who was at the time reading a dispatch to the committee.

A great number of Poles of distinction, and high in rank, were among the dead, and many others among the prisoners. They had in general been completely deceived by the batteries erected on the side of the Russians. They expected, and were preparing for a regular siege, which they hoped would be protracted throughout the winter. The night before the assault, they transported thirty-six pieces of cannon to Praga from Warsaw, leaving only twenty pieces on that side of the river; which, however, did more execution on the Russians than those on the entrenchments. The artillery taken consisted of one hundred and four cannon and mortars, of large calibre.

Souvarof established his quarters without the entrenchment, adjoining the park. The general and superior officers repaired to him; and after mutual congratulations, the general caused a slight refreshment to be served at a spot, to which he invited the Polish generals who were taken prisoners. After the repast, he reposed some hours upon the straw, and the simple tent of a common soldier was pitched for him for the night.

Particular orders were given for the subsistence of the prisoners, and the care of the wounded, the greater part of whom were sent over to Warsaw. The Polish officers had permission to retain their swords, and were treated kindly. Souvarof made them feel that they had to do with an enemy

who was generous in victory. He took no other revenge for the many Russians massacred treacherously, and perhaps at the instigation of the very same officers whom he treated with such consideration.

The morning after the taking of Praga, a deputation of the magistracy of Warsaw, arrived, bearing a letter from the king, and a note from the council of the city. Souvarof gave them the most flattering reception. He ran to them, crying, *Pakoi*, peace; embraced them; conducted them to his tent, and making them sit down by his side, granted them much more favourable terms than they could have hoped to obtain. Nevertheless, on the day following, the same deputies came from Warsaw, bringing answers to the articles proposed by Souvarof, from which it appeared they wished to gain time; and pretending among other things, that the bridge could not be repaired as promptly as the Russian general had required, they wished to afford time for the Polish troops to evacuate the city, and carry with them the artillery, ammunition, and stores. Souvarof instantly sent back the deputies, adding new articles to those he had at first proposed, and demanding in form;—that the magistracy of Warsaw should cause all the inhabitants to be disarmed, and their arms transported in boats to Praga;—that they should engage to deliver up the arsenal, powder, and stores, to the troops of his sovereign the empress of Russia;—that in compliance with their former promises, they should cause the troops of the Polish republic to lay down their arms, or, in case of refusal, compel them to evacuate Warsaw. The general demanded also, that the king of Poland should command all the regular troops to lay down their arms, with the exception of one thousand men retained as his personal guard; and that all the Russian prisoners detained at Warsaw, should be set at liberty on the very next day. He granted to the eighth of November for the re-establishment of the bridge; and required an immediate answer to these demands. In the mean time, he gave orders to

general Buxhowden, whom he had nominated commandant of Praga, to re-establish immediately with the troops, that part of the bridge next to the town; that the Poles might be relieved from part of the labour, and have no pretext for delaying to finish it. He commanded general Fersen at the same time, to ascend the Vistula as far as Koresev, eight leagues from Praga, and pass the river at that point. The object of this order was, to attack the troops who were escaping from Warsaw with their arms; and at the same time, in case of treachery or insurrection in the capital, to be able to march instantly to it, and attack it from the other side, which looked towards the open country.

These precautions were not useless. In the night of the 26th—27th October, a great tumult and commotion took place at Warsaw. The troops under the orders of Vavrochevski attempted to carry away the king and all the Russian prisoners. The evil disposed part of the inhabitants joined the military: but the magistracy, who foresaw the dangerous consequences of such a design, commanded the people to oppose it, and to resist force by force. They were well obeyed. Vavrochevski, stopped in the execution of his designs by the resistance of the people, left Warsaw with his troops, leaving a declaration, by which he announced, that in concert with the supreme council of the revolution, he left all authority in the hands of the king. The first use which this monarch made of his power, was to request Souvarof to fix a day for his entry into Warsaw, promising to have the bridge restored with the utmost dispatch. Souvarof announced that he would enter it on the eighth of November.

On the day appointed, the Russian troops commenced to defile by the bridge, and entered into the city with drums beating and colours flying. At the hour of nine, the count Souvarof passed the bridge on horseback, surrounded by his staff. He wore a simple cavalry uniform, without decora-

tion or ornament, and the plain hat of an officer. He was followed by the regiment of grenadiers of Kerson, and a numerous band of music.

He was received on the other side of the bridge, by the magistracy of the city in a body. The president presented to him the keys of the city on a cushion of velvet, with bread and salt, and addressed him with a harangue. The count took the keys himself, carried them to his lips, and raising them towards Heaven, said aloud, "Almighty God, I thank thee that I have not been obliged to purchase the keys of this place so dear as"—and turning towards Praga, his voice failed. With his cheeks bathed in tears, he cordially embraced the magistrates. He was soon surrounded by a numerous crowd: Some threw themselves at his feet, others stretched out their hands. The count took them affectionately by the hand, and replied with an expression of profound sensibility, to all these marks of attention, admiration and respect. All the windows were filled with spectators, who contemplated this imposing scene, and rejoiced at the return of order. On all sides resounded the cries, "*long live Catharine, long live Souvarof.*" The presence of a conqueror, whose clemency and fidelity inspired confidence, suddenly rendered a whole people, just before tumultuous and ferocious, gentle and quiet as a lamb.

In this manner the procession continued to move on through Cracow street, till it arrived at the square called the square of the New World. Arrived before the cathedral, Souvarof halted, and entering the church, made a short prayer. He made choice afterwards of a hotel in the neighbourhood of the camp, where he established his head quarters. A new scene was there presented to his sensibility. The magistrates presented to him the Russians who had been so long in captivity at Warsaw, to the number of thirteen hundred and seventy-six. These unfortunates threw themselves in the arms of

their general with the greatest joy. They owed him not only their liberty, but life itself; for before the retreat of the revolutionary committee, a proposition was made on the part of some of the members, for the massacre of these prisoners. Five hundred Prussian prisoners and eighty Austrians were likewise delivered to Souvarof; who caused their irons to be struck off, and themselves to be conducted to the frontiers of their respective countries.

The general had demanded an audience of the king; it was fixed for the day following. At ten in the morning Souvarof set out for the castle, attended by his suite, and a guard of honour. On that day he was in full uniform, and decorated with all his orders. The king received him with marked distinction, and embraced him several times. They remained some time in the cabinet of the king, and this private audience effected, what the formal negotiation had not done. At the instance of Souvarof who set before the king the dangerous consequences to the public tranquility if the Polish troops should remain armed, the king consented that they should be disarmed, and delivered all the artillery of Warsaw into the hands of the Russians.

Still, however, the troops of the confederation who had escaped from Warsaw, assembled in bands and parties, which were so much the more formidable, as in the provinces they found numerous partizans. They were estimated at thirty thousand men, under the orders of general Vavrochevski, the intimate friend of Kosciusko. These troops formed different divisions under the generals Hedroitch, Dombrowski, Madalinski, and prince Joseph Poniatovski as their leaders. Their intention was to repair to Gallicia, which they should have done before the assault of Praga, if their movements had been directed with any portion of military skill, for it was the only movement which could have embarrassed the operations of Souvarof. But his vigilance was still active, and they had

taken this step now when it was too late. During the eight days that he awaited at Praga the rebuilding of the bridge, he had dispatched various corps to cut off the retreat and intercept the Polish troops in detail. His instructions were quickly and punctually obeyed ; for the generals serving under him, were accustomed to execute his orders promptly and to their full extent. In giving an order, he passed over the difficulties attending its execution, and enjoined them merely to be on such a day and such an hour, at the point directed ; and he who did not comply exactly, must have good reasons to allege for his failure. In the present instance, every thing succeeded to his wish. Many Polish corps, cut off by the skilful and rapid movements of the Russians, implored the clemency of the conquerors. The answer of Souvarof to the propositions of all, was constantly to promise protection and safety to those who submitted. The officers and nobles were permitted to retain their arms, but he demanded that the troops should be completely disarmed and dispersed. These terms did not seem at first to be acceptable to the generals Vavrochevski, Dombrowski, and Madalinski, who had united, and had a disposable force of about twenty thousand men. But Souvarof promptly reinforced general Fersen, who pursued them, and instructed him to follow and attack them without mercy. The skilful and indefatigable Fersen, so well acquitted himself of his commission, that the Polish army was thrown into the greatest disorder, and every day whole battalions and squadrons, separated from the main body, were surrounded and laid down their arms. And the Polish generals at last perceiving their inability to make any longer resistance, resolved to accept the terms prescribed by Souvarof ; but before the courier dispatched by them could return, their camp was invested by general Denisof, commanding the cavalry of the army of Fersen. The Poles had now no choice but that of accepting or refusing their pardon. This did not change however the disposition of Souvarof with respect to them. He observed the terms first promised,

and the whole of the Polish troops surrendered. Their arms were taken from them, and they themselves dispersed; and on the 7th of November, 1794, Poland was entirely in the power of the Russians, without a single adversary or rival to dispute its possession.

Such was the termination of one of the most remarkable campaigns mentioned in the annals of history. In the space of two months, an extensive country, a nation of more than twelve millions of men, a nation armed and enthusiastic in the cause, fighting on its own soil and for its independence, was overcome by twenty-two thousand men, who seemed suddenly to be transformed into so many heroes. Nor was this nation subjugated only for a little time; or the country occupied in a military view until treaties should decide its fate. But it was absolutely put under the yoke; and henceforward must recognize the same laws and the same sovereign. Certainly it was not to their numbers that the conquerors owed their advantages. It was not because they had the power to invade and inundate the territory of their enemies, to overpower them with the weight of their immense forces, that they conquered. All must be ascribed in this transaction, to the genius alone of him who conducted the enterprize. Unaided by circumstances, he alone did every thing. Intimately acquainted with men and circumstances, he seized with a master's eye the only method of making circumstances and men co-operate to the success of his plans. He, having conceived his plan, executed it with more celerity than the historian can explain it. By the rapidity and skill of his marches, the justness and precision of his movements, the audacity of his attack, he surprised his enemies, gave them no time to recover from defeat, and was always victorious. It was he who infused into his soldiery a spirit and courage almost more than human; and which, while it produced among them union and vigour, scattered terror, confusion, and dismay among their enemies. It was he whose magnanimity,

justice, and clemency, made the vanquished look to him after the victory with as much confidence as they had dreaded him before it. It was he, in fine, who in all these respects, has rendered himself worthy of the appellation of *great*, which the justice of his own age and of posterity, should accord to his memory.

And yet this is the man who has been calumniated and represented as a mere barbarian, as an Attila, whose only skill was in slaughtering men and shedding blood; and it is in particular from his campaign in Poland, that they have presumed to justify this lying portrait. Such has been the falsity of the relations and accounts, that many persons throughout Europe have believed, and perhaps still do believe, that Souvarof vanquished at Praga only a tumultuous assemblage of the populace, whom he was delighted to have massacred before his eyes. Doubtless many persons would have stayed his arm at the moment of this assault: and they had their reasons for it. But as to Souvarof; how dare they contest his reasons for having done what he did? How! a general who was accountable for his conduct to his sovereign, to his country, to his army, and to his own reputation, should then have left unavenged the death of his companions in arms, basely massacred! He should have given time for the mad and fanatic Poles to have grown strong and formidable, that they might pour out their rage upon the neighbouring countries, and even upon Russia herself! He should have been gentle with the revolutionary committee, and permitted it, with the hope of impunity, to have put to death all their Russian prisoners! He should have prolonged the war, to exhaust the armies and treasures of his sovereign; and for the sake of sparing a few unfortunates, (whose death is no doubt deeply to be lamented, but was the necessary consequence of the tumult and fury of an assault,) he should have doomed to perish in the war and bloodshed which would have ensued, perhaps fifty thousand Russians and an hundred thousand Poles, the

flower of their nation, and who on the return of good order, became so useful to their country. If we believe these detractors of genius, it is evident that Souvarof erred as a subject, as a captain, as a man. But fortunately the motives of those who hold this language will be appreciated by posterity; What do I say? they are already understood and pitied in our own generation; and Souvarof better known, is already avenged in public opinion.

But if in some countries and by certain individuals, the conduct of Souvarof at this epocha was condemned, elsewhere it excited a lively admiration, and among the Russians an enthusiasm proportioned to the glory which was reflected upon themselves from the exploits of their general. Catharine who knew how to distribute reward with so much grace and majesty, wrote thus to Souvarof: "I have no longer reason to fear, that in your case, I might be guilty of injustice or neglect; for it is not I, but you, who have just now created Souvarof field-marshal in Poland." He received also from the empress a present of a domain of six thousand peasants, in the district of Kobrin, the theatre of the first battle which he gained in the commencement of the campaign. From the king of Prussia he received the order of the Red and Black Eagle, and the emperor of Germany sent him his portrait set round with valuable diamonds.

It was not only as a pledge of esteem and regard, that these two sovereigns conferred on Souvarof these marks of favour; it was also a testimonial of their gratitude. Both had an interest in the conquest which Souvarof had made of Poland, since both were to profit by it. By a wise policy, Catharine united with her, two powerful neighbours, who could have shaken and destroyed her schemes, but who were now interested in maintaining them. It was on the part of the empress of Russia a calculation of policy, foresight and

generosity ; for if guided by other sentiments, she had wished to preserve Poland to herself alone, neither Prussia, who with difficulty reduced her revolted provinces to obedience, nor Austria, who had need of all her forces to continue the war with France, would have entered into a war with Russia to prevent her keeping possession of a country already occupied completely by her troops. Catharine, free in her munificence, would shew it to its full extent. In giving to Prussia, as far as the boundary of the Vistula, and to Austria, Gallicia, the Palatinate of Craeow, with its rich mountains, she actually divided between those two powers the valuable and productive part of Poland. For herself she received provinces which were fertile, but which needed a population of double the amount, and to be cultivated and nourished with care for many years to arrive at their full value. Nevertheless this central division of Poland is a nursery for soldiers. It opens to Russia an easy and superb route to Moldavia and the Ottoman empire, and protects her new acquisitions along the banks of the Dniester.

The philosopher who is not satisfied with the consideration of a detached, isolated fact ; who suspends his judgment until ascending to first causes he examines the series and succession of events, will perceive in the partition and political annihilation of Poland, from its origin down to its final completion, the dangers attending a first great fault ; the consequences of which, like those of the first deviation from the path of honor and virtue, cannot be foreseen. If the furious and factious spirit of the Poles, the excesses of which they were guilty, and their revolutionary committee, were sufficient to provoke the severity of the neighbouring powers, and rendered necessary and justifiable (as far as such a measure can be justified) the partition of Poland ; it is at least certain, that by abstaining from fomenting factions and internal troubles among them, by abstaining from inflaming and rousing their passions by every species of insult, this people would

never have been driven to those extremities which made them dangerous ; nor would any agitations or troubles of their own ever have produced inquietude or been the cause of mischief to others. And in this state of things, (that is supposing that Poland had given rise to no uneasiness and apprehensions on the part of the surrounding governments) the preservation of her integrity and neutral existence, was an object of importance as respected their relative situation with each other. In fact, however Prussia might think it necessary to extend her territory, her true policy was to seek it on the side of the North Sea and towards the Rhine, and by no means on the Vistula ; for she could only lose by being brought into contact with Russia. The territories of Austria are sufficiently extensive ; her system of aggrandizement should neither be directed towards Poland, where there is nothing to add to her riches ; nor on the side of Germany, where a formidable rival is presented immediately in Prussia, and more remotely in France ; nor on the side of Wallachia, where Russia is her opponent. Her true policy is, to extend her commerce, and to derive advantages by her industry, from the immense staple productions of the country. She wants outlets, coasts and harbours. Belgrade is her proper rampart and bulwark ; and it is between this city, Moravia, and the borders of the Adriatic, that she should seek to extend the line of her possessions. Russia herself had no need of Poland to enable her to pursue her designs upon the Ottoman empire. Russia had become so powerful that Poland, weak and enfeebled, could never dare to refuse her alliance ; and would have opened to Russian troops a military road, afforded provisions and given even liberty and facility to recruit her armies. It was much more to the advantage of Russia, to extract these services from Poland at the expence of Poland, than to be herself at the expence of exacting and compelling the performance of them ; and in the mean time, she neither aggrandized Prussia nor Austria, nor acquired them for jealous and watchful neighbours. When any nation, even the most weak

and feeble is forcibly deprived of its independence, the seeds of hatred and rankling desire of vengeance are sown, which a crowd of circumstances may call into action and render fatal to the nation thus abusing its power. In the actual state of things it would be difficult to determine how far Poland may avenge herself on Russia at some future time, for the yoke which is now imposed upon her. But this much is certain, that Russia has weakened and exposed herself on that side. It would be more easy at the present time, to enter into Poland, and with the willing assistance of the Poles, to penetrate directly into Russia, than it would formerly have been to force a way through all the obstacles which the ancient government of Poland was interested in opposing to such an invasion.

These reflections which Souvarof would have developed better than we, had it been within his province to do so, did not concern him in the position in which he actually stood. He had fulfilled his duty ; and he had fulfilled it to its extent with such eclat, success and loyalty, as merited for him the admiration of the world and even of the vanquished themselves. He was now at the height of his glory. He was the greatest general of his time, and one of the greatest of the age in which he lived. He had placed his country in a formidable attitude with regard to the rest of Europe. Through his victories, the reputation of the Russian armies shone with a lustre, which eclipsed the memory of their former trophies. The victories of Roumanzof and Potemkin, and even the former triumphs of Souvarof himself, eminent as they were, yet bear no comparison to this plan, conceived with a force, an union and adaptation in all its details, which the present age has had an opportunity to admire, only in some of the operations of Frederick. The illustrious general could then repose tranquilly upon his laurels ; since it was not owing in any manner to him, that his government, mistaking the true interests of its policy, had been led into speculations and measures which eventually may prove injurious and destructive.

The marshal Souvarof, during the year that he remained at Warsaw, at least exerted all his abilities to retard the arrival of such a period, to give tranquility to Poland, to obliterate the remembrance of their ancient political existence, and to attach them if possible to a state of things less brilliant, but more secure and easy than they could have anticipated from a foreign yoke. And he succeeded, as far as appearances can prove it; for since that time Poland has been perfectly tranquil. Perhaps the example of the other nations of Europe, who if they can once recover peace and tranquility, will enjoy its blessings with delight, will engage the Poles long to persevere in their actual calm.

The king Stanislaus Augustus, in the beginning of the year 1795, had left Warsaw with his court and repaired to Grodno; but the vacancy was soon filled by the officers of rank, and strangers of distinction whom marshal Souvarof attracted to Warsaw.

Towards the end of the year, after having made a general inspection of all the troops under his orders, and established them in the best positions for the defence and security of Poland, Souvarof set out for St. Petersburg whither the empress had summoned him. He had requested that no honours should be shewn to him on the road; but the news of his arrival drew about him crowds of the inhabitants of all the provinces through which he passed. All hastened to see, and pay their homage to him.

He arrived in the beginning of December at Petersburg, in a carriage which the empress had sent forward to meet him. He alighted at the winter palace, and threw himself at the feet of his sovereign, who lavished upon him every mark of esteem and good will. She made him inhabit the Tauride

palace, and placed servants from her own household in attendance upon him.*

After some time spent in the capital, where he shared the attention and regard of the public, even with the empress herself, the marshal was nominated to the government of the same provinces, from which he had been taken to effect the reduction of Poland. In consideration of his new dignity of field-marshal, he had also a more extensive tract of country, and a greater body of troops under him. Always mindful of the importance of his functions, and the obligations they imposed upon him, Souvarof, who in age as well as in youth, knew no enjoyment more precious than that of fulfilling his duties, set out in the month of May for his command, and fifteen days after his arrival, commenced through the army a series of manœuvres and mock campaigns, which continued through all the summer and part of the autumn.

In the mean time, the war of the French revolution, far from resulting as the powers of Europe had at first promised themselves, had on the contrary, augmented the force of France; and success after success on their part, and fault upon fault on the part of their enemies had carried them by degrees to the gates of Vienna. This war fixed the attention of all Europe, and began to excite a lively apprehension in Russia, who saw the storm approaching herself. For some time Souvarof had not ceased to say and to write to Catharine, "Lady and Mother, † let me march against the French."

* We were present at Petersburg at the time of the arrival of Souvarof in that city, in the month of December, 1795; and it was with great satisfaction we then enjoyed the sight of this great man. He was, for some time, the subject of all conversations, and the object of universal attraction.

† *Matouchka soudarina*; an expression among the Russians of the highest respect, when applied to a female of high rank, and particularly to their empress.

This cry was not the *delenda est Carthago* of the fierce and unrelenting Cato. Souvarof would not destroy France, but that hydra to which she had given birth, and which after having devoured her, would proceed to glut its ferocious and devastating cravings upon Europe. The sentiment of Souvarof was that of Hannibal, swearing in the name of the gods, in the name of humanity and virtue, to be the enemy of the Romans, so long as the Romans should continue to be the disturbers of the peace, and repose of all nations. He felt perhaps, that he was more than any other man in Europe, alone fitted to contend against the ascendancy of the revolutionary French; because he, more than any other, had studied man in a state of revolution compared with a state of political calm. Catharine yielding in fine, more to necessity than to the pressing instances of her general, had just given Souvarof the order to march with the whole of the army he commanded, to the aid of the emperor of Germany, menaced in his very capital, when heaven, arresting this princess in the new career of glory now opening upon her, suddenly cut short the thread of her days.

Her successor, newly seated on a throne, the possession of which had been doubtful, although he was the legitimate heir, thought it prudent to encourage peace in the commencement of his reign. He stopped the march of Souvarof, who was already hastening on. The warrior with grief returned his sword to its scabbard. He did not then foresee that he should soon draw it forth again; but that the moment of happiness would be preceded by many pangs. Souvarof, doubtless, could not foresee that suspicion would attach itself to his opinions, his talents, and his virtues; and that like another Scipio, he should be obliged to justify himself, even for his victories.

CHAPTER VI.

Death of the empress Catharine II.—Elevation of Paul I. to the throne of Russia—Disgrace of Souvarof—Coalition of Russia, England, and Austria, against France—Souvarof is appointed commander in chief of the grand combined army—History of the campaign of 1799 in Italy and Switzerland, from its commencement until the return of the Russian troops to their own country, at the end of the year.

WHEN great and remarkable events occur, they fix and arrest our attention in proportion as they are extraordinary and unexpected. On the 6th of November, 1796, Petersburg, Russia, and Europe, were far from expecting the event that was preparing so soon to astonish them. On that day the empress Catharine, after a sound night's rest, breakfasted with unusual cheerfulness, and having complained of no pain, nor manifested any symptom of sickness, was found in her cabinet by her women, in a state of complete insensibility, at nine in the morning.

The attending physician being summoned immediately, declared that the swoon or fit was occasioned by an attack of apoplexy. Every medical aid was lavished in vain; and in the course of the following night, this princess expired, without having articulated a word from the time of the first attack.

Thus disappeared in an instant, from among the number of the living, the most powerful sovereign in the world, and the greatest and most illustrious female that ever sat upon a throne.

She was the greatest and most illustrious female that ever

reigned; nor do we except from the number, the fabled Semiramis, who only ravaged and desolated the earth and knew not how to govern it; nor Marguerite, nor Elizabeth, nor Maria Theresa, who governed their states with glory, but not with that great superiority, which characterises pre-eminent genius.

Catharine the Second played in the world the part of a great man. She gave to her people a vigorous impulse towards improvement; she made them feared, respected, admired, and elevated them to the first rank among nations;—she did, in a word, for Russia what the greatest kings have done for their people; what Charles the Fifth did for Spain; Louis the Fourteenth, for France; and Frederick the Second, for Prussia. This it is which distinguishes Catharine from other illustrious females who have borne a crown. The reign of Catharine will be noted in Russia as the reigns of the monarchs we have cited are marked in their respective kingdoms, and will form, as they have done, a memorable epocha in history.

With Catharine, expired royalty in Europe, considered as to the respect it should excite, and the effect it should produce on the opinions of men. After her death, the crowns of Europe placed on heads, weak, feeble, and ignorant of the supreme dignity of their station, presented no longer that imposing appearance of majesty, awful to the enemies of social order, which was so strongly stamped on the august head of Catharine.

The effect which her death produced in Russia and throughout Europe, sufficiently indicates the melancholy consequences which might have been apprehended from it, and how much it was to be regretted that a hand so steady and skillful was taken away from the guidance of the helm of affairs, in the ruinous and perilous crisis into which they had fallen.*

* We resided in Petersburg at the time of the death of this empress, and

Nor had the great society of Europe ever presented the spectacle of a similar disorder and confusion. All the principles of public right were forgotten, and solemn treaties despised; commerce had no security; the arts no longer a refuge; the public fortune no stability; the moral ties which united nations together were attacked and sapped at the roots, and the political union of which they are the base, for want of sustenance was fast falling into decay. A powerful people who hitherto had boasted to be one of the great columns of social order in Europe, shook to its base by a spontaneous concession, now menaced the whole edifice with destruction; and the other supporters of this edifice, insecure in their position, and tottering from that very insecurity, unsupported and unsupported by the rest, opposed but a very feeble resistance to the formidable torrent which threatened every moment to sweep them away altogether.

Nevertheless one column was still proudly erect, and in an undaunted attitude appeared like the rock which bids defiance to tempests.

Russia, yet new among the powers of Europe, had not awaited the gradual completion of the years of her maturity to distinguish herself. The sovereign who governed, knowing the resources of her empire and the character of her peo-

the extraordinary sensation which we witnessed at the news of this event, and which was visible on every countenance, will never be obliterated from our recollection. People regarded each other with anxiety, and scarcely dared to interrogate; thought, which wandered into the prospects of the future, interrupted speech. The enemies even of this princess evinced as much anxiety as her friends; they felt that she could not be replaced, and this consideration gave rise to painful reflections. It was not only a sovereign whom they lamented, but a sovereign peculiarly necessary for the times. All minds anxiously enquired, What will be its consequences, to us individually, to us generally? The uncertainty which prevailed for many hours with respect to the death of this princess, added still more to the general agitation and confusion.

ple, had called both into action with the promptitude of a magician. She had thrown forward the boundaries of her empire and had fixed them upon the borders of seas some thousand leagues distant; but in the heart of this immense extent, her genius had created a military force which united all its parts, and at the extremities, a maritime power which defended its approach. The Russian army had trebled in the number of regular troops since the death of Elizabeth; but it had more than trebled in the excellence of its organization, in its discipline and fitness for war. This army, become now as light and skilful as it before was heavy and rude, was perfectly adapted to the vast extent of territory which it had to protect, and the no less extensive system of conquest which its government had already projected. The marine of Russia, which was scarcely the sixth in Europe at the commencement of Catharine's reign, acknowledged at its termination no superior but that of England. Commerce, from the numerous channels that had been opened, the protection of the sovereign always carefully extended to it, and the spirit of activity introduced among the people, had greatly increased. The arts and sciences had made rapid progress from the same causes. Agriculture was improving, and population increased by colonies from abroad, and by wandering hordes which were settled in villages built for them. Ports were formed, and canals and roads made which established a safe and easy communication from the coasts of the Baltic to China, from the frozen regions of the White Sea to the sultry shores of the Black Sea. In fine, Russia inaccessible and flourishing within, feared and respected abroad, was the preponderating power of Europe, was the hope and support of its tottering thrones, and the polar star anxiously sought for by the nations menaced with destruction, at the time when Catharine, who had elevated her to this high and brilliant station, terminated her glorious career. Is it then to be wondered at, that her death excited such general regret and dismay, since on her life depended the safety and security of millions.

The grand duke Paul, her son, a prince who was hardly dealt with in the fortune which caused him for forty years to lead a dull and dissatisfied life, within view of that grandeur the enjoyment of which he had constantly in perspective, upon the death of his mother, took the reins of government and ascended the throne under the name of Paul I.

It had long been doubtful, whether this prince would ever come to the throne ; for it appears that his mother, who feared from his turn of mind the future destruction of the work she had so carefully reared, had been disposed to deprive him of the succession to the crown, and place it on the head of her grand-son. Paul had known of the project, and the eagerness with which he seized the reins of power, proves the extent and vivacity of his fears. This prince was therefore, doubly exposed to the intoxication that is often the consequence of a sudden possession of supreme power. On him it had its full and complete effect. Banished from all concern in the affairs of government while he was grand duke, and not being allowed to occupy himself with any thing of importance, he had received from his mother a present of three or four regiments to gratify his military propensity and furnish him with amusement. To distinguish these regiments more effectually from the rest of the army and prove more completely his property in them, Paul took it into his head to prescribe a different system for the formation, dress and manœuvres of these troops than that prescribed by Catharine for the Russian army ; and he adopted the Prussian regulations. This whim had often furnished an object for the pleasantries and ridicule of the courtiers. Paul knew it, and the first act of his power was to force them to adopt themselves the very changes which had so much excited their ridicule and raillery. He changed the uniform of the troops, and clothed them in German dresses; instead of the national costume which they formerly wore, and which was perfectly adapted to their manners and habits. This first innovation,

the effect of caprice and childish revenge, was in reality, a blow which he himself struck at his own power, and which contributed to deprive him of the regard and love of his army, which in Russia more than any where else, is the force and power of the throne.*

We may conceive the effect which these changes would produce on the mind of an old warrior, who, like Souvarof, was attached to the customs of his country, and who had had constant and repeated experience of the vast advantage derived from leading on and governing the Russians by means of this national spirit, instead of endeavouring to stifle and suppress it. The frankness of the old soldier and love of country, always the reigning sentiment, carried him beyond the reserve and discretion which he owed to the orders of his prince; and he permitted himself to indulge in some pleasantries on the subject of these changes in the uniform of the troops. The Russians wore the hair cropped short in the manner of the peasantry, which was economical, and at the same time proper and convenient for soldiers. Paul ordered them to wear queues and buckles in the Prussian fashion, and their hair powdered. He did not perceive that Frederick the Second,

* We must add, that it is particularly in Russia that these innovations on established usages and customs are injurious and dangerous. With all nations it is a dangerous experiment; with the Russians a formidable evil. Nevertheless Paul fully proved what despotism sustained by a well organized police is able to effect; while it shewed at the same time the selfishness and submission of mind resulting from greater civilization. Paul was not contented with changing the uniform of his soldiers, but he changed also the dress of private individuals, and even of strangers, and subjected them not only in respect to dress, but in many other respects to a thousand practices and observances as idle as they were ridiculous. To shave off one beard gave more trouble and difficulty to the terrible Peter the Great, than it did to Paul to give the step and carriage of a Prussian corporal to every beau and gentleman in his empire.

whom he took for his model, had given to his army a costume which harmonized with the military system and the discipline he had introduced, as well as with the general character and habits of the Prussians ; that this costume was his own also, and that this great man did not propose himself for a model until he had acquired the right to do so from an hundred victories. Paul did not perceive that in these respects, as indeed in every thing, Frederick proved himself a creator and founder, and so far from even weakening the national spirit he fortified and confirmed it by affixing it even to the dress and appearance of individuals. Paul was a mere imitator ; and that the manner of wearing the hair might be similar, he had small wooden truncheons or forms made, to serve as models for the hair buckles and queues of the soldiers, and he sent a supply of these to the generals commanding the different corps of the army. The surprize of Souvarof on opening this packet may easily be imagined ! He had not been accustomed to receive such dispatches from Catharine, nor was the employment of a hair-dresser that which she charged him to exercise with her troops. "*Hair-powder,*" said the sarcastic marshal, on reading the regulation—" *Hair-powder is not gun-powder, hair-buckles will not do for cannon, nor queues for bayonets.*" These words of the general passed to the army and were immediately repeated from one to another to the great amusement of the soldiers, who added new ridicule and pleasauntries to those of their general. The emperor was highly incensed at this ; and eagerly embraced the opportunity to deprive Souvarof of his command and compel him to retire. But this was in reality only the pretext, for, in fact, Paul constantly testified his dislike to Souvarof ; a prejudice which arose from the perfect devotion to the party and interests of his mother, which he knew Souvarof entertained, and the assent and support Souvarof had given to the views, projects, and innovations of Potemkin, whom, above all others, Paul detested and abhorred.

Souvarof wished himself to communicate to his army the order which deprived him of the command. He drew them out and ranged them in order of battle. In front of the line was erected a pyramid of drums and musical instruments piled on each other. The marshal then appearing in full uniform, decorated with all his orders, placed himself at the side of this military trophy, and in a short speech addressed and took leave of his companions in arms. "Comrades," said he, "I quit you, probably for a long time, perhaps for ever, after having passed fifty years in the midst of you, without ever leaving you, but for a few moments. Your father who ate, drank, and slept among you, must now eat and drink separated from his children, and thinking on them for his only consolation. Such is the will of our common father, of our emperor and master. Still I hope that he will one day relent and have compassion on my old age. Then, when Souvarof shall re-appear among you, he will resume these spoils which he now leaves as a pledge of his friendship, and an appeal to you not to forget him. Remember that he wore them in battle in the victories which he gained at your head."

At these words, the general took off the decorations of the different orders and the military insignia of his command, and deposed them on the top of the pyramid in the form of a trophy.

Immediately after this farewell which the soldiers received with murmurs of grief and indignation, Souvarof quitted his army and retired to his house at Moscow. But he soon received an order to leave that capital, where the ceremony of the coronation of Paul was to be performed. A police officer entered the habitation of the old warrior, and presented him the order which exiled him to a remote part of the country. Souvarof, who knew the minute details into which the emperor often entered in issuing orders of this nature, enquired what

He was allowed him to make his arrangements; the officer replied, "four hours." "Oh! that is too indulgent," said the marshal, "one hour is sufficient for Souvarof." He immediately put his gold and jewels in a casket and descended to the door, where a travelling carriage was attending, "Souvarof going into banishment," said he "does not require a carriage; he can use the same equipage which conveyed him to the court of Catharine, and carried him to head her armies.—Bring me a *kibitka*."* It was found necessary to do as he desired. And it was thus at the age of sixty-eight years, that the robust and active warrior made the journey of two hundred leagues with the guard who accompanied him at his side, in the common rude vehicle of a peasant; for he expressly ordered, that none other should be brought him.

Arrived at the place of his exile, the marshal remained under the inspection of police officers, without being permitted to see or correspond with any one. This seclusion, painful as it was, neither shook his firmness or induced him to make the voluntary submissions which perhaps were expected by Paul. But he knew very little of the character of Souvarof if he expected to induce him to implore the pardon which he was soon obliged freely to grant; for fortune, as if irritated at the persecution of so great a man, was already preparing an exalted revenge worthy of him.

For four years the safety of all the states of Europe had

* The *kibitka* is in the form of a bathing-tub or cradle, covered over, in which the person lies down at full length. It is very much used in Russia from the peasants, who, from the distance of two or three hundred leagues, transport during the winter provisions and game to their lords and proprietors living in Petersburg or Moscow, to the nobles themselves, who, when they make a rapid and distant journey, employ these vehicles, which may be made extremely convenient and comfortable. In the summer season the *kibitka* is mounted on two small wheels; in winter, upon sliders or runners, as a sled; and the person within lies down, and wraps himself in covering as in a bed.

been endangered. On all sides the French had passed beyond their old limits ; and Europe was to submit to their yoke or experience a total revolution, by their means. The plan of the campaign of '96 had been formed ; the most formidable scheme ever devised against the liberty of Europe, and executed by Frenchmen, whose natural courage was exalted by the effervescence of the revolution, its success appeared indubitable. The military position of France was fearful ; Italy already subject, and Germany open to her, and and in both countries, but especially the latter, the partizans of the French revolution were numerous and violent. Austria was weakened in her military force, exhausted in her finances, and unsteady in her policy. The different countries which composed her government, agitated by the spirit of innovation and licentious reform, which ran through Europe, were disposed to separate and form distinct and independent states. Prussia remained in an unaccountable lethargy. The Poles, just subjected to a foreign dominion, badly organized as yet, were ready to seize with avidity, an opportunity to throw off the yoke of their conquerors. Russia, in case of an approach to her frontiers incurred the only danger to which she is subject from the attempts of foreign powers ; that of having introduced among her peasantry the spirit of insurrection and the desire of liberty. England, occupied with herself alone, could not be the regulator of the continent, with regard to which, her views and plans were continually changing. If in this conjunction, three formidable French armies, setting out, one from the sources of the Danube, and marching directly onwards ; another from the banks of the Meuse, and marching obliquely to the right ; and the third, inclining from the banks of the Po to the left, succeeded in forming a junction in Austria, the point of the angle described by their lines of march ;—the destruction was ensured of this ancient monarchy, which by its position is the key-stone of the political arch of Europe. This monarchy once broken up, with her the face of Europe would change. Poland would be liberated ; and three hundred thousand Poles uniting under

the protection of one hundred thousand Frenchmen, would carry war, carnage and desolation into Russia. Prussia, attacked from the rear, and hemmed in, would not be able to resist for two months. Of the rest, it is scarcely worth while to speak. Never were circumstances so favourable to the innovators who had sworn to re-mould the social system of Europe. The excesses of the French in Germany, and the phlegmatic boldness of a young and sage warrior, saved Europe, and warded off, perhaps for ever, the revolution which was meditated.* Had the French army of the Sambre and the Meuse been less licentious and disorderly in its conduct, and had it not raised against itself the mass of the population of Germany, it would have realized in that country all the projects it had conceived ; for all those who resided in Germany at that epoch, can testify how much the opinion of a vast proportion of its inhabitants was favourably disposed towards a change. Or if, on the other hand, the arch duke Charles had not possessed as much prudence, caution and presence of mind, or, carried away by martial ardour, had rashly opposed in the first instance, the entry of the two formidable French columns into Germany ; it is probable, that although victorious in some combats, yet he could not have withstood the repeated battles which his enemies were in a situation to offer ; that he would have been forced to leave them a free passage, and those means, which his prudent retreat secured, and which enabled him to resume the offensive when united to those he possessed already, would not have sufficed to stay the progress of an enemy,

* The spreading of the French in Europe, which commenced in 1794, has quieted the minds of the people of other countries, with respect to the favourable sentiments entertained of the revolution of France, and the desire they had to imitate it ; and the progress of the spirit of innovation and change has been in an inverse proportion to the conquests of these disciples of liberty and political reform. Every unprejudiced observer remarks, that the attachment of nations to their sovereigns, their ancient constitutions, and established usages, has been much stronger since the year 1794, than it was previous to that time.

who by the concentration of his forces, became more powerful as he advanced.

This same plan was resumed in 1797, and the power of France enabled her then to pursue the same schemes with perseverance, and to gain by force alone that which the concurrence of many circumstances had before flattered her with the hope of obtaining. It was then that the empress Catharine had determined to send forward Souvarof at the head of eighty thousand men to the relief of the emperor of Germany, menaced and endangered in his very capital. But in the midst of these arrangements the empress expired, and her successor Paul stopped the march of the Russian troops. Nevertheless the emperor of Germany found means, by making great concessions, to enter into an accommodation with France. Preliminaries were already signed which appointed a congress to assemble for the conclusion of a definitive peace. But whether in the interval which elapsed, France had leisure to repent that she had let slip a favourable opportunity of crushing Austria,—or whether Austria felt some regret for the numerous cessions she had made,—or (which is more probable) that both these motives acted upon the minds of the respective negociators,—it is at least certain that they assembled at the place appointed for the congress with very little desire for a pacification. The opening of the negociations was only a delay which each one took advantage of, to renew hostilities with more vigour than before. England, who never ceased to incite Austria to the war, and made large promises of money for it, decided her at once by assuring to her the aid of Russia. She had engaged to take into pay an army of one hundred thousand Russians, who, divided, in two columns, one marching into Italy and the other on the Rhine, would lend a powerful assistance to the efforts of Austria against France.* The pri-

* This second coalition of a part of the powers of Europe against France,

rate sentiments of Paul the First had as much influenced his decision on this subject, as the address of the English negociators. This prince, whose interest as a sovereign gave

as well as that which had recently terminated in the treaty of Campo Formio, was the work of the celebrated Pitt. In the power and fruitfulness of his genius, and profound knowledge of man and his secret springs of action, Pitt was one of the most extraordinary men that have ever appeared. Nor was he less remarkable for the knowledge he possessed of the affairs of politics, of finance, of administration, of commerce, of the situation of different states of Europe, and of that of England, and of its resources, and true interests. He was still more remarkable for his disinterested patriotism;—and above all, for his transcendent eloquence.

With such a rare assemblage of eminent qualities, how is it that Pitt wanted a just and true conception of that great event, the revolution of France? How did he, who managed at his pleasure all the cabinets of Europe, suffer them to escape so easily from the bonds in which he united them? Why, having armed all Europe against France, did he not succeed in vanquishing her?—And why, instead of being vanquished by Europe, has the latter been enabled to assume over the former an ascendancy as unexpected as it is vast, and which has mocked all calculation? It is because the original first idea of Pitt of the French revolution, and the first opinion and system which he formed in consequence of that idea, were equally false. In the movements which agitated France, he saw only one of those ordinary revolutions to which nations from time to time are subject; and he thought only of profiting by it to raise up England at the expense of France, weakened and enfeebled by dissention. But the revolution of France is one of those great impulses given from time to time to the human race by a supreme and invisible hand, to conduct it to the great destiny it has assigned for it. This revolution is not of a nature peculiar to France: she is distinguished in the great drama only as having entered first upon the stage. This revolution too must have a certain course, and produce certain results, which develop themselves slowly and in due time; and all those who endeavour either in France or elsewhere, to fix, direct, or arrest it, or to draw from it such results as suit their own particular views, passions, or ambition, will be borne off and destroyed by the torrent. This happened to Pitt, among other memorable examples. The true policy of wise men, and especially those who govern or influence society, would be to endeavour to divine the designs of Providence on these great occasions, and gently to prepare men, and smooth the way for their accomplishment, and oppose resistance, in fine, only to prevent the operation of violence and cor-

him just views of it, detested the French revolution. But here, it was not his interest alone which inspired this feeling ; it was the sentiment of honour and loyalty of which he boasted, and which was inherent in him. The proof of it is, that he possessed them in the same degree when only grand duke, and when on the throne, and it was the only point on which he suffered himself to think in unison with his mother.

As England had so great a share in the coalition, it was agreed that she should nominate a general to command the combined army. She selected Souvarof, and caused him to be demanded of the Russian court by Francis the Second. Paul could not refuse, since it was his general that was demanded to head the Austrian grand army, which his Russians joined only as auxiliaries ; and in fact, it was in the capacity of field marshal in the service of Austria, that Souvarof was to conduct the war. On this condition Paul consented to permit him to serve ; but it is certain, that he would neither have selected him of his own accord, nor to command his own army. Thus it was that the reputation of this great man rescued him from the oblivion in which all the power of his sovereign had in vain endeavoured to sink him ; and fortune drew him forcibly from retirement and inaction, to exhibit him to

ruption in the midst of a nation, or the interference of strangers. If from the beginning of this crisis in France the other governments of Europe, foreseeing its tendency, had undertaken with wisdom the political and civil reforms which public opinion required,—and if the military efforts of these powers had been directed solely to keep the French within their proper limits,—the fanaticism of the revolution, which was the froth arising from the effervescence of opinion, would have been dissipated on the spot, and these grand agitations been productive of general good. From the extent of his conceptions, the force of his genius, and the prodigious ascendancy which he possessed over his own nation, and over Europe, Pitt was particularly fitted to produce this effect so important to the happiness of the human race ; if, banishing from his soul all prejudices and vulgar passions, he had been more zealously attentive to the duties of the man, and less so to those of the Englishman.

The eyes of the world on a new scene, and in a manner more glorious and brilliant for him than ever,

Souvarof was at one of his houses in the country, where, to dissipate the profound disgust which political events and the actors who then bore a part in them caused, he amused himself in learning the ceremonies and chanting of the church service. He thought that the knowledge of these things would be sufficient for the part which he was condemned to play in the world for the rest of his life, and that he might forget every thing else. In this apathy, so little suited to him, he received the letter in which his own emperor informed him of the intentions of the emperor of Germany with regard to him, and his acquiescence in them. He laid the letter on his heart;* touched his wounds with it in succession, crying out that it gave him new life : a sublime emotion ! and one which seems to prove, that the warrior saw in this circumstance more than a simple occasion to acquire new triumphs. He was too accustomed to victory to suppose she would escape him. But the pleasure of succouring the unhappy and distressed ; the hope of calming the agitations of Europe and re-establishing order ; the power so dear to generous hearts, of being useful to the world ; these were the sentiments that exalted his magnanimous soul and caused his transports of joy.

Souvarof having replied to the emperor, that he accepted

* This letter was in these terms :—“ I have determined to send you into
 “ Italy to succour his majesty the emperor and king my ally and brother.
 “ Souvarof has no need of triumphs or laurels ; but the country has need of
 “ Souvarof ; and my desires are conformable to the wishes of Francis the Se-
 “ cond, who having conferred upon you the supreme command of his army,
 “ requests you to accept that dignity. It depends then only upon Souvarof,
 “ whether he will be given to the wishes of his country and the desires of
 “ Francis the Second.

“ (Signed)

PAUL I.”

the honourable mission which he was pleased to confer upon him, made his preparation immediately to set out for Petersburg, to receive the orders of his sovereign, and thence to Vienna, where he was to take his instructions from the mouth of Francis himself. He was very soon ready, but before he began to journey, he performed his devotions in all the form and ceremony used by the christians of the Greek church.* His stay at Petersburg was short, and though the emperor received him with much distinction, yet as it must have been embarrassing to both, they were both perhaps, willing to shorten the interview. But this was not the case at Vienna, where the emperor Francis the Second received Souvarof, with all the marks of esteem and the most flattering distinction. He immediately conferred upon him the rank of field-marshal, and assigned him a revenue of twenty-four thousand florins of Austria. Souvarof became immediately the subject of conversation for all the circles of Vienna, and the object of eager curiosity to all the inhabitants of that great city.† The emperor gave him the entertainments most wor-

* It was the minute ceremonies and multiplied observances of the Greek worship, and which Souvarof rigidly complied with, (because he knew how much mankind are governed by outward forms, and how necessary they are to give a just and true estimation of the foundation and reality of things) that gave rise to an opinion widely circulated that the religion of Souvarof was no more than a ridiculous superstition. These assertions which acquired some strength at the time when they were made, (a time when it was the fashion to turn into derision every religious practice and every appearance of devotion) do not now appear to merit from the historian a serious refutation.

† We were present at Vienna during the stay of Souvarof, and had occasion to repeat an observation we had made before, during his visit to Petersburg, that often the most popular and vulgar stories pass currently among those who are far removed from the people, without being more dignified on that account or less worthy to be confined to the class of society to whom they are adapted. By constantly turning conversation on Souvarof, on his person, his sayings, his most trifling gestures, and his originality, they began by amplifying facts; then distorted them out of all proportion; then forged and invented them altogether. But with all this, what we saw and considered

thy of him, military reviews and manœuvres. The countenance of Francis beamed the satisfaction he felt. He was never known to be more gay than when he had at his side this famous general, the conqueror of so many nations, who became for the time his own subject, was preparing to cover his arms with immortal glory. This young emperor, worthy of a more propitious reign, and born for better times than those in which he was destined to live, appeared to feel all the value of the hero of the north ; and he received from the latter, on his part, the most lively and constant marks of respect and attachment. He admired the appearance and equipment of the superb Austrian army, especially of the Hungarians, the handsomest men in the world ; and he contemplated in advance, the trophies he should raise, by means of these brave and faithful warriors.

The marshal had many conferences with Francis the Second upon the campaign now about to open. It had been agreed that Italy should be the principal theatre of war ; and Souvarof approved the arrangement. In fact, Austria possessed at that time the state of Venice and the Tyrol. She had a free passage into Italy, which she influenced and touched, as it were, by the centre of gravity, that is, by the strongest part of her possessions. She should, therefore, for the commencement of offensive operations prefer that country to the Rhine, where France presented to her an imposing front, and an insuperable barrier, in a line of strong fortresses. France, on the contrary, had her weakest side contiguous to Italy, and communicated with her by a long and oblique line, which was

attentively, and as a striking phenomenon, was the joy, the confidence and hope which the presence of Souvarof inspired, from the most obscure individual to the greatest noble, from the soldier even to the generals in chief. It seemed as if the Austrian monarchy was animated with new life, and awaited the highest destinies ; such is the influence of genius and noble character ! This, in truth was the kind of originality which distinguished Souvarof ; but it is an originality rarely met with.

interrupted by the Alps. The occupation of Switzerland had not been productive of many advantages to the French; for the passages from Switzerland into Italy are too difficult to serve as a habitual communication, and besides, Switzerland was not sufficiently brought under the yoke to offer to France the same resources as one of her own provinces. Moreover the French had committed the fault of expanding themselves very much in Italy, and were spread to the extremity of the peninsula with a number of troops very disproportioned to the great extent of country. To this disadvantage of position was joined that of the hatred of the inhabitants who supported the yoke with impatience, but dissembled in silence, awaiting an opportunity of joining an avenger when he appeared. Lastly, Austria was closely allied with England, and all her operations could be powerfully supported by the maritime forces of that power in a country which presented so great an extent of coast as Italy.

Souvarof perceived all these advantages, but satisfied with this general view, and persuaded, that when a military scheme appears practicable in the general outline, that it then depends upon the skilfulness of the general to take advantage of circumstances and carry it into execution, he refused constantly to enter into explanations upon the details or the manner in which he intended to direct the operation. He refused positively to communicate on this subject with the council of war formed at Vienna, to assist the ministers and direct the generals; and he even declined hearing the plans which this council had already projected. Souvarof knew that the best arranged plans of a campaign are exposed to heavy inconveniences and objections,—in the first place, because they can never receive their complete execution, since it is quite impossible to calculate before-hand, the modifications which may become necessary from the resistance of the enemy, or his counter plans; and, in the next place, because plans committed to writing and thereby become the secret of many persons,

will soon find their way to the enemy, who is thereby enabled to direct his operations with great advantage according to the knowledge he has of the plans of his adversary. For many years, we may say indeed for the last century, Austria had paid dearly for this desire of foreseeing and pre-concerting every thing in writing, and of conducting their generals, as children in leading strings, according to the plans pre-arranged in the cabinet. The only brilliant and decisive campaign which the Austrian armies have made since the time of prince Eugene, is the campaign of 1799, in Italy. This should have opened the eyes of the court of Vienna, to the great evils resulting from giving so much power and influence to their councils of war. Nevertheless, it has not been corrected by experience, and a recent instance of the result of such obstinacy has been presented to the world.*

After having invoked the divine assistance in the cathedral of Vienna in presence of an immense concourse of people, and having taken leave of the emperor, to whom he promised very soon to send tidings of victory, Souvarof, full of hope and confidence, set out for Italy, and arrived at Verona, where were the head-quarters of the Austrian army, on the 14th of April, 1799.

Nevertheless, the Austrians had commenced the campaign with great success—on the defensive in the first instance, they had by a series of victories now resumed the offensive. Faithful to their system of invasion which they had successfully practised since the revolutionary war commenced, the French without waiting for the end of winter to commence their operations profitted by their position in the territory of Mantua, by which they commanded and cut off Tuscany, to pour themselves at once into that defenceless country. They regarded

* The campaign of 1804, which terminated by the unfortunate battle of Austerlitz, is here alluded to. In the campaign of 1809, the arch duke Charles had full powers as *genera lissimo*, to act independently of the Aulic council at Vienna....*Translator*

its easy conquest as an advantage, because it afforded some booty, without calculating that it was the concentration and not the extension of their forces which should secure to them the conquest and possession of Italy. The Austrians, more prudent, did what their enemies had neglected to do; they concentrated themselves on the left bank of the Adige, behind Verona and Porto-Lignano, resolved to first await the arrival of the Russians before they advanced.

But the impetuosity of the French gave a different complexion to the state of things. Believing that they marched to a certain victory over the Austrians, whose forces were far inferior to their own, they advanced under the command of general Scherer against the line of Austrian posts, which extended from the Adige to the lake of Garda. The imperial troops were commanded by lieutenant general baron Krag. He defended himself with great courage, vigour, and presence of mind, and after alternate successes and reverses during a hard combat of fifteen hours, he maintained himself in all his posts; giving the rare example of a position maintained against brave and audacious assailants, and superior in number; an example dangerous in its effects upon Austrians, who are too prone to the system of fortifying and fighting in entrenchments, and who lose by this pernicious plan what constitutes the essence of war, motion and movement.

The Austrians took no advantage of this success, and made very few alterations in their position, where they were soon attacked again by the French. They fought for Verona. The French manifested the greatest desire to possess themselves of it; while, on the other hand, it was of the highest importance to the Austrians to maintain themselves in it; and they finally succeeded. The loss of the French in these two fruitless attacks was very great; and dissatisfaction and want of confidence spread in their army; they disliked their general in chief, and the general in chief was on bad terms

with the generals under him. In this state of things, which renders a reverse ruinous, and makes it impracticable to repair a disaster, Scherer adopted the resolution to retreat and concentrated his troops on Mantua, behind the Adige. The Austrian general now advanced; passed the Adige, encamped before Verona, and perceiving that the situation of his army, compared with that of the enemy, enabled him to act on the offensive, he brought on a general action with him near Magnano. The result was a complete victory on the part of the Austrians. The immediate consequences were the investment of Mantua, (which the French, obliged to retire on the Adda, abandoned to its own defence;) the re-establishment of the communications between the Austrian army of Italy and that of the Tyrol; the insurrection of the people of the north of Italy, who saw with joy, after a long absence, the standards of their former sovereigns floating among them; and the boldness and confidence which animated the Austrian army in proportion as it forsook that of their adversaries. It was in these prosperous circumstances that Souvaroff took the command of the imperial army, bringing with him a reinforcement of forty thousand men.

These troops were the conquerors of the Turks and the Poles. They were the men who fought at Rymnisk, at Ocza-kof, at Ismail, and at Praga. The Russian army had been now long accustomed to victory. The officers were accustomed to war; the soldiers were veterans. Notwithstanding the pernicious innovations introduced by Paul the First, that prince had not yet had time to disorganize entirely his army. The same spirit remained with the individuals, and it was yet the best army in Europe. Souvaroff was the greatest general in Europe; and he came at the head of his forty thousand veterans, to unite them to fifty thousand combatants of an army completely organized, and which only wanted confidence in their determinations and their measures; but this assurance, which it had entirely lost by a previous

unfortunate war, it commenced again to acquire by a series of successes as unexpected as they were brilliant. Every thing united, therefore, to present the fairest occasion to Souvarof, and he was not a man who would fail to profit by it.

As it happens always in war, from the effect of victories or defeats, the French had lost in the natural and moral strength of their army, all that the Austrians had gained; but a number of circumstances rendered their situation still more difficult and precarious. The faction which then held the reins of government rendered all the others dissatisfied, were it only from the good fortune it had had in obtaining the supreme power. The nation, wearied with the agitations of faction, was still more discontented. Disorder and confusion prevailed, as might be expected, in every branch of the administration. It was impossible for such a state of things not to affect the army; the recruiting for which met with every obstacle, that a disgusted and discontented people could oppose, and the guidance of which was often committed by the government to very unworthy hands. Still, however, the army which could no longer combat from the inducement of patriotism, nor of love for its chiefs, and which from their weakness and recent defeats might justly fear that they could no longer combat even for glory, this army still fought from the impulse of two sentiments always powerful, dear to Frenchmen, natural bravery and national honour. These were more than sufficient to make the victory cost dear to those who vanquished them, and give it greater brilliancy and lustre. Souvarof, who could not desire too easy a victory, because he knew so well how to extort others, foresaw without anxiety, the resistance which would only increase his glory. The force and ardour of his genius redoubled as obstacles increased.

The plan which he conceived, on arriving at Verona was worthy the characteristic boldness of his mind, while at the same time it was adapted to the knowledge he had of the cha-

raster of the Austrians and Russians, the situation of the French, and of the scene of action. Italy, by its configuration is divided by nature, into two great divisions, of which one extending from West to East, backed and supported by a strong chain of mountains and a great part of the continent of Europe, borders on and separates, and naturally commands the other, which extends from north to south, girt around by the sea and isolated from other countries. The example of the Romans, who proceeding from south to north, conquered Italy, and proved in their time how powerful is civilization over barbarism, knowledge over ignorance, and order over confusion, cannot be admitted to disprove this natural order of things ; which seems to prescribe that the master of the north of Italy should be also master of the south. The point essential, is to be sufficiently master of the north to apprehend nothing from the influence of adjoining powers interfering in the fate of the south. But this first part is enclosed within natural bulwarks, the gulf of Genoa and the Adriatic, and the immense chain of the Alps. All these considerations then point out immediately to a mind capable of embracing things on a great scale, the plan necessary to be pursued to effect the conquest of this country. It is evident, that the first part must be previously mastered ; and with this view setting out, whether from the east or west but advancing rapidly to the opposite point, and sweeping away all inferior obstacles, the conqueror will be then surrounded by a vast entrenchment or barrier, defending him on all sides and cutting off the southern part of Italy from all communication or succour, so that it must inevitably fall under the accumulating force pressing upon it. Souvarof saw with one glance the plan he was to follow. He saw that since the French, left to themselves, had penetrated imprudently into the south of Italy, that it was by no means necessary to commence operations against that part of their army, which would remain as a reserve for a second victory ; he conceived that his sole object should be to push vigorously that army which occupied the north of Italy until

it should be forced entirely to evacuate the country, then returning upon the other, his position and united forces would afford him a certain and complete victory. All the circumstances of this bold and decisive scheme presented themselves at once to his mind ; he saw the Austrians almost sure to conquer, because they had already done so ; and the Russians, stimulated with the liveliest emulation to imitate them ; whilst the French, beaten, weakened, and astonished, uncertain of the part they should take, were reduced to a defensive, as contrary to their character as to their hopes. He saw that this impetuous march would isolate and place without succour in the midst of his army, a number of strong places which would fall from weakness alone, as members cut off from the body. He saw that the rapidity of his movements would surprise the enemy and betray him into faults, while it animated his own troops and roused, in a manner the most favourable to his designs, the population of the country who detested the French yoke. This march was also the only means of opening a communication with the imperial armies in Germany through Switzerland, whose neutrality was already violated by France, and the possession of which joined to that of Italy, would give a most formidable and menacing position against France. He saw indeed a reasonable hope of penetrating into France on her weakest side ; and to the military advantage of living at the expence of the enemy, uniting the political effects of inducing the discontented and dissatisfied spirits in the country to change or destroy a government, whose existence compromitted the safety and repose of Europe. What a proud day was that for Souvarof, when he conceived and arranged this grand scheme, and when he contemplated the means in his hands of carrying it into execution !—could Alexander, setting out for the conquest of Asia and the world, having in prospect whole nations chained at his feet, experience the satisfaction of the generous and loyal warrior, who only marched to the deliverance of nations, and made use of victory only to conduce to the public good.

At Verona, the marshal was received by the inhabitants as the deliverer of Italy. The people at his appearance manifested the greatest joy; and he received deputations from the clergy, the nobility, and the citizens. He encouraged the hopes of all, and impressed them with the same firm confidence which animated himself. After a short stay at Verona he set out for Vallegio, to which the head-quarters of the Austrian army had been removed. General Melas, who had a short time previously taken the command of the Austrian army, immediately gave it up to Souvarof. To the Austrian general officers he paid the most flattering compliments, but among others, he said in particular to general Kray: "It is to you that I shall be indebted for the advantages which I hope to obtain over the enemy; it is you who have opened and indicated to me the way to victory." Thus, superior to all low jealousy, this great man knew how to nourish and keep alive in others that thirst and emulation for glory of which his own soul was full.

As soon as the first Russian column, ten thousand strong, had joined the Austrian army, Souvarof, faithful to the first of military principles, resolved to pursue the enemy and allow him no time to rally. This was so much the more necessary as the French generals daily received re-inforcements and supported by the strong places of the Milanese and of Piedmont, their position would become so formidable as to cause great difficulty in expelling them. This resolution of Souvarof leads us to remark, how much more rare than all other is the talent which enables a general to profit by victory; and the reason appears to be, that this talent depends more upon the character of the man than his science or experience. Certainly the baron de Kray had just shewn himself an able officer; Melas too had proved his skill; yet neither of them, although with a victorious army, and against an enemy repeatedly defeated and still suffering from his reverses, had put in execution the manœuvre by which Souvarof com-

enced on his very arrival. This manœuvre, nevertheless, must have presented itself to their conception, and there can scarcely be any doubt but that it did present itself;—but as it was not without difficulty, it required to undertake it, a confidence in himself and a conviction of success which ordinary men do not possess. Yet it is evident, that the position of the French, who had fallen back upon the Milanese and were masters of Piedmont in their rear, the Alps on their left, and Genoa on their right, was stronger in Italy than that of the Austrians, while the latter had not possession of Mantua. Consequently it was presumable, that as soon as they received sufficient reinforcements, the French would resume the offensive, which the position of Mantua would facilitate extremely.

General Moreau, who had succeeded Scherer in the command of the French army, had resolved not to fall back, but as the Austrians advanced. He was entrenched behind the Adda. Souvarof marched against him. The rear guard of the French which had not crossed the river but still remained posted on the other side, was immediately routed and compelled to join the main body of the army. The cities of Cremona, Brescia, and Bergama with some others of less importance, being defended only by their garrisons were speedily carried by the Austro-Russians sword in hand. The whole army, full of ardour and confidence, followed this first impulse which was given. The Austrians became as daring and enterprising as the Russians; and the natural emulation of soldiers added to their courage. Before they had been good soldiers, but were now heroes who would know nothing but victory.

All the auxiliary Russian army had now come up. Souvarof in fact, independently of the talent which he possessed of increasing his strength by the energy which he infused into his soldiers, had very considerable forces at his disposal. He now had more than eighty thousand men under him; and

resolving to profit by these advantages he continued to advance. The 18th of April he left the borders of the Adige ; on the 25th he was in the presence of the enemy, on the banks of the Adda. The intermediate country had been evacuated by the enemy ; Peschiera and Mantua were surrounded and besieged.

The French army was concentrated near Cassano. Moreau had established his head-quarters at the village of Inzago, a little distance in the rear of that city. The infantry was posted around the head-quarters, the cavalry stationed on the right of the infantry. The whole army was covered by the Adda. The upper part of this river, near the lake of Como, was guarded by the division of general Serrurier. The French were strongly entrenched on the right bank of the Adda, and they had lined [with batteries] the steep and craggy banks of the river, and destroyed all the bridges.

The Austro-Russian army advanced in three columns. The 26th of April, in the evening, all the troops had arrived at the different points which they were to occupy for the attack ; which it was resolved to make the next day. Its success depended on the activity and secrecy with which the army of the allies should cross the deep and rapid Adda, over which it was extremely difficult to throw a bridge. The quarter-master-general of the Austrian army the marquis de Chasteler, succeeded, however, in establishing one at Trezzo, in one of the most rapid and difficult parts of the river. The French did not perceive it, and were suddenly attacked from it with great spirit. This diversion favoured the passage of the other divisions of the Austro-Russian army ; and when on the other side, the courage and valour of the combatants could alone decide the victory. Nor in this case did Souvarof doubt for a moment of his obtaining it, because he knew himself, and the power he had over those he commanded;—and victory was faithful to him in this first battle with a nation, recently become

the terror of Europe. She was faithful to him on this occasion, when for the first time in Europe, opposing French and Russian ensigns waved in hostile array, against each other. The French lost on that day more than two thousand men killed, and as many prisoners, many standards and cannon, and a large magazine which they had in Cassano. The loss of the allies in killed and wounded amounted to fourteen hundred men. The Austrian hussars and the Cossacks distinguished themselves at this battle; and the latter particularly, who under Souvarof, seemed to perform prodigies, charged the French cavalry repeatedly and with the greatest success. The day after this battle, the French general Serrurier, who defended the upper part of the Adda, was obliged, after a sanguinary affair, to capitulate to the Austrian general Vukasovitch. These two successes united, gave to the Austro-Russians the command of the whole course of the Adda; and decided the fate of Lombardy which the French were forced precipitately to evacuate. Souvarof immediately marched into it, and by this rapid movement became master of all the posts on the Po, and cut off the French army coming from the south, from the roads of upper Tuscany and the duchy of Parma, by which alone they could come to the succour of the army of the north, or effect a retreat to France; he then hastened to Milan which he entered on the evening of the 28th of April.

His entry into this city had the appearance, and was in fact, a real triumph. The archbishop and his clergy, the judicial and municipal bodies followed the crowd which went out to meet the Austrian and Russian troops, and received the hero at the gates of the city. On the appearance of the prelate, Souvarof alighted, and prostrating himself, demanded his benediction.* "I come," said he, rising, "to re-establish

* This was his constant usage whenever a bishop appeared, and it is the ancient custom of the Russians, not only before a bishop, but before every

“ religion, restore the Pope to his throne, and bring back the nations to the respect due to kings. Your holy office engages you to assist me in this laudable design, and I count upon your co-operation.”

The marshal passed through the city amidst an immense crowd, to the great cathedral, where a solemn *te deum* was sung with great pomp. At night the whole city was illuminated.

The opinion of the capital having a powerful influence on the surrounding country, Souvarof issued the following proclamation.* “ Italians ! to arms, unite yourselves with us. The victorious army of a powerful emperor comes to succour you, to restore your religion, your government and your rights. Espouse freely this noble cause ; victory is attached to it. We come in force from the bosom of the

priest. Souvarof knew very well that it was not the custom of the Germans, nor of the Italians, but he studiously affected during this whole campaign, the most pointed respect for the forms of religion and established government, to furnish a contrast to the manners of the enemy with whom he contended.

* This method of proclamation is a modern invention which dates from the war of the revolution. Previously it was useless, for wars were merely disputes of kings, which did not change the condition of the people, even when by treaty they passed under a new dominion. In the present time, wars have a tendency to change the whole social system, and to regenerate mankind by a complete revolution in their ideas, opinions, manners and laws. It is therefore necessary, that the people should co-operate in this work, and it is necessary to address them to incite them to it. This communication with the people by means of proclamation, has often succeeded with the French ; but it should for the same reason, succeed with those who are interested in opposing their progress, and it became as necessary to exhort the people to adhere to their ancient principles as to urge them to change them. Souvarof was too skilful to neglect this mean, which the generals of the allied powers had before him too much neglected.

“ north, to effect your deliverance ; will you not do for yourselves what we generously attempt in your favour? Certainly no good citizen can hesitate on the part he should take in this great conjuncture. All those who remain attached to the enemy, and in any manner aid and assist him, thereby declaring themselves unworthy citizens and traitors to their country, shall be shot without distinction of rank, office, or birth. People of Italy, we expect from your love for your legitimate and ancient sovereign, that we shall have occasion only to applaud your zeal, and by no means to exercise severity.” Thus the first moment he could do so in an authentic and useful manner, he took occasion to manifest the generous sentiments for which he had taken up arms, and which have added such lustre to his victories.

From Milan, Souvarof, pursuing with activity his advantages, and faithful to his plan of driving the French army from the north of Italy, and compelling it entirely to evacuate the country, detached the greater part of his forces towards Piedmont, convinced that that labour once completed would give him many facilities towards the accomplishment of the other. He was, nevertheless, obliged to disperse his army very much, which had always been contrary to his system ; and here we see the great superiority of fortified places in a defensive war, whatever may be the superior strength of the attacking army. The place of Mantua alone, took off twenty-five thousand men from the army of Souvarof. And he was to expect similar obstacles in the strong places of Alexandria, Tortona, and Turin. It required indeed a mind as daring, firm, and inflexible as his to dare to conceive the plan of chasing the French in one campaign out of Italy—when he had an army in his rear and another on his right, around him the strongest places in Europe, occupied by the enemy, and before him an enemy continually increasing by the arrival of fresh forces from France.

The army which was in the rear of Souvarof, and which might prove ruinous to him, was the army of Naples, which general Macdonald was bringing up by forced marches through Tuscany to the plains of Parma and the banks of the Po. It was impossible for Souvarof to combat with the same advantage and superiority, the French army of the north and that of the south of Italy. It was necessary then either to march upon Macdonald with the whole of his army, and abandon all operations against Moreau (which would enable the French to resume the offensive in the untenable positions of the plains of Lombardy) or pursue and destroy Moreau, incurring the risk that Macdonald would descend the Apennines before his colleague was entirely cut up, and in time therefore, to succour and to save him.

Any other than our hero would have here found himself in a critical dilemma and repented his daring march. But Souvarof had calculated on a solid basis, when he depended on himself; and the circumstance which proves so strongly the genius and boldness of this campaign, is that, when he advanced to Milan with a determination to enter Piedmont, he knew very well that it would be necessary to return again and oppose Macdonald. He knew that he could not by any means avoid fighting him; that it was naturally and morally impossible that any other general or army than his own, could be charged with this operation. It became absolutely necessary, therefore, that one operation should be entirely finished before the other was begun; and Souvarof was perfectly aware of this alternative.

The locality of the country, afforded indeed a considerable advantage in his favour. Tuscany is separated from the plains of the duchies of Parma and Placentia, by the chain of the Apennine mountains, the defiles of which are extremely difficult and which Macdonald was absolutely obliged to cross. By occupying these immediately, even with inferior forces,

the march of the enemy would be retarded; which it would be impossible to do in the plain, but by opposing to him an army equal to his own. Souvarof detached general Ott to possess himself of these defiles; while, besides the siege of Mantua, directed by general Kray, he ordered Bologna and Ferrara to be besieged by general Klenau.

The other army of the enemy, whose movements it was necessary to watch, was the army of Switzerland which fortunately was too well occupied by the Austrian army under the arch duke Charles, to be very formidable to the Austro-Russian army of Italy. If the operations of the arch duke had been followed up with as much vigour as those of the active and intrepid Russian, the plan of the latter against France would have completely succeeded. Chance, politics, or we should perhaps say, Providence ordered it otherwise.

The marshal, who at this time calculated upon the most active and vigorous co-operation on the part of the arch duke, detached from Milan some troops towards Switzerland, to keep up the communication with the Austrians and occupy the passages of the Alps. He then continued his march, and arrived on the 3d of May at Pavia. Parma, Piacenza, Modena, and Reggio were already occupied by the allies. The people, and particularly the country-people, and peasantry, every where declared in their favour, and these risings which Souvarof organized and directed, of little avail against an army acting on the offensive, but ruinous to a beaten and retreating army, were accordingly found very destructive to the French.

Nevertheless, their army having not more than thirty thousand combatants continued to retreat, but shewed always the firm countenance of good troops more familiarised with victory than defeat. Moreau in retiring, never permitted himself to be attacked to advantage; but was his retreat, admir-

ably conducted as to *tactique* equally so with respect to *stratégie*.* This may admit of discussion. He fell back on Tortona and Alexandria, pushing his right towards the Apennines and Genoa to endeavour to communicate with Macdonald, who would arrive in the state of Genoa through Tuscany. The object was at once to place himself on the side of his enemy and threaten his flank if he advanced, and put himself in a situation so as to ensure receiving the principal succour which he then expected. Nothing was more eligible or proper considered as to manœuvre, and for the immediate occasion. But Souvarof was very superior in number to Moreau. He could stretch beyond the position of the latter, penetrate into Piedmont without obstacle and shut up Moreau in the Apennines in a most inconvenient and contracted position; and this is what he actually did. The direction which Moreau selected, therefore, for his retreat was badly chosen, as a combination of generalship, which should embrace the future as well as the present. His retreat should rather have been made immediately in the direction to France, after leaving strong garrisons amply supplied, in Tortona, Alexandria, and Turin. There, whilst the Austro-Russians

* Military men will understand, that the French now use the term *tactique* to mean those movements of an army made in the actual presence of the enemy or within the circle of his operations; and *stratégie* to express the movements which result from the great combinations and the general scheme or plan of a campaign. It has become necessary to have a term to express these operations, which have become much more important and decisive than those of *tactique*, especially since armies have become so numerous, and military operations connect themselves so closely with politics, topography, statistics, and a crowd of moral considerations.

[The word *stratégie*, is of very recent introduction, and is borrowed immediately from the Greek, in which it signifies,—*prætura, imperium rei militaris*, the command or office of a general. It may, therefore, be with great propriety confined to those great and comprehensive plans by which the movements of a great army are conducted, and the efforts of every particular part made to combine, in producing one general effect....*Translator.*]

employed their forces to reduce those places, the French general behind the shelter of the Alps, would refresh, repose, and recruit his army, and having restored to it strength, courage, and confidence, could then lead it against the enemy. A campaign is never lost when the general is able and active, and retains any germ or foundation for an army in a position where it can be augmented and recruited. But Moreau, by his position, ran the risk of destroying entirely, the whole of the army that remained to him.

With the first troops who passed into Piedmont, Souvarof took care to issue a proclamation addressed to the people and to the soldiers of the ancient Piedmontese army. To the people he said, that he came to restore their government, their religion, their laws, their national independence, and their legitimate sovereign. The troops he invited to return under their ancient banners; he reminded them of their former oaths, and in the name of honour urged them to quit the service where they were detained by force, and unite with the liberators of their country. This was in conformity to the wishes of the emperor of Russia, who intended to restore the king of Sardinia to his throne. It was also in conformity to his own sentiments, for Souvarof believed that no measure was more politic, or more just and wise, than to commence by building up again the ancient social system in all its parts, to inspire confidence and regain the attachment of the people; subject afterwards to a treaty dispassionately formed between the great powers of Europe to fix the limitations and boundaries most proper to ensure for the future a permanent peace in Europe. Besides, he immediately perceived the advantages of attracting to his service a body of forces, who were already organized and disciplined; and who, it was natural to suppose, would be animated with the desire to take revenge for the violence which had made them join the French cause; and who would now engage with zeal in the service of their sovereign, since by that alone, they could hope to obtain complete indemnity.

Nevertheless, this step and this wise calculation were disapproved by the court of Vienna. That court, without explaining its future intentions respecting Piedmont, discouraged for the present every idea of re-establishing it as an independent state; she occupied it as a conquered country, and subjected it to military regulation. Did this proceed from a selfish policy on the part of Austria? or was it from deep and profound views of the changes which the order and distribution of the states of Europe must one day undergo?—It is a point which we will not undertake to decide; but it is certain that it was this refusal of the court of Vienna to acquiesce in the designs of Russia with respect to the king of Sardinia that first produced the dissention which broke out very soon between these two coalesced powers. From this time Souvarof lost the confidence of the emperor Francis, and all credit in his cabinet. He himself conceived a just and well-founded distrust which afflicted him the more, because he saw the evils that would arise from a want of perfect understanding, and its effects upon the future operations of the war. It was doubtless, for that reason, that he could not resolve to inform his own sovereign of the extent of his fears and his dissatisfaction. Knowing the impetuous character of Paul and the hasty promptitude of his decisions, he feared a sudden rupture which would have destroyed all that he had done, and all that he intended to do. His mind embracing things on a great scale, he saw that the expulsion of the common enemy was the great object which should not be lost sight of, and that by fixing the attention on this point, he should turn it from those little dissentions which result in general from too much security. Or he hoped in fine, to acquire for the arms of his master, by his victories, such an ascendancy, as to give him the right to express in proper time and place, more than his mere wishes on the subject.

Following therefore, with eagerness, his great military plan, the marshal had ordered general Vukasovitch, whom he

had detached into Piedmont, to ascend the left bank of the Po occupying in succession all the small posts which the French were obliged to evacuate, and to halt only under the walls of Turin. He at the same time put his own army in motion to sustain this movement. His object in this march, independently of the important acquisition of a new territory, was to force Moreau (by pushing by him considerably on his left, and threatening to attack him from the rear) to abandon the strong position he had just taken, in the neighbourhood of Alexandria. Moreau perceived the danger and endeavoured to extricate himself from it;—the city of Tortona had been taken by the allies, but the citadel still held out. Moreau moved for this point with the double intention of relieving it, by attacking the besiegers suddenly and unexpectedly; and of stopping the march of the Austro-Russian army.

In fact, on the 18th of May, before day, the French threw a bridge of boats over the Bormida, passed that river, and marched against the enemy by the plain of Marango.

The Austrian general Lusignan, commanding the besieging army, having by a fortunate hazard been reinforced by the Russian division of prince Pancration, which was on its march for another destination, but stopped on seeing the probability of an approaching combat, between the French and Austrians, did not hesitate to advance and meet the enemy, instead of waiting his attack. This movement deranged the plan of Moreau, who had calculated on attacking. He now endeavoured to turn the flanks of the Austrians by detaching strong columns along the Tanaro and the Bormida. But the march of these columns was slow and uncertain, since they had to fear being attacked themselves every moment by the allied corps encamped in different directions; and because their progress depended on the firmness of their main body, whose defeat exposed their retreat to be cut off. The main body of the army and the columns who

were to support it, were reciprocally observing the movements of each other ; and there resulted from this an uncertainty and confusion in the attack of Moreau, which the Austrian general immediately perceived and turned to his own advantage. Without being alarmed at the movements of the enemy's columns and at the risk of being attacked on both flanks, he directed all his forces against the main body of the French, which he completely succeeded in breaking. From that time victory declared for him—Moreau was obliged to retreat and destroy the bridge which he had thrown over the Bormida, with the loss of a great number of men. But this was a trifling disadvantage, compared to the results which followed it. The unsuccessful attempt of Moreau proved to him all the dangers of his position. The divisions of Lusignan and Pancration threatened to extend themselves and cut off his right, while Souvarof was already greatly in advance of his left. Trino, Casal, and Valentia, were very soon carried by the allied troops. Moreau was obliged to evacuate Alexandria, after having thrown a garrison into the citadel, and to retire precipitately upon Coni. All the communications with the army of Switzerland were cut off and those with the army of Naples extremely contracted. The plan of the campaign of the allies, was therefore executed. Such were the decisive results of the rapid march of Souvarof and the too measured retreat of Moreau.

In the mean while, the French garrisons abandoned by their army, surrounded by enemies and cut off from all hopes of succour, capitulated one after another. Peschiera, Ferrara, Ravenna, Rimini, Puzzigitono, and the citadel of Milan, successively fell into the hands of the conquerors. These captures gave to the Austro-Russians an abundant supply of ammunition and provisions, a considerable artillery, and the disposal of the troops who had been occupied in the sieges ; who could now be employed with the principal army under Souvarof, whose object was to get possession of Turin, or to

reinforce the corps besieging Mantua, and the citadels of Alexandria and Tortona, whose fall would assure the possession of the north of Italy.

The allies were now masters of the whole of the open country which the enemy no longer disputed with them. By his victories in Italy, Souvarof had assured the progress of the Austrians in Switzerland; and all the chain of the Alps and the vallies on both sides were now evacuated by the French. General Bellegarde, who commanded the Austrian corps charged to compel this evacuation, joined on his left the Austrian army at Chiavenna, and keeping up on his right a free communication with the army of the arch duke by the country of the Grisons, he united the communications of the allied armies of Germany and of Italy. This union, by establishing harmony and uniformity between the operations of two such generals as the arch duke and Souvarof, excited in the highest degree, the hopes of the coalition, and seemed to indicate to Europe a complete change in her political system.

To speak to the eyes and to public opinion, those two great directors of mankind, Souvarof resolved before setting out for Turin, to make a solemn public entry into Alexandria. For some days he had had with him the grand duke Constantine, the second son of the emperor Paul.* The presence of this young prince, which had the happiest effect upon the soldiery, would be no less favourable upon the people of Italy, by shewing the anxiety of the greatest sovereign of the coalition for their deliverance, since he sent his son to aid in it. The entry of the victorious marshal into Alexandria, having

* This prince, to whom nature has given martial propensities and talents for war, having made his apprenticeship to arms under so great a man as Souvarof, and in the brilliant campaign of 1799, preserves for the glory, the lustre, and pre-eminence of the Russian arms an enthusiasm and warmth of feeling, which must render him extremely dear to a brave and courageous people.

on his right the favourite son of his sovereign, and on his left the Austrian general Melas, chief commander under him of the Austrian army, had all the pomp of a triumph. The city and the army testified the greatest joy, and saw in this fete only the prelude to more important and solemn triumphs and marches.

Certain now of being able to fight Macdonald and the army of Naples with great advantage if it came down into the plains and knowing the precious importance of time, Souvarof had strongly at heart to effect the conquest of Piedmont without delay. Turin, by its position, the importance of its citadel, and its immense magazines and artillery, was in a military view, not only the capital, but the key of Piedmont. Souvarof marched immediately for it and arrived there on the 26th of May. General Vukasovitch had already commenced the siege; on the arrival of Souvarof he took the command in person, and after an unsuccessful summons to the governor, resolved on a bombardment. The effect was such as might be expected. The people rose upon the garrison; forced it to retire to the citadel, and opened the gates of the city to the allies. Six hundred and sixty cannon, and other artillery, found in the arsenal or upon the ramparts, a vast quantity of bombs, balls, and other munitions of war, and more than six thousand quintals of powder were the price of the occupation of Turin, which cost the Austro-Russians only thirty men killed and fifty wounded. *Te deum* was chaunted in the cathedral; and in fact, he had cause to return thanks to heaven for these unexpected successes.

But the citadel held out. A cannonade was commenced on it and kept up with great spirit from the very day the allies entered Turin. The garrison answered it and fired upon the city. The marshal immediately sent a menace to the governor to put him and his whole garrison to the sword in the event of taking the citadel, if he did not cease to fire upon the city,

contrary to the law of nations ; and he would certainly have executed this threat. It produced its effect ; the fire on the city was suspended. This was not the first time that the firmness of Souvarof, declaring that he would retaliate, had awed an enemy too violent and rash in their declarations. It is a striking example and proof that folly, violence, and extravagance yield to true firmness and decision of character.

Immediately upon the occupation of Turin, the marshal sent several detachments to possess themselves of the principal points which opened the entry into Piedmont from the side of France. These columns penetrated into the vallies of Aoste, of Morena, and of Suza, threatening to enter France by Savoy and Dauphiny. The Russian patrols pushed even into the latter province, after the taking of Suza by prince Pancration. On the side of Pignerol and the Vaudese vallies, the inhabitants, who were all protestants had declared violently in favour of the republicans : they did not however, venture to hold out in Pignerol when menaced with an assault. To put an end to this war against the people, always irksome, Souvarof addressed a proclamation, couched in the mildest terms, to the people of the Vaudese vallies, and promised them that they should not be molested in their belief or their privileges. They laid down their arms : thus the same warrior who was able to force them from the most terrible enemies on the field of battle, obtained them here, by persuasion, from a courageous but deceived people.

In the mean time general Moreau, whose army was reduced to twenty thousand men, was obliged to abandon Piedmont entirely to the allies. He retired by the Col de Tende towards the territory of Genoa, harassed extremely in his march, by the insurgent peasantry of Piedmont, who, under the name of "The Christian Mass or Levy," shewed the extremest hatred and bitterness against the French, notwithstanding the menaces of the latter and the severe reprisals they sometimes exercised.

The only plan of Moreau at this time, was to unite himself with Macdonald through Genoa. With this augmentation of force, and assisted by the situation of the territory of Genoa, covered by the Apennines and accessible only by a few narrow defiles, Moreau would have opposed to Souvarof a line of defence exceedingly perplexing to the latter, and which would not have been easily forced. This, it is to be presumed, was the plan of Moreau : but it was not that of Macdonald.

Upon the first intelligence of the successes of the Austrians, Macdonald had quitted Naples, bringing with him all the disposable troops he could collect, except a few garrisons left in the most important places. He was reinforced in the Roman states, and in Tuscany, by the different French corps spread through the country, so that on his arrival on the frontiers of Modena, he presented himself ready for battle, with a force of thirty-five thousand men.

These forces, although far superior to those that were immediately opposed to them, yet were not very considerable compared with the whole of the Austro-Russian army in the north of Italy. If Moreau had not yet been driven beyond the Apennines, or if his army had been less completely defeated, and Souvarof less decidedly victorious, the manœuvre of Macdonald would have been, without doubt, to traverse the defiles of the Apennines and display his army on the plains of Parma ; thus placing the allied army between two fires. But in the actual state of things, prudence and military rules required that he should unite with Moreau by the state of Genoa, covering himself by the Apennines, instead of crossing these mountains. Macdonald, however, disregarded prudence to signalize himself, by a more brilliant action. But Souvarof was watching him. He had previously made his dispositions to retard as much as possible the junction of the two French armies ; and with this view had detached the troops lying before Mantua (after turning the siege into a blockade)

to reinforce the chain of posts which guarded the passages of the Apennines. He knew, nevertheless, that these troops were not of sufficient force to advance before the enemy in Tuscany and give him battle, the only way of retarding his march. He foresaw that he could not prevent the junction of Moreau and Macdonald, if Macdonald desired it; and he had long been satisfied that he should be obliged to retrace his steps to combat these generals in person. All that he could wish therefore, was to be able to fight them separately, and on favourable ground—Macdonald granted him that satisfaction.

This general had in his favour but one chance, which in truth, might have been decisive; it was the calculation, that his enemy would not arrive in time. But if he indeed depended upon this, if ever man reckoned without his host (to use a familiar but strong expression) it was Macdonald. He should have known Souvarof better from his former actions, than to expect that he had gone as far as Turin, and forgot completely, that a hostile army was arriving in his rear. Souvarof had foreseen and combined every thing. He had spared no effort to destroy Moreau and prevent him from being any further dangerous. He had advanced to Turin, to secure the opinion of the people in his favour; to augment his own army by the addition of the Piedmontese; to seize the magazines and formidable artillery, and to ensure the speedy fall of the places which he left behind him, by cutting them off from all hope of succour; and lastly, to establish the communications with the army of the arch duke, and encrease his forces and the facility of their development. These great objects being attained, Souvarof, who knew that Macdonald had a force strong enough to enable him to descend into the plains, but not powerful enough to prevent his posts from gradually falling back, or to capture them, was sure to meet the army of Naples with superior numbers; and in that case, he who had always vanquished his enemies with inferior numbers, counted before the battle upon a certain victory. The chance

therefore, which Macdonald believed was in his favour, was specious we acknowledge, had he been opposed to any other than Souvarof; who never came too late, but always too early for those who had to deal with him.

No sooner had the marshal learned that the enemy was advancing towards the lower Po, than leaving the siege of the citadel of Turin to the field-marshal lieutenant Keim, he brought his army by hasty marches to Alexandria. It was there that he learnt that Macdonald had already passed Modena, after having repulsed beyond the Po, the feeble corps of the generals Hohenzollern and Klenau, and that he was now advancing by Reggio, into the plain between Parma and Placentia, where he was pressing vigourously on the field-marshal lieutenant Ott. Quickening his march, he arrived to his succour on the 17th of June, in the afternoon, at the moment when Ott, who had received orders to hold the enemy in check, but not to engage in a battle, was on the point of yielding his ground and retreating. The van-guard of the Russians had no sooner reinforced the right of general Ott than the Cossacks precipitated themselves on the left wing of the enemy. They were followed by the infantry, who charged the French at the point of the bayonet and drove them back. The same manœuvre was executed by the left wing of the Austrians against the right of the French, by the Cossacks and Russian infantry, under the conduct of prince Gorjakof, the nephew of Souvarof. At this moment general Ott led the main body against the centre of the French, and notwithstanding the resistance of the latter, they were repulsed and driven over to the right bank of the Tidone with the loss of four thousand dead, nearly as many wounded, and four hundred prisoners.

All the Russian columns did not take part in this action, but joined the army in the night of the 17th—18th. On the 18th the marshal resolved to give a general battle, and Macdonald evinced a determination to await it. He had ranged his army

at the distance of half a league from the river-Trebia, on the same side, and in a plain between that river and the little rivulet Tidone. The French army, more than thirty thousand strong, and supported by a numerous artillery, was still more formidable from the ground it occupied, which was intersected by woods and ditches, and though a plain presented as many difficulties as the most unequal and broken ground. Souvarof had thirty-six thousand men become invincible under his orders by the succession of victories they had gained. Trusting in himself and his army, he appeared on the 18th June, at the hour of ten in the morning, on the left bank of the Tidone. What a spectacle was here? Before him lay the same field of battle on which, two thousand years ago the greatest general of antiquity the famous Hannibal, had vanquished the Romans in a bloody combat, and manifested to the nations, that those who then aspired secretly to the dominion of the world, could be made to tremble for themselves. It was also to dispute the possession of a part of the world from the encroachments of an ambitious people that Souvarof fought; it was with intentions as magnanimous and just as those of the Carthaginian: it was after his example that he had arrived, victory after victory, to the same plains, where he was to reach the pinnacle of his glory, or perish. In fine, he was the Hannibal of his age; in him were united bravery, perseverance, immovable firmness of character, fruitfulness of resource, severity to himself and ascendancy over all others,—all the brilliant qualities, in a word, which distinguished the illustrious Carthaginian. What a singular collision of circumstances, and how much it was calculated to inflame the soul of Souvarof. It was then that he declared the victory was his; and no human obstacles were sufficient to wrest it from him.

In proportion as the victory was certain, so much greater was the glory of selling it dearly, and Macdonald did this in a manner worthy of his own reputation and the brave soldiers

he commanded. No battle in the whole war of the revolution had been so bloody and so terrible as that of this famous day, when both sides exhibited efforts of the most determined and intrepid bravery. It seemed that in the two armies they thought of the distance they had come and spurned the idea of being beaten after all their fatigues; and they saw neither danger nor hazard but only the shame of being vanquished. It is almost certain, that on this terrible day, any other general in Europe than Souvarof, must have succumbed. But if he ever shewed that it was impossible to defeat him, it was at Trebia. His plan of attack was simple, because the ground did not admit of any other. In a battle there is commonly a feeble point to take advantage of, a combination or movement to seize, a chance or accident to be embraced, which may be called the key of the battle. Here, two armies of equal force, enclosed in a narrow space which they entirely filled, offered no base for manœuvres, other than a shock more or less prompt and terrible, and the skill to re-inforce at proper times the enfeebled points, and those in danger of being carried by the enemy. The battle of Trebia resembled the battles of antiquity. Souvarof attacked the French army in three columns, charged it every where with the bayonet, and after prodigious efforts, dislodged it from all its positions and drove it with great loss to the right bank of the Trebia.

But on the next day, the 19th, Macdonald, by a sort of desperate stroke attempted to have his revenge. He felt, that since he had engaged in it, he should maintain himself in his posts until the arrival of Moreau, whom he expected constantly. The Cimbri formerly, before Marius, attended in like manner, the arrival of the Teutones to destroy the Romans; but what Marius replied to the Cimbri of the Teutones, Souvarof could have said to Macdonald of Moreau, who like the sad remnants of the Teutones, was not in a situation to afford relief to his brethren in arms. Depending, however, upon this hope, Macdonald infused it into his troops

and prevailed on them once more to try the chance of arms. On this day he was the assailant. On both sides, the troops had been so fatigued by the cruel combat of the day before, that Souvarof had abandoned his design of passing the Trebia to pursue the French; and it was not till ten in the morning that Macdonald, having restored order to his army, endeavoured to throw his left wing over the river. In a little while, he made the same attempt in his centre and on the right wing. The right wing formed in columns which was to follow the Po, and turn the Austrians, suffered most cruelly. Charged twice by the cavalry, commanded by the prince John of Lichsteinstein, it was completely broken and driven across the river, leaving two thousand dead upon the field. A similar success soon after crowned the efforts with which the centre and right wing of the allies resisted the attacks of the French. Macdonald, completely routed, thought only of a retreat. He effected it the night following; happy that excessive fatigue prevented the Austro-Russians from finishing the destruction of the remains of his army before it reached the Apennines. Aftersome days march he entered the mountains, with twenty thousand men less than when he left them, having lost besides, the greater part of his baggage, ammunition, and artillery. He himself, together with most of his generals had been wounded in the battle.

Souvarof, allowing to his troops no more time than was absolutely necessary to recover from their extreme fatigue, put himself at the head of some regiments and commenced on the 20th, the pursuit of the French, who were retiring by Parma, Reggio, and Modena. Before he set out, he despatched a courier to Vienna, carrying the first intelligence of the victory of the Trebia. He wrote thus to the emperor Francis: "The officer charged with this despatch, will inform your
"majesty of the glorious details of the triple battle of Tre-
"bia. The admirable courage which the French have evinc-
"ed, was only a stronger motive to the allied troops to mani-

“**fast superior bravery. Our success is due to the brave army that I command. As to myself, I have no other merit than to have executed the orders of your majesty. You commanded me to deliver Italy from the enemy. The enemy has been driven out ; Italy is free.**”

Although Italy was not actually freed from the presence of the enemy at this time, yet the foresight of the marshal enabled him to see, that it would inevitably happen very soon, and this part of his letter was, therefore, not an empty boast. Macdonald, unable to shew himself on the field of battle, saw the feeble remains of his army harassed on their march. His rear-guard was attacked and a number of prisoners taken. The Ligurian legion, who advanced by Bobbio upon Placentia to reinforce him, was scarcely able to protect its own retreat. Attacked by a detachment sent by Souvarof to meet it, it was obliged to make its way back with precipitation, by the way it had come. The only enemy of importance who fixed the attention of Souvarof was Moreau.

Hastening to avail himself of all the advantages which his situation might present, and having received some reinforcements from France, Moreau had no sooner been informed of the movement of Macdonald upon Parma and Placentia, than leaving the state of Genoa by the pass of the Bochetta, he advanced by Novi upon Tortona (whose citadel yet held out,) compelled the Austrian general Bellegarde to repass the Bormida, and pushing him on constantly, threatened to arrive on the rear of the Austro-Russian army, and thus place it between two fires. In the latter respect, the approach of Moreau was no longer dangerous ; still the marshal wished to have again the glory of his defeat. He returned upon him from Parma, with a corps of twenty-five thousand men, and by a rapid march, and collecting all the Austrian corps in his route, he arrived on the 26th, between Tortona and Alexandria, where he met general Bellegarde. By this

junction the army was increased to forty thousand men. But Moreau had not waited for him. So soon as he was apprised of the defeat of Macdonald, he had fallen back upon Novi, and had been obliged to engage in a second and bloody combat with Bellegarde, who had taken a position to dispute the passage. This battle was destructive to the French, who had nine hundred men killed and two thousand wounded. Moreau was unable to maintain himself at Novi, and fell back to Govi, where he concentrated his forces, covering the pass of the Bochetta. But he speedily abandoned this new position, and returned into the territory of Genoa, where he was joined in the course of July by the shattered remains of the army of Macdonald. The diversion of Moreau had at least been favourable to the retreat of Macdonald, who was not molested in passing the mountains. The victory of Souvarof was crowned not only by the complete disappearance of the enemy, but by the surrender of the citadel of Turin, of Fort Urbano, of Bologna, and the possession of all Tuscany. The capitulation of the citadel of Alexandria soon added another to these great successes, and nothing was now wanting to the complete satisfaction of the marshal but the possession of the important place of Mantua.

Mantua, illustrated in antiquity, as the birth place of Virgil, celebrated in modern history by the splendour with which it shone under its dukes, and by the arts which flourished there, is now only known as one of the strongest places in Europe. It is built upon an island in a lake formed by the Mincio. This situation renders the siege of Mantua difficult and even dangerous, by reason of the noxious influence of the humidity and exhalations of the lake, breeding disease and pestilence. To this natural defence, Mantua unites all those of art, both in the strength and the number of its works. The city is vast, and able to contain a very numerous garrison, always an important advantage when there is time to lay up magazines. The position of Mantua, nearly central in the north of Italy, renders it an object of importance to the

powers bordering on the extremities, whether France or Austria, who would ensure the conquest of the country. Souvarof, who perceived the urgent necessity, that the allies should gain possession of it, had allotted thirty thousand men under the orders of general Kray for the siege. It was a complete army in itself, and diminished greatly the force of the active army; which Souvarof experienced when on the appearance of Macdonald in Modena, he was obliged to draw off the troops besieging Mantua, to make head against this new enemy. But after the victory of Trebia, he sent back general Kray to renew the siege with increased forces, and brought up all the artillery taken in the different places, and among others that of Turin. Mantua was now cannonaded by six hundred pieces of cannon and mortars. It was constantly the system of Souvarof, during this campaign to cannonade with an immense artillery in his sieges. This system must be accounted good, since it is very expeditious; and this advantage, incalculable in almost every species of war, is particularly so in sieges, where the operations, if protracted for any time, become as ruinous to the besiegers as the besieged. Mantua was unable to resist this terrible fire, and the attacks which, under the protection of the cannon, were made upon it. Nineteen days after the trenches were opened the city was forced to capitulate. The garrison, consisting of nearly ten thousand men, were made prisoners of war. Eight hundred pieces of artillery, thirteen thousand muskets, a prodigious quantity of ammunition and implements of war of every kind, magazines sufficient for the support of the garrison for twenty months, and a complete medicine chest, were found in the city.

Upon the fall of this place, Souvarof united to him the army of general Kray, and found himself in a situation more favourable than ever for the prosecution of his great views. His attention was particularly directed to Genoa. This city and its territory were now the refuge and rallying-point of

the French armies of Italy, who thence had a communication with France, by means of Nice. But this communication, extremely contracted, left a great inconvenience in the want of provisions for the army. Genoa was unable to furnish them, and they could neither draw them from Italy, since the allies had united the possession of Tuscany to that of Lombardy; nor from the sea, on account of the English fleet which blockaded the harbour of Genoa and interdicted all entrance. Souvarof had the choice, therefore, of two plans for the reduction of Genoa: either to pass and turn it, as was done at Mantua and Alexandria, by advancing with all his forces into Piedmont, and menacing the frontiers of France, (which would have retained in France all the succours coming from the interior, and rendered the situation of the French in the state of Genoa extremely precarious) or to force a way through the Apennines into the territory of Genoa, and bear down with his whole force upon the French armies assembled in this contracted space. One of these plans he would without doubt, have put in execution; but the sieges and the double diversion of Macdonald and Moreau had consumed much time. The French government too, resolved to attempt another effort for the recovery of Italy, had made extraordinary levies, and sent on to Genoa fresh reinforcements, and a new general, from whose youth and boldness great expectations were formed. By this concurrence of circumstances, Souvarof was anticipated, and while he meditated an attack, perceived on the contrary, that he must guard against one preparing against himself.

JOUBERT, a young man who had never commanded an army in chief, but who on many occasions had displayed great military talents, and manifested especially that vigour and decision of character so powerful in its influence over others, was selected by the Directory, as the man most capable of restoring the desperate state of affairs in Italy. An army was hastily made up for this general, of all the disposable troops in

France, and they succeeded in assembling under his orders (including the troops of Moreau) from forty-five to fifty thousand men. From the arrival of Joubert at Genoa, the advanced posts of the Austrians observed among the French troops an activity and movement which seemed to portend an attack. And in fact, Joubert had received orders to advance. The citadel of Tortona had not yet surrendered—a desperate stroke might yet save this place; and if it succeeded, place the French again in the centre of Lombardy and change the fortune of the war. It was incumbent on the French to make the attempt, and the personal character of Joubert as well as his instructions stimulated him to try the favour of fortune by a bold and decisive step. On the first intelligence he received of the movements of the enemy, Souvarof foresaw his design and the manner in which he intended to execute it. There was indeed but one; for the play of the French was to hazard all, and advancing, to give battle immediately. Tortona was the only point of support remaining to them, and their present situation urged them strongly to commence operations. It was natural therefore to conclude, that they would advance by the shortest road to Tortona. Consequently all the measures of Souvarof tended to concentrate his troops on the avenues leading to this place, while Joubert united his on the same line, to be enabled to penetrate and force his way to it. The two armies were soon in presence of each other. They met first at a little distance from Novi, some leagues from Tortona, and on the road to Genoa by the pass of the Bochetta. The French arriving from the mountains, spread themselves along the heights between Novi and Serravalle, intending to establish themselves strongly on their elevated position and chuse their ground to descend into the plain. Whether it was that there was reason to apprehend that the French would really gain the choice of ground in the plain and attack with advantage, or because he was convinced that when troops are equal in number, courage, and discipline, that the advantage is always on the side of the assailant, Souvarof resolved to

attack the positions of the French. By a nervous and eloquent address, he brought over to the same opinion the council of war of the Austrian generals, promising them the victory, and pledging as a guarantee all his former triumphs. The attack was fixed for the next day, the 16th of August.

That day exhibited the spectacle of an old man of seventy, shewing more ardour for battle than a young man of twenty-five, and confiding in his long experience, and a fortune which had never forsaken him, bursting impetuously upon an adversary, who on his part burned with impatience to meet him. In this disposition, the shock of the two armies was terrible. Souvarof made his dispositions according to the general rule, regulating the attack of a position; which was to turn it. The French had rested their right wing upon Serravalle, a small town on the river Sorivia. In the castle of this town, the allies had a garrison, but it was at present blockaded by the French. As the ground was sloping to the river, and presented an easier access, and as the strong point of this part of the position (the castle) was in the power of the allies, it followed, that this was the weak point of the French army, the key of its position, and consequently the side against which the greatest efforts of the Austro-Russians should be directed. Upon Serravalle then, Souvarof directed the principal column of attack, under the command of general Melas. But to prevent, on the other hand, the enemy from collecting his principal force for the defence of this part, he caused him to be attacked vigorously and at the same time at Novi, on his centre, and Pastorana on his left.

Joubert, who knew the strong and weak points of his position, was not led away to make his principal resistance on his right wing at Serravalle. But profiting by the repulse of the allies in their attack on his left wing which was posted on heights almost impregnable, he reinforced still more his left wing, with troops drawn from his centre and right, and put

ting himself at their head ordered a charge with the bayonet, with the intention apparently of overthrowing the Austro-Russians in the plain, and thus forcing their centre and left to desist from the attack or incur the danger of being attacked themselves in their rear.

This manœuvre, which would have given a different turn to affairs, and obliged Souvarof to change his dispositions, was not carried into execution, because, in the moment of the charge, Joubert received a mortal wound from a musket ball, of which he died a few hours afterwards. The French nevertheless, maintained themselves in their positions with unshaken firmness. Their centre, posted at Novi, resisted three furious attacks directed by Souvarof in person. But in the mean time, the column of the left wing of the allies having forced the right of the French at Serravalle, came over the heights in the rear. At the same instant a fourth attack directed upon Novi, found the French beginning to be uneasy for the safety of their rear, and of course more easily broken. From this time victory declared for the Austro-Russians. The remainder of the battle was only a continued carnage : The French left eight thousand dead upon the field of battle, besides a vast number wounded. Pursued by the victorious enemy in their retreat to Genoa, through difficult passes and mountains, many prisoners were taken from them ; and, as it commonly happens, when a position is turned and carried by force, they were unable to carry off their artillery, the whole of which fell into the hands of the allies.

But this victory, which put an end to all the hopes of the French for this year at least, and assured to the allies the subjugation of Italy, was not obtained without great sacrifices. The French sold very dearly their final defeat, and taught their enemies that the continued and successive reverses of a whole campaign had been insufficient to subdue their courage. This battle has been with reason, compared with the most ter-

rible of the last century, with those of Malplaquet, of Pultowa, and of Kunersdorf. Though the number of killed was less considerable on the part of the conquerors, (since it is always in the first moments of retreat that a beaten army loses the greatest number of men) yet the wounded were nearly equal on both sides. Souvarof said of this battle, that it was the most obstinate he had seen; and he was capable of judging, for few generals of the age had been engaged in as bloody and desperate combats as himself. He repeated here the example which he had shewn at Trebia, of that perseverance which no obstacle could discourage; and in fact, a general less firm and constant in his determinations, and less powerful over the minds of his soldiers would never have succeeded in forcing the French positions at Novi.* To celebrate this great victory he caused *te deum* to be sung on the field of battle.

Nevertheless, this victory did not produce the great results which were expected, on account of a combination of circumstances which we shall endeavour to explain. At the moment when Souvarof prepared to give increased activity to his operations, he was fettered, and his progress stopped. Combinations and plans, to which he was a stranger, came to cross and perplex those he had formed.

Subjected to an exterior influence, this great man saw him-

* The attacks of the Russians on the centre of the French, were repulsed with so much energy, that Souvarof was doubtful of the victory. He was heard to cry out repeatedly: "*Shall I then be beaten at the end of my career!*" It was represented to calm him, that to be repulsed in an attack was not to be vanquished; but this was a reverse that he could not support, and obeying the courage of his youth, which seemed to animate his old age, he resolved to put himself at the head of his grenadiers; but an *aide-de-camp* of the emperor stopped his horse and prevented him. The officers of his suite had the most precise orders to suffer him by no means to expose his person which was the safety and hope of the army.

self controlled in his plans, and uncertain what was expected of him, and of the course he should pursue, was obliged to stop short in the career of victory. He attempted no great enterprises, but was contented to prevent the enemy from carrying on any active operations.* General Melas was placed at the passage of the Bochetta, to observe the French army beaten at Novi, which had fallen back to its old positions in Genoa; but which could be reinforced at any time and attempt again to advance. The marshal himself established his headquarters at Asti, to watch and be able instantly to repress any attempts the enemy might make upon Piedmont by the Alps. In the mean time the siege of Tortona was vigorously pressed. Notwithstanding the defeat of the army destined to relieve it, and the detached and unfavourable situation of this fortress, the chief of brigade Gast, faithful to that sentiment of honour rare at present, and that sacred duty which commands a soldier never to yield, until he has exhausted all means of defence and resources of courage; this brave officer (for he deserves the title) held out three weeks after the battle of Novi, and surrendered only on the 11th of September.

This place having fallen there now remained to the French after having been four years absolute master of the country, only the place of Coni to cover their own frontiers, and Genoa to facilitate the assemblage of troops and fresh incursions into Italy. In the space of five months the wise plans and unwearied activity, the just combinations and vigour of Souvarof had reduced them to this situation, and the successive destruction of four French armies been accompanied with the

* It is necessary to add, that the rules of the military art required, that Genoa should be acquired previously to engaging in operations against France. Souvarof, whose inaction could not proceed from negligence, thought seriously of taking that place. It was with that view, that wishing to engage admiral Nelson to second him with his fleet, and to compliment him upon the victory of Aboukir, he wrote him the following laconic letter: "I hope that the baron of the Nile will be very soon duke of the river of Ponento."

loss of nearly the whole of Italy. The brightest laurel was now added to the conqueror's crown, in triumphing over a people the bravest and most expert in the art of war of all he had yet combated. He had now given a splendid proof to Europe, that notwithstanding the calumnies and lying assertions of his enemies, his science was not confined to vanquishing the Turks and Poles, and that he knew how to elevate his conceptions to the range of the ablest adversaries.* His

* How can enlightened persons doubt this, either of Souvarof, or of any other great man? How can they persuade themselves that a general who had vanquished enemies yet rude in the art of war by the skill of his combinations, should not be equally capable of vanquishing others? Are the genius and talent received from nature circumscribed then in their action to a certain climate or country, to particular men or locations? Are they not rather of the same essence, universal, and capable of varying and modifying themselves according to the objects and circumstances of their application? All men of genius have proved this since the world was created, and Souvarof belonging to this class only proved it in his turn.

Still, however, there are some military men candid and unprejudiced, who, without contesting the glory of Souvarof, have criticised and discussed according to the principles of the military art his campaigns in Italy. Among others, the general Mathien Dumas, an officer of experience and enlightened judgment, has, in a work expressly written on the campaign of Italy, (*Precis des Evénemens militaires, &c.*) blamed Souvarof for having scattered his forces too much; for having undertaken the siege of too many places at once; for not having been sufficiently persevering in the pursuit of Moreau and the dispersion of his army; and in fine, for having not sooner attacked Macdonald, whose junction with Moreau he was by all means bound to prevent.

Let us examine these objections; let us enquire what would have been the result of the campaign of Souvarof, if he had turned his whole attention to hinder the union of Moreau and Macdonald. Certainly his reputation as a tactician would have been much increased. He would have made scientific marches and counter-marches, occupied fine positions, gained some battles and having the superiority of forces probably prevented the junction of the two generals. But would the great interests of the coalition have been advanced? By keeping both Moreau and Macdonald in check he would have beaten neither; nor would he have gained any ground; while the French continued to

glory had reached its summit, and from all parts he received the most flattering proofs. The king of Sardinia, whom he desired very much to restore to his throne, and to whom he

possess an extensive territory. Moreau, reinforced from France, would have been soon in a situation to resume the offensive, or disputing it with Souvarof, would have placed him between two fires. The true policy of Souvarof, having a large army, was to follow the plan which he actually adopted. To advance, beat and outflank the enemy, and paralyze his movements, is the true secret of war with superiority of numbers, and what was certainly the proper line of conduct for Souvarof. There was more wisdom indeed, in rendering the union of Moreau and Macdonald useless, than in preventing it entirely. Of what consequence was the arrival of Macdonald within the Apennines when Moreau had been driven to the other side, and rendered incapable of keeping the field? It was on the contrary, his interest to draw him on to the plains of Parma to give him battle to greater advantage, and we remain convinced, that if Macdonald had persevered in keeping within the Roman states and Tuscany with his whole army, and Moreau had returned within the frontiers of France with his, leaving strong garrisons in Mantua, Tortona, Alexandria, Turin, and Genoa, and provisioning these places, that the army of the allies, threatened on both sides, and having not a single strong post in Lombardy, would have been forced to evacuate it. The kind of defence adopted by Moreau and the system of offence of Macdonald, together with the rapid march of Souvarof produced together the effects ardently desired by the allies. It is very certain, that if it had not been for political intrigues, both the east and the south of France would have been invaded. But the French generals could not have calculated on these political intrigues. And it is fair to judge of the plan of campaign of a general by the result, if he is opposed to a skilful and experienced enemy. If Souvarof had committed great faults, if among others he had neglected to follow up Moreau, is it to be believed, that Moreau on one side of him and Macdonald on the other should both have neglected to profit by them? But in fact, did Moreau prevent him from conquering Lombardy and Piedmont, and capturing all their strong places; from restoring the communications with the army of the arch duke; from taking off the flower of his army without any apprehension for his rear, to combat Macdonald; from returning afterwards to menace the frontiers of France with an invasion which Moreau was no longer able to prevent? It seems to us, that when Souvarof performed so much, in spite of the efforts of the enemy, he had combined sufficiently well, the means of weakening and enfeebling him.

But general Dumas adds to the recapitulation of the faults of which he

had often written, and indeed forwarded a regular account of his operations from the time he entered Piedmont, elevated him to the office of grand marshal of his troops, and the rank

accuses Souvarof, (*pages 210, 211, 213, of his work,*) "that if after having passed the Adda, and separated the army of Moreau from the places of Mantua, Ferrara, and Bologna, the marshal had employed all his forces to pursue Moreau and outflank him, the latter would have been unable to maintain so long his position between Alexandria and Valentia, and perhaps been driven from the state of Genoa. In this manner Souvarof could detach a corps to watch the movements of Moreau, embarrass his marches by arming the Piedmontese, and thus reserving to himself time and means to appear in force against Macdonald, he would have deprived him from the first, of all hope of effecting a junction with Moreau. It will be objected in vain that the sieges of Peschiera, Mantua, Ferrara, Pizzigotone, Milan, Tortona, Turin, and Alexandria, employed more than the half of the army of the Austro-Russians; for, in fact, there was no necessity to besiege those places, and by merely blockading them and preventing their communication with each other, or with the French army, they would have all fallen by a general capitulation, as happened to prince Eugene in 1706."

In answer to this we will ask, whether it would have been right in Souvarof to have penetrated into the interior or south of Italy, having the army of Moreau immediately before him, and in a situation to give any reinforcements from France? whether, notwithstanding the obstacles the fortified towns already gave him, he should have interposed the Apennines also, between them? Had Souvarof been guilty of that imprudence, Macdonald would have retreated as he advanced and led him on even to Naples. He would have drawn on his enemy, until from the want of magazines, places of refuge and support, he must have been totally ruined. But farther, what would have been the conduct of Moreau? would it have been impossible for him to force the corps of observation, raised all the blockades, and posting himself on the Apennines, kept Souvarof prisoner in the lower part of Italy? Those who will weigh these considerations attentively, will be convinced that Souvarof ought by no means to have been uneasy at the march of Macdonald upon Tuscany since his measures were taken to receive him on his arrival. It was certainly better to leave the French to evacuate the south of Italy voluntarily, than to have detained them forcibly in it. But in adopting this bold calculation, ought he therefore to have joined to it an extreme imprudence? Although he did not think proper to hinder Macdonald from advancing, yet he was bound to prepare to meet

of prince and noble of his kingdom. The city of Turin presented him with a sword enriched with diamonds. The emperor Francis, who could add nothing to the dignities he had already conferred, expressed his gratitude to him in the most flattering letters. But the emperor Paul, his sovereign, distinguished him especially, created him prince of the Russian empire, added to his surname of Rymnikski, that of Italski, and accompanying these honours with the present of his portrait set round with diamonds, wrote to him that he requested him to wear it as a testimonial of the gratitude of a sovereign to a subject, who had made his reign glorious. He ordered *te deum* to be sung at St. Petersburg with great pomp, as a solemn thanksgiving for the victories of the marshal; and commanded the name of Souvarof to be inserted in the public prayers, after those of the imperial family. Who could have foreseen that this splendour was the forerunner of mortification, chagrin, and bitter disappointment for Souvarof, and of the melancholy results which the folly of the princes he had so well served, was about to produce from his victories?

We have now arrived at one of the most singular epochs of the war of that revolution, so fruitful in singular events. We come now to that period, when the coalesced powers, after having succeeded beyond all probable calculation, and enfeebled their enemy more than they had even hoped for in the commencement, wearied as it were with their success, and hurried on, some by ambition, others by jealousy, all by the spirit of discord, themselves overturn the whole fabric of their success, and prepare to receive instead of it nothing but defeat and disgrace.

him; and for this reason besieged and spared no pains to take the strong places in the dutchy of Parma and Lombardy. Eugene, when he neglected or disdained to make himself master of those places, had no army arriving in his rear from the south of Italy.

A PLAN is formed at London, approved at St. Petersburg, supported at Berlin, and adopted at Vienna, by which the whole of the Russian armies united in Switzerland under the orders of Souvarof, were to pursue in that country the operations commenced by the arch duke ; while the Austrians should remain alone charged with the conduct of the war in Italy, and at the same time the arch duke at the head of another army make a diversion upon the Rhine.

It is evident that this plan was not founded upon true military principles. These do not permit a general to be drawn from a country which he has just filled with his own fame, at the time when he was on the point of reaping the fruits of his victories ; to be drawn off too with an army so enfeebled by its own victories, that it could scarcely be considered a reinforcement to the army which it joined.* This plan, therefore, had its origin in motives of policy. And what motives could there be, unless it were to enfeeble Austria in Italy, the great object of her ambition ; to snatch from her Switzerland, the possession of which she would be inclined to covet

* Souvarof to spare the Austrians had been so prodigal of the blood of the Russians, that his army, forty thousand strong when they entered Italy, was reduced to twelve thousand men when they left it for Switzerland. In the painful and difficult passage of the Alps, having continually to fight their way, they would lose, at a moderate calculation, even if victorious, four thousand men. There would remain therefore only eight thousand men, harassed with fatigue, to join an army already worn down, in a country entirely new to the general, and in face of an enemy constantly pressing on him. To send the Russians to such a combat was almost certainly to sacrifice them ; or if it had been foreseen that Souvarof would have extricated himself from the difficulty it was at least, certainly to disable him from acting with effect against the enemy. Austria advantageously situated for that purpose, should alone have had the burthen of recruiting her army in Switzerland ; and instead of ordering Souvarof to join Korjakof in Switzerland, it was Korjakof who should have been ordered to join Souvarof in Italy. We may imagine what Souvarof would have effected if he had had a reinforcement of forty thousand men after the battle of Novi.

too ; and to oblige her to employ her forces in favour of the coalition in a disinterested manner. But what could have been the calculation of a power who would choose that moment to add still more to the alarms of Europe ! and what sort of preservative was this, furnished by these powers to the dangers that menaced them all, to thus break the chain of military operations, to derange the forces charged to execute them, to want the prudence to dissemble even for a few months and to sow abroad division and dissention at once. They had all sufficient reason to repent afterwards of their faults. When the coalition ceased to be wise, it ceased to be fortunate.

If, at least, Souvarof on arriving in Switzerland had found considerable forces and an active and honest co-operation on the part of the Austrians, he would doubtless, have assumed the offensive in that country with as much success as in Italy, and the allies equally have looked forward to a happy and glorious result. But under pretext that a French corps had passed the Rhine and menaced Germany, the arch duke advanced to Manheim before the arrival of Souvarof, with the greater part of his forces; leaving only in Switzerland about twenty-five thousand indifferent troops under the orders of general Hotze.*

The marshal yielded, although with many regrets, to the subordination of a soldier, and executed without delay the

* Who can believe that the small corps of French which passed the Rhine, at Philipsburg, was sufficiently dangerous to call for the presence of the arch duke himself, and the employment of the greater part of his forces? what marches, what operations could this army make to give serious uneasiness to Austria at so great a distance, when Austria, till then victorious in Italy and Switzerland, menaced France herself with an invasion on a frontier line of an hundred leagues and on her weakest part? It is clear to us that this conduct was a display of ill-humour and spite, a project to humiliate the Russians, and perhaps a secret desire to entrap their envied chief.

order he had received. He took an affecting leave of the Austrian army of Italy, and set out from Asti for Switzerland on the 8th of September, with all his Russians.

To have a correct idea of his plan, the changes which he found it necessary to make in his march as he advanced, the obstacles he had to surmount, the dangers he ran, and the address with which he extricated himself from them, in a campaign which every impartial man must regard as the highest proof of his talents, and his master-piece,—it is necessary to have an exact idea of the affairs of Switzerland at this epocha.

Since Belgium had been ceded to France by Austria, and the German body separated them by a barrier too extensive to cross, these ancient rivals came in contact and collision only on the plains of Italy. Now Italy is commanded by the chain of mountains, which, rising from the shores of the Mediterranean sweep round her in a semi-circular form, to the gulf of the Adriatic. This chain is the true military position by which Italy is permeable. A part of it was possessed by Austria; who from the Tyrol, could pour without obstacle numerous battalions into the fertile fields watered by the Po. France had not this advantage, but ardently desired it. The obstacle in her way was Switzerland, which stretching from the Tyrolese Alps to the frontiers of France, left no part of these mountains at the disposition of the French. It was then necessary to the French republic, who wished to continue the war with Austria to get possession of Switzerland; and this had been already planned during the meeting of the congress for a peace in Europe. As soon, therefore, as the war was decided on anew, the expulsion of the French from Switzerland became naturally the fundamental plan of campaign of the Austrians. The execution of it was entrusted to the arch duke Charles and the flower of the army given to him. His first steps were fortunate. After having chased the

French from Suabia, he fell upon Switzerland along the lake of Constance and triumphing at Zurich over the skilful general whom the French had opposed to him, he had already opened a way by this point to the plains of Switzerland and turned the Alps, when it was agreed that he should take the command of the Austrian army in Germany, and abandon the direction of the war in Switzerland to Souvarof.

It was evident that the plan of Souvarof was to turn the French positions in the south of Switzerland as the arch duke had done in the north, and pouring from the mountains into the plain at Lucerne, there to unite himself with the victorious army at Zurich, and advancing together, arrive at Berne, a central point, whose possession in a manner ensured that of the rest of Switzerland. But this army, which Souvarof believed still victorious was no longer so. Anxious to frustrate the plans of Souvarof which he penetrated, the French general Massena had advanced upon Zurich with forty thousand men. He there found an equal number of Russian troops newly arrived. But commanded by whom? By a young man whom the mere whim of his master, and the slavish respect he evinced for the new innovations of this master, had elevated to the supreme command.

After some efforts badly directed, to arrest the descent of the French, (coming down the mountain with the intention of attacking) this school-boy general Korjakof imagined a manner to receive them, by forming his troops in solid columns; and thus foolishly and awkwardly imitating the manœuvre he had seen practised with success by the greatest generals of his country against the loose and irregular cavalry of the Turks, he thought by it to overpower a brave and well-trained infantry, expert marksmen, and a numerous and well served artillery. He had taken every measure to be destroyed completely; and he was so. The victory was so complete on the side of the French that the remains of the Russian army were not

sufficient to give them any uneasiness, and after the occupation of Zurich, Massena retraced his steps to wait for Souvarof, in the full expectation of taking him prisoner.

In the mean time, the marshal was advancing rapidly into the heart of Switzerland. Ignorant of the defeat and disgrace of Korjakof he never doubted but that the Russians had maintained their positions, even if they had not made further progress or gained fresh successes. With this impression he arrived at Bellinyone with twelve thousand infantry and fifteen hundred Cossacks. At Bellinyone the Austrians had engaged to furnish him with fifteen hundred mules to transport his provisions and ammunition over the mountains. But instead of finding them ready as he had been led to expect, there was not a single mule, nor any preparation made.*

He waited eight days for the arrival of these mules, a delay most unfortunate in its consequences, since it gave time to Massena to collect and concentrate his troops and entirely cut up Korjakof in the manner just related. Those who were immediately about him at this time, believe that the chagrin and mortification he felt in abandoning Italy (which as another Hannibal, he regarded as his prey, and which like Hannibal, he quitted only in consequence of superior orders) had for the time soured and changed the whole character of Souvarof; otherwise he would have had recourse immediately to the expedient which he adopted at the end of eight days, of dismounting his Cossacks, and by dint of large promise of reward, engaging them to follow him on foot, and make use of their horses to transport the necessary baggage and ammunition.

* The vigour which he displayed in this campaign, proves that he had lost nothing of his energy. We believe that he could have had no suspicion that the affairs of Switzerland would become so desperate under the short guidance of Korjakof. Nevertheless, Souvarof committed a fault, to wait as he did. But how much greater was that of the Austrians, who thus unpardonably violated their solemn engagements.

When he had finished these arrangements he caused to be read to him the plan for the general campaign of Switzerland, drawn up under his direction, by colonel Weyrother, of the Austrian staff, an officer who possessed his perfect confidence.* He adopted the essentials of this plan. He struck out the measures to be taken to ensure safety in case of retreat, (he would never permit the word to be used) and the dispositions for securing his line of communication in the rear, by leaving detachments and occupying posts on each side of the line. On the contrary, he ordered that after the passage of a difficult defile the communication should be broken up: (which was executed, particularly at the Devil's bridge.) His reason was the unskilfulness and incapacity of the Russians for a war of posts, among mountains, totally ignorant, as they were of the language of the country. "With my Russians "around me," said he, "I can depend on them and answer "for every thing. If they are detached, they will be turned and "cut up, and the army destroyed by degrees." The plan which he at last resolved on, was to force in person, the passes of the mountain St. Gothard, while general Rosenberg, at the head of a second column should turn the posts of the mountain, by crossing above, in the country of the Grisons. The army accordingly commenced its march. The French general Lecourbe, who occupied the passes, attacked by the Russians, after an obstinate resistance retired with his corps, part over Mount Furca, upon the sources of the Rhone, and part upon Altorf. At Ursen, Souvarof was joined by Rosenberg and continued his march over the Devil's bridge, one side of which the French had destroyed and rendered impassable. It was restored, and after passing it, again broken up. Soon after, they were joined by an advanced party of Austrians under the command of general Auffenberg, who after-

* We have received these particulars and those immediately following, from a judicious and intelligent officer, who accompanied Souvarof in the whole of the Swiss campaign, and was an eye witness of the facts here related.

wards led the van of the column of march and performed important services. The enemy were constantly beaten and driven before the Russians, who arriving at Altorf at the extremity of the lake of Lucerne, took the road to Schwitz by the Muttenthal or valley of Mutton.

He entered into the valley, and there first learned the defeat of Korjakof and the death of general Hotze, who had been killed in the commencement of the battle. The astonishment and anger of Souvarof may be conceived. All the consequences of this disastrous event rushed at once upon his mind. In the first impulse, dwelling upon the honour of his country, and willing to save it at any price, he sent an order to Korjakof to return against the enemy, whatever might be the state of his army, and rendering him responsible with his head, for every retrograde step he took. As to himself, regarding a retreat as dishonourable, he resolved to commence the offensive, and looked around to see on what side his blows should fall.

He had the choice, for in fact he was completely surrounded by enemies ; and in the midst of great and pressing danger. On the horses of the dismounted Cossacks he had brought provisions for eight days, expecting to meet general Hotze at Schwitz, where he would have been abundantly supplied. Hotze had been killed and his army routed. General Linken had set out from the country of the Grisons for Glarus, to establish the communication by the lake Kloenthaler, with the Muttenthal, where Souvarof was. But content with gaining some trifling advantage over the French, this general had since remained in his positions opposite to the enemy, having Glarus between them. During this time, Lecourbe had returned in force upon Altorf. This was an additional motive for Linken, who had intelligence of it, to attack the enemy and force open a communication by Glarus with the army of Souvarof. But not only did he neglect to do this ; but having

heard the defeat of the Russians at Zurich, and thinking that as he was unable to assist Souvarof, he should avoid being hemmed in himself, and surrounded, he fell back upon the Grisons, contenting himself with merely giving notice of his retreat to the marshal. Here then was Souvarof alone, shut up in a valley, enclosed by high, craggy, and inaccessible rocks, from which it was impossible to emerge but by three paths, all of them occupied by forces more than sufficient to guard them. The first led back to Altorf and was occupied by general Lecourbe; the second led to Glarus, and was held by general Molitor; and the third led to Schwitz, to which Massena, secure of his prey, was advancing by forced marches with his whole army.

All Europe, with eyes fixed upon this point, believed that there was now no escape for Souvarof. He alone neither despaired of himself or his fortune. More dangerous and terrible as the peril approached, he advanced boldly upon the head of the column of the army of Massena, attacked it and put it to flight with the loss of four hundred prisoners, many killed and wounded, and several pieces of cannon thrown over the precipices. This success gave him a short respite, but in no way changed his deplorable situation. There was scarcely any thing short of a miracle, that could save him; and it was through him at last, that this was effected.

There was only one way which offered a possibility of escape; which was to force the mountain path leading to Glarus. But on examination it appeared to be impracticable. The road, or path was so narrow, that two men could scarcely walk abreast in it. On the left were perpendicular rocks; on the right the lake of Kloenthaler. The French had broken up and fortified the pathway with trees and large rocks, and the whole of it was commanded by their artillery posted on the opposite side of the lake. While attacking the enemy in front in the narrow path, the flank of the assailants would be then necessarily exposed to the whole fire of this artillery.

Souvarof shewed this path to his soldiers, then shewed the son of their emperor at his side,* he and his veteran protector both ready to fall into the hands of the enemy, and both destined to adorn the triumphal car of the conqueror. Indignant at the danger of their general and their prince, the Russians exalted by enthusiastic honour, demanded with loud outcries to be led to battle. Their audacity, impetuosity, and persevering bravery surmounted every obstacle. The French were driven from the path, and the activity of the pursuit was such, that the successive posts were overthrown by the enemy himself in his rapid and precipitate flight. Souvarof arrived at Glarus. Here he wavered an instant upon the part he should take. His daring genius and unconquerable courage tempted him to resume the offensive. He was tempted to attack the French in the valley, and arriving at the point where it touches the lake of Zurich, rally around him the remaining Austrians of the corps of Hotze, and the Russians under Korjakof. But he cast his eyes upon his army; he saw it enfeebled, and worn down by fatigue; and every fresh account convinced him that the defeat of Korjakof was more complete and disastrous than he had before credited. Souvarof was obliged to yield to his hard destiny. He determined to retire into the country of the Grisons, and passing the great Alps, he arrived through Caire at Lindau, on the 10th October.

It is surprising that the marshal at his advanced age, stood the fatigue of this astonishing march. He was often obliged to march on foot; but whenever the road permitted it, the Cossacks placed him on a sort of sedan and carried him upon their shoulders. While he was shut up in the Muttenthal, and in the most critical situation, in which a general can be

* The grand duke Constantine made with Souvarof the perilous march through Switzerland, and after the example of that great man, who guided his footsteps in the career of glory, never manifested the least fear or anxiety. What a prize for the French, if they had conducted this prince and Souvarof captives to Paris.

placed, no sign or symptom of apprehension was ever observed upon his countenance. He preserved his accustomed serenity and his wonted habits. He pushed indeed strength of soul and self-command so far, as not even to testify any impatience to make efforts to deliver himself from the peril that surrounded him. A Cossack carried the casket which contained the decorations of the different orders conferred upon him, together with his diamonds and jewels. He possessed great riches of this kind, which he valued very highly, as they were principally the fruit of the munificence of Catharine. He amused himself one day in spreading them out on a table in the middle of the valley ; as if he meant to brave the enemy who regarded this treasure as their prey. This was certainly not because he was ignorant of the danger, which was known to every officer of the army. But it was all-important to maintain the confidence of the soldiery, who happily reason seldom, and never discuss the operations of their chiefs but when they suppose them unskilful. Frederick shut up in his camp of Liegnitz, shewed the same security as Souvarof in the Muttenthal. They were characters of the same mould ; they surmounted with the same energy and success, obstacles invincible to the generality of mankind.

It was at Lindau that Souvarof, having given sufficient repose to his troops, and convinced himself of the unwillingness of the Austrians to co-operate with zeal to the success of the cause of the coalition, declared publicly and firmly his intention to return with the army to Russia, and soon afterwards commenced his march for the interior of Germany.

When this determination was known, and they began to perceive the effects it would have, and the consequent abandonment of the coalition by the emperor of Russia, they repented at Vienna of their procedure towards Souvarof. But he remained firm in the resolution he had taken. To all those who on the part of the courts of Vienna or London, endea-

voured to prevail upon him to change it, he replied, "I have
 " been deceived once, but there would be too much shame at
 " my age, and with my experience, to expose myself to be
 " duped again. They have broken their word and been false
 " to me on every point. They refused to furnish me in Italy
 " with the necessary means to accelerate my march
 " through Switzerland. They left Korjakof exposed, before
 " it was in my power to sustain him ; they compromitted the
 " honour and the existence of a brave army, thus insulting my
 " sovereign even more than myself. I owe it to his honour
 " and to my own sense of duty, to carry back to him, at least
 " the feeble remnant of the troops he confided to my com-
 " mand ; and which have but too well served the cause of the
 " allies."

What particularly disgusted Souvarof was, that fondness
 for parleying and holding conferences, which has been so inju-
 rious to Austria during the war of the revolution ; and which
 generally speaking, is so deplorable in a state of affairs where
 every thing depends upon acting. "Conferences," he was
 once heard to exclaim, "treaties, negotiations !—An Aus-
 " trian officer receives a flag and enters into discussion ; and
 " during this time the French pass the Rhine, and beat his
 " division ; the general is still parleying when the enemy
 " makes him a prisoner. Cæsar said you must not parley
 " with the barbarians : I say as much of every enemy. Like
 " Cæsar, I make no plan of details : I see things only in the
 " large scale, because a crowd of events always interfere to
 " modify and change the best concerted plans."

Nevertheless, the marshal, resisting all solicitations, and
 pressing the march of his army, advanced towards the inter-
 ior of Germany. During this march he was silent and
 reserved. Lying in the bottom of his kubitka wrapped up in
 his mantle, inaccessible to the public view, he shewed himself
 seldom, and spoke still less, and this lofty but noble and gener-

ous character, whom his own reverses would have found firm and unchangeable, now appeared weighed down by the misfortunes of a cause which he had embraced with ardour and good faith, because he believed it to be the cause of justice and honour. He took up his cantonments at first, between the Danube, the Lech, and the Iller, and afterwards, on the 7th of November, fixed his head-quarters at Augsbourg, there to await the ulterior orders of his sovereign.

But fifteen days after, he announced officially, that his army was about quitting Suabia and Bavaria, and continue its retreat. He had received orders from Petersburg to carry the army into Bohemia, and there pass the winter. He arrived at Prague on the 20th of December. In this city he received general the count Bellegarde, and lord Minto, the English ambassador at Vienna, who came each in the name of his respective sovereign, to induce Souvarof personally, to entertain sentiments more favourable to the common cause, and to endeavour to influence Paul to change the resolution he seemed to have taken to break with the allies.

The marshal now become more calm, no longer refused to transmit to the emperor the fresh solicitations of the two courts; but Paul was inflexible. The defeat of his troops in Holland, which happened soon after that of Switzerland, and which was caused by an abandonment, on the part of the English, still more marked and apparent than that of the Austrians, had completely exasperated him against faithless allies, who hoped by stimulating his self-love and vanity, to draw him on to sacrifice his troops to further their individual interests. For this time, they were deceived in the character of Paul, who saw clearly the snare laid for him, and whose extravagance of disposition only shewed itself in demanding more complete satisfaction for the injuries he had received. He demanded peremptorily, that all the Austrian generals who commanded in Switzerland at the time of the battle of

Zurich, should be dismissed, and arraigned before a council of war. He demanded besides, that the republic of Venice should be re-established, and Piedmont restored to the king of Sardinia. From this moment it was impossible to come to any good understanding. The hostility which pervaded the two courts broke out very soon between the Austrian and Russian generals, and afterwards extended even to the soldiers. It became necessary to separate them, to prevent bloody private quarrels, and open violence.

On the 21st of January, 1806, there came from Petersburg an order to Souvarof to march the Russians back to their own country. He made therefore immediately, the dispositions for the march of the troops in columns by the way of Moravia and Silesia ; and the necessary arrangements all completed, he himself set forward and travelling with great expedition through Poland he arrived at St. Petersburg.

Thus ended the second coalition against France ; much more formidable than the first, if we take into the account, not only the immense forces of Russia, but the character of the sovereign who governed it, and that of the general who directed its operations. We have sufficiently detailed these plans and operations and their constant harmony and agreement one with another. Like a superior mind which from an elevation views the whole nature of things, Souvarof waged war against the French, according to a general plan formed from a consideration of their character, their means, and the character and means of the troops he led against them, and according to other political, moral, or natural considerations which presented themselves. What was to be done, he succeeded in doing. So long as he was master of his own dispositions and movements, success always attended him. When embarrassed by the faithlessness of others, he still found in himself resources to enable him to escape from the difficulty, and bear down every obstacle. He who refuses him justice, is incapable of judging him.

The detestable policy of the courts of Europe in all the intrigues which occasioned the disasters of this coalition, a policy so contrary to the true interest of these powers, will remain forever a subject of surprise to posterity, and a striking proof that at certain epochs, the hand of Providence presses upon nations and the councils of princes, to conduct them towards some fixed and determinate end, which we seek in vain to discover. Convinced of this awful and profound truth, which experience has amply demonstrated, and now daily demonstrates, we will abstain from extending our reflections upon these singular events; and the more willingly, insomuch as the conjectures to which they gave rise, have not since been verified: and every wise man must acknowledge that such has been the lot of all those which have been formed within the last nineteen years,* upon the extraordinary events which the world has in that time beheld. It will be the case too, in all probability, for a long time yet to come; but fortunately for the consolation of the vulgar, it is certain that those who appear to hold in their hands the chain of events, are not more instructed in their last results than those who are only permitted to behold them at a distance.

* 1790 to 1809.



CHAPTER VII.

Souvarof arrives at St. Petersburg—Is seized with a dangerous illness—His last moments and death—Portrait of Souvarof—His character, manners, and habits—Æcdoles respecting him—Comparison with other celebrated generals of the eighteenth century—Conclusion.

OF all the species of persecution which a man of real merit can experience, the most cruel is to find himself the victim of the caprices and false judgment of a single individual, against whose decisions there is no appeal, because they are dictated by self-love and supported by uncontrolled power. Such was the situation of Souvarof with Paul I. Souvarof, the pride of his country, the most zealous of patriots, the most ardent and the strongest supporter of the reputation and pre-eminence of Russia, now beheld his own reputation and greatness become the sport of a prince, who enraged at being duped, was blindly indifferent in the choice of the victims to his passion. We have been assured that the great crime with which Paul reproached Souvarof, was of not having informed him in time of the self-interested policy of Austria with respect to Piedmont ;—as if Souvarof at the head of an army in the field, was likely to be better instructed in the secrets of the cabinet than the diplomatists employed expressly for that purpose by Paul himself ;—or, as if his first duty was not to defeat these intrigues by the force of genius, courage, and activity, before they had time to produce their effect. Besides, was it possible for Souvarof to defeat that fatal intrigue which so unfortunately changed the destination of himself and his army after the victories of Italy ? and ought not all the blame

of this affair to rest upon Paul? We will say further, that if Paul had been capable of resolving upon an energetic plan of campaign from the first, and of subduing his prejudices against Souvarof, he would at the opening of the campaign have sent him at the head of an hundred thousand men through the north of Germany to the Rhine.

However this might be, it now suited the emperor Paul to consider Souvarof as guilty, and to punish him. Arrived on the frontiers of Russia, the illustrious warrior experienced the most humiliating mortifications, even to the refusal of the military honours due to his rank. At St. Petersburg the emperor Paul received him with great indifference and neglect. He affected not to enquire concerning his campaigns, still less of the details of the operations. It seemed as if this active general had done nothing; as if he had not returned from battle as he was wont to do, victorious and successful. This was the second time that his victories had been only the source of mortifications to him; and after all the disappointments he had met with for the last few months, this fresh affliction was more than he could bear. At the end of his career this undaunted character, whom no passion but the thirst for glory had ever completely swayed, was unable to resist the chagrin of this attempted stab at his reputation and glory. He was soon taken dangerously ill. All medical advice and assistance, which were promptly afforded were inefficacious,—for the seat of disease was in a wounded spirit, not in the body. Souvarof had received many wounds, but this one was mortal, since it invaded and poisoned the sources from which his life was supported.

The emperor hearing of the danger of the marshal, relented from his harshness and indifference so far as to extend to him some attentions and consolations in his last moments. He sent to him his two sons, Alexander now upon the throne, and Constantine, who had just left as it were, the school of Souva-

rof, and who was enthusiastic in his attachment and veneration for him. The presence of these princes revived for an instant the expiring old man. It was in their arms that he expressed his last thoughts, which were still for the benefit of his country. It was to those who were to be the future arbiters of the destinies of Russia, that he expressed his grief to leave at his death this great empire, already attacked by the principle of degeneration, when it had not yet attained its ultimate period of greatness and glory. It was to their attentive and astonished ears that he unfolded all his regrets, and the misery of having lived too long; since, having witnessed the rise and birth of his country's greatness, followed it in its development, and himself contributed vastly to advance it, he was now condemned to behold its decline;—to see in prospective the glories of his country melting into the darkness of ages, like the bright but passing meteor which appears only to terrify, and vanishes suddenly into the gloom of night. After this conversation, which appeared to solace and relieve him in the hope that the illustrious brothers who heard him, would one day avert, by their wisdom and talent, the melancholy prognostic he had made, the hero waited tranquilly the rapid approaches of death.

Upon the return of the two grand dukes, the emperor, foreseeing perhaps the reproach which history would cast upon him for his injustice and ingratitude to Souvarof, sent an officer to inform him that his imperial word was pledged to grant any favour he should demand. At these words the old warrior struggles with death for an instant. Collecting his strength, he enumerates the benefits and marks of honour he had received from Catharine. “I was,” cried he, “but a simple soldier; she saw the zeal I had to serve her. I owe her more than life; she gave me the means to make myself illustrious. Tell her son that I accept his imperial pledge. Look at this portrait of Catharine; it has never quitted me. The favour I demand, is that it may be buried with me in

“ the tomb, and remain forever on my heart.” Having said this he soon after expired.*

What a death!—And what a spectacle does it present in the midst of convulsed and agitated Europe?—The image of destruction is always fearful; but when we behold the columns of an ancient edifice tumble to the ground, we tremble for the building itself, lest deprived of its support, it should suddenly be precipitated in one undistinguished ruin. What hope is there for mankind, when a new race of men starting up, greedy to desolate and destroy, profit by the decay and fall of the ancient props of the social edifice, to accelerate the progress of devastation?—The heart of the sage sickens, and withdrawing from the prospect, he awaits in silence and anxious suspense the gradual unfolding of the mysterious purposes of Heaven.

The death of this great man was to be deplored as a public calamity. Of this every one must be convinced, who will believe that we have not represented him in this history under false and borrowed colours. But here opens upon us the most singular discussion which a historian can be called on to maintain; for the fidelity of our portrait is denied in advance, and its truth and resemblance pre-judged, before we have even completed our work. Many persons, influenced by different passions, have undertaken from imaginary outlines, to draw a portrait of our hero which they have succeeded in imposing upon a portion of Europe as the real and legitimate likeness. Instead therefore, of terminating peaceably our work with an eulogy of the hero drawn from authentic facts of the history, as writers are generally permitted to do, we on the contrary, must now enter into battle. Armed from head to foot we must

* This interesting anecdote, before unknown to us, confirms the representation we have given, of the true character of Souvarof. We have received it from the same person, who furnished others already related, and as its fidelity may be depended on, have hastened to enrich our work with this affecting proof of the gratitude of the veteran warrior.

descend into the lists, hoping to triumph over that calumny and prejudice which has instigated our adversaries to distort the most notorious facts, that they might compose according to their own false notions and with an assurance which is perfectly astonishing, the lying portrait of a man, whose actions are too recent not to render the imposture palpable.

We have already in the course of this history, allowed ourselves some latitude in the digressions and notes which have been presented to the reader, and which we are sensible may have injured the simplicity and unity of the recital. For these we demand the indulgence of all candid minds. They will feel that it was a duty imperiously incumbent on us, to set right the public opinion wantonly led astray on the subject of a personage, whose history we have undertaken, only because we judged it proper to serve in its kind as a model for the instruction and improvement of men. After what has been said already, on the subject, we will be contented here with probing the true cause of the errors and absurdities which have been credited with respect to Souvarof; to select a few of the principal, and demonstrate their absurdity; satisfied that the truth will then be enabled to regain its proper place.

The celebrity of Souvarof out of his own country, commenced only when he began to command armies in chief, and gain victories, which influenced in some measure the wars and the politics of nations. It does not therefore, ascend farther than to the period of the second war between the Russians and the Turks, which commenced in 1787 and finished in 1791. But we appeal to the public journals and records of the times, to the memory of all those who then followed with attention the course of events passing in Europe, and we challenge them all to say, if it was then ever heard that Souvarof was a sanguinary and barbarian warrior, who knew how to conquer only by an unsparing effusion of blood, and enjoyed with complacency the cries and shrieks of the vanquished.

We see him on the contrary, represented as a rigid and severe warrior, who did not hesitate to employ the most decisive means to obtain success, but who knew how to second these means by all the resources of art ; as a warrior who never refused accommodations or capitulations, nor pursued an enemy submissive and disarmed ; and who in exacting from the troops he commanded their utmost possible exertions, was neither so unskilfully rash nor foolishly proud as to attempt what was impossible. Such was then the reputation of Souvarof in Europe. For the truth of this we solemnly appeal to that crowd of strangers, who from all countries rushed to take part in that famous war which promised to decide the fate of Turkey ; we call in particular for the evidence of all the Austrian officers who witnessed at that time the exploits of Souvarof, and whom we have often listened to while they spoke with admiration and gratitude of himself and his actions.

The assault of Ismail, which from its consequences was forced into a proof of cruelty in Souvarof, was at the time considered as less destructive to the inhabitants, than that of Oczakof. All those too who are acquainted with the Turks know that their fanaticism renders all their wars national, and that it is impossible in taking a place from them by storm not to sacrifice a part of the inhabitants, because they are mingled with the soldiery for the defence of the town. It is well known that marshal Munich, prince Eugene, the prince of Baden, Romanzof, Panin, Laudon, and others constantly carried on their wars against the Turks in the same manner, and surely it is not surprising if Souvarof, placed in similar circumstances, acted as they did.

But this war was not yet finished, when that season of confusion and darkness began, when all the science and experience of the past was accounted for nothing ; when men who had never learned any thing, never reflected, and never done

any thing good or great, assumed their own opinions as the measure and standard for the whole human race ; their own notions as the rule and criterion for the ideas of all ; their own actions as models for all to imitate ; and bathing in the blood of a vast crowd of innocent and defenceless victims, dared with astonishing presumption, to stigmatize as cruel and inhuman those who never had been guilty of the death of any other than obstinate or culpable men in arms, and at the proper hazard and peril of their own life,

It was at this period that Souvarof received from such judges the title of *Anthropophagus* or *Cannibal*. But he had merited it from them by actions more strongly exciting their sensibilities than the cruelties they falsely charged him with. He had subjected Poland to the yoke of Russia ; this was the front of his offending. These modern regenerators of the human race had calculated that Poland would be able to place Russia on the contrary under her yoke, and then pass together with Russia under their own dominion. They hoped that Poland lighted up by the fire of revolution, would become a political volcano to devour and destroy the four powerful monarchies that surrounded her ; and while this conflagration was spreading over the east of Europe, France, having to do only with feeble and disunited monarchies in the west, would transform them at her pleasure to the new system which she proposed to establish in Europe. Then would monarchy be at an end in Europe ; and nothing remain of all that was connected with the ancient social system and order of things ; Man, governed by other opinions and other modes of thinking, other laws, and other manners and customs, would be completely regenerated ; he would be no longer the descendant of those who had preceded him on the earth, but begin, as it were, the whole species anew.

The sword of the terrible warrior, cut at once the main-spring of these beautiful projects, which thenceforward were

for ever blasted. Judge then if he merited from them the appellation of *barbarian*; and of the motives of those, who from poverty in expressions sufficiently strong, had recourse to the most odious comparisons to depict him.* But it is impossible for this wanton indulgence in invective to impose upon impartial minds. In examining the origin of the evil character which they attempted to attach to the renown of Souvarof, and the time when so many efforts were made to sully his fame and degrade him in the opinion of the world, there is not one who has any sense of justice or equity who will not suspend his judgment. Before pronouncing sentence he will demand to see the proofs of such heinous charges. But what is his astonishment when not a single fact is adduced to inculpate the honour, probity, patriotism, loyalty, or morality of the hero; but on the contrary, the only support on which they rest are some few singularities which they endeavour to force into vices. While on the other hand, authentic documents are presented, clearly shewing that the brilliant victories of

* It is curious to read his character among others, in a work entitled "*Memoires secrets seu la Russie, etc.*" (vol. 1st, pages 298 to 306.) This portrait is absolutely a recapitulation of all the slanderous falsehoods and caricatures which were scattered through Poland and Germany at that time, concerning Souvarof. If we pay attention to the spirit in which this character is drawn, and to the general tone of the work above cited, it will be seen whether or not we have correctly indicated the source of the absurd and defamatory reports which have been spread abroad concerning the Russian hero. What is very remarkable is, that in the third volume of this work, written a long time after the first, the author in giving an account of the expedition of Souvarof to Italy and Switzerland in 1799, makes a complete recantation. He uses expressions very different and entirely decent and respectful of Souvarof, of whom indeed he sometimes makes a very handsome eulogium: all this is very easily explained. At this epoch Souvarof came to be known to all Europe, and the French among others, to whose view he was exhibited under appearances by no means agreeing with those which they had sought to give him in the first instance. It was impossible, therefore, to make entirely a fancy portrait of him: and they were obliged for their own sakes, if not to tell the exact truth, at least to make some approach to it.

the warrior were due alone to his talents and courage ; that this warrior was faithfully and constantly attached to his God, his country, and his prince ; that he despised fortune, but was covetous of glory ; that he left to others the spoils of the enemy which he had vanquished ; that he generously shared with his soldiers and the poor, the pecuniary rewards assigned him ; that he fulfilled his military duties with strictest exactitude for fifty years ; that he lived in sobriety and temperance ; that he was idolized by the soldiers, to whom he was a father and friend ; that he never acted the part of a courtier even to his sovereign, but was indebted to his merit alone for his dignities and elevated rank in the world ; that he made use of the originality with which nature had endowed him to gain an ascendancy over all men, and this ascendancy he employed in rendering the greatest services to his country ; in a word, that he possessed all the distinctive virtues of the citizen, the public character, and the man born to command over others. What must be the surprise of him to whom this contrast is presented ?—He will recognize the marks and characteristics of the extravagance of this unfortunate age, and redouble his watchfulness to guard against the prejudices which they seek to throw around him.

The military talents of Souvarof are now no longer disputed ; it would be singular indeed if they were denied to a man, who having made war for half a century, against almost every nation and in many countries, was present at more than an hundred actions with the enemy ; and of these gained for his share, either in actions, rencontres, battles, assaults or towns taken, sixty-four. But what are still disputed and denied him, are his moral qualities. This injustice will cease. We hope that many who were misinformed on this head are already convinced. There is not one of the virtues we have attributed to him, which did not in reality shine with uncommon lustre. Of this, his life which we have written from certain and authentic documents is a sufficient proof.

Let any one examine, on the contrary, the accusations of his detractors; they will find that their charges are all reduced to two points, his eccentricities and his cruelties. But we have already proved that these pretended cruelties, which in fact, when analysed, are all founded on the assault of Praga (for which a certain description of people will never pardon him) are ridiculous and unfounded accusations; and the details we have given in the proper place of this assault, (the most brilliant exploit of Souvarof, after the battles of Rymnik and the Trebia,) reflect as much honour on his military genius, in the assault itself, as its consequences do to his magnanimity, foresight, and wisdom.

There remain then only his eccentricities, the grand field of battle for his calumniators. But why do they not rather fasten on some vice or crime? How rejoiced would they be, could they do so! How they would exult if they could say that Souvarof was a revolutionist and a robber; that he pillaged the people he conquered, and enriched himself with their spoils, by robbing his government of its due; that he was proud, insolent, debauched, prodigal in corruption, miserly in doing good; that he was destitute of religion, and that he who only armed himself to preserve the ancient institutions and belief, was in fact himself most hostile to them. But unfortunately for them, as they perceive instead of these vices only their contrary virtues, they have sought out some other resource, and trusted they had found it in some eccentricities and originalities which they turn into ridicule. They rail at Souvarof for his rude and gross manner of living, when in the midst of his soldiers: not seeing the prodigious merit this man must have possessed to secure to himself, with his Spartan manners, on the one hand the esteem and confidence of a luxurious and magnificent court; and on the other, the love of an army, who, seeing their generals surrounded constantly with oriental pomp, might naturally be led to regard the simple and plain Souvarof as an upstart who was unworthy to hold

a place among such magnificent personages. They do not perceive what strength of mind is absolutely necessary to enable one to oppose openly, the manners of his age and of his country ; to oppose them not by mere argument or empty railery, but by actions, of which he only is capable, who possesses energy of character and habitual self-command. If when he indulged in his pleasant humours Souvarof had been merely a buffoon, he might have amused the soldiers, but he must inevitably have disgusted the officers, whose clamours would have produced his dismissal. When he inspired his soldiers with a devotion so absolute that upon a sign from him they marched to certain death, and his officers with a veneration and awe which kept them in the strict bounds of the severest duty, there must certainly have been in these seeming buffooneries, something of profound calculation and wisdom. His religious practices and his observance of the minute ceremonies of the Greek church have been stigmatized as proofs of superstition, and his enemies eagerly seized on them as the subject of ridicule and mockery. But this is natural, and it would be indeed almost a pity not to allow them that poor indulgence of spleen ; for was it not mortifying to them in the extreme, that the same man who with one hand seized the ring of an arch bishop to press it with transport to his lips, should crush with the other the apostles and preachers of modern philosophy.

If, quitting him in his public career, we follow our hero to the details of private life, we shall there find the same stamp of character ; we shall behold, as it were, in the latter, the elements and parts of which the former was composed.

This uniformity of character both in private and public life, proves completely the unity and steadiness, and consequently the strength of character with which nature had gifted Souvarof. She had given him but one great passion, the passion for glory ; and he appeared to be organized with faculties of

body and mind proper for the attainment of that great end. In his person, Souvarof was lean and thin; his body, rather of small proportions, was muscular and full of nerve; and the habit of fatigue and being accustomed to constant exercise, had added still more to his natural strength. His physiognomy was by no means prepossessing; his nose was flat; his mouth wide and large; and his eyes small; but in the expression of his eyes was found the martial character of the man. Always quick and penetrating, in battle his eye became threatening and terrible, and his soldiers might read in its glance, *death to the enemy*.

The health of Souvarof was good; and an excellent constitution was fortified by a temperate, austere, and uniform diet. It was his custom to rise at the earliest dawn; several buckets of cold water were thrown over his naked body; his hair was then dressed, (which consisted in drawing the hair from each side over the top of his head, which was bald, and in a small queue behind without pomatum or powder :) afterwards he dressed himself. He dined at eight or nine o'clock; when with the army he was accustomed to live on the same food as his soldiers, which consisted of coarse bread often sour, and a broth or gruel of oat or barley-meal; but augmenting his indulgences, when he was not with the army, he added to it slices of salt meat, and a little butter and cheese. His ordinary drink was a kind of beer made from fermented wheat which the Russians call *Kislichtschy*, and a little brandy after the repast. He made two meals a day, and ate very heartily. After having dined he slept for three hours, when business or the occasion permitted; but prolonging the evening which he devoted to business, he scarcely slept more than three or four hours during the night. Before going to bed, and immediately upon rising, he took a cup of tea or coffee. Before he dined he had already given several hours to business and his devotions, which last he never omitted. He made a short prayer after each meal, and again when going to bed.

He usually performed his devotions before an image of St. Nicholas, the patron saint of Russia. He was aware of the profound attachment of the Russians for their national usages, and he conformed carefully to all of them. His bed was commonly a small mattress, or a coverlid spread upon the floor, upon which he slept wrapped up in his cloak. But in the field or on a march, he commonly slept on the bare ground or the floor of a chamber, or sometimes remained in his kibitka, which served him instead of a tent. He had no guards about his person; the whole army were his guards. He was at all times accessible to the common soldiers as well as to the officers, and it was their glory and delight to behold their general living as they did, and adopting from choice, all their habits and customs.

And in fact, the manners which Souvarof adopted did not proceed from originality and eccentricity in himself, as was generally believed in Europe, but were the manners of the great body of the Russians. But what seems to us a decisive proof that the adoption of these manners was on his part, a calculation and mark of genius, was that he had been educated in easy circumstances under the roof of a father, who had never been in the army himself, and who was always unwilling that his son should be a soldier; he had consequently never been prepared in his infancy for the fatigues and hardships incident to that life, but had inured himself to them at a mature age, and adopted these singular habits upon serious reflection and with profound design. In fact, Souvarof entered late into the service, and remained in it for some time destitute of patronage or protection, vegetating in the subaltern grades, because he entered it against the wishes of his father. After the death of his father, being totally destitute of any support at court, and unfitted by nature for playing the part of a courtier, it was evident that there was nothing to expect from patronage. Could he hope then to gain preferment only from capacity, merit, and zeal? The

knowledge he had of the world forbade him to expect it. He therefore affected singularity, as a powerful means of bringing himself into notice, depending afterwards upon the talents and merit which he felt himself to possess. We have already seen how an accidental speech of Catharine strengthened him in this resolution ; thenceforward he persevered in his singularities for the same reason which had caused him to adopt them ; and he had the more reason to persevere, since the impression and effect they produced were greater in proportion as he advanced in rank ; and as they aided him powerfully, in assuming over others that empire and ascendancy, so necessary to the prosecution of his great designs.

This ascendancy, the mark and stamp of real genius, evinces the pre-eminence of the genius of Souvarof ; for no captain ever possessed so complete an empire over his soldiers. His influence over their minds was so powerful that he absolutely controlled them at will ; and from this circumstance alone we are satisfied, that with equal forces Souvarof was invincible. The proofs of this assertion are simple and clear. A battle completely gained, is the result either—of open force, which cuts up and overthrows the enemy, or—of movements which paralyze those of the adversary as in the game of chess, and force him to acknowledge himself conquered. But even in the last case, an intrepid and determined general can place himself in the same relative situation as in the former. For if he should be surrounded (the most decisive manœuvre against him) he can still, by attempting to cut through, bring himself in contact with the enemy, and force him to a combat hand to hand. But in this sort of combat the uncommon valour of Souvarof, and the fire which he infused into his soldiers when he saw them beginning to droop, together with the bodily force and surprising strength of the Russians, would have certainly secured him the victory ; provided his enemy did not possess an overwhelming superiority. And even in this case, Souvarof, rather than yield, would have made his

Russians combat even for seven or eight days in succession, and under his orders, the Russians would have persisted to the last. His retreat from Switzerland is a remarkable instance to prove, that even with a great numerical inferiority, he could scarcely ever have been fairly vanquished. And this retreat, at the age of seventy years, is an exploit and achievement in war, a parallel to which is not to be found, in the history of any general of modern times or of antiquity.

If nature gave to Souvarof a frame perfectly adapted to the hardships of war, heaven was no less bountiful, in endowing him with a mind and soul fitted for that terrible profession. Repose was incompatible with his ardent soul; he considered it as a degradation and disgrace. He was gifted with a presence of mind that nothing could disturb or alarm, and with a degree of courage, which, like that of the heroes of Ariosto, scarcely admitted of comparison. Great intelligence, an astonishing sagacity, and long experience had made him profoundly acquainted with the human heart. He had a superb decision of character which no obstacle could ever bend.— This determined spirit, directed constantly towards the object of his military life, was the more likely to be successful in attaining that object, inasmuch as nothing ever diverted him from the pursuit of his sole and ruling passion, the passion for glory. His heart was not sufficiently tender to permit love or pleasure to enter in, and distract him from the pursuit of fame. He was too robust to fear the fatigues of this laborious career; too active to prefer a calm existence, and too indifferent to vulgar enjoyments to suffer the allurements of riches ever to lead him one step from the path he had traced out.

With a character so energetic, with an imagination capable of giving birth to the most hardy projects, with courage to stimulate him to their execution, and with talents and perseverance to bring them to a successful termination,—living too

in an empire whose power was colossal, and under the reign of a sovereign whose ambition was co-extensive with the enormous means at her disposal,—it was to be expected that Souvarof, so soon as his reputation should begin to spread abroad, would acquire boundless renown from great and glorious exploits. He made the campaign of Italy, having under him a far greater number of Austrians than Russians, and under peculiar circumstances of restraint, which cramped the genius of the warrior, and subjected his operations to the control of others ; and yet that campaign astonished Europe. But Europe did not behold all that was practicable for Souvarof, placed in more propitious circumstances. Had he marched at the head of a numerous army of his countrymen, during the life of the great Catharine and accountable to her alone for his actions, then indeed would he have furnished to Europe, abundant occasion for wonder and astonishment !

Let it not be thought, that if he had appeared with this array of power and force, he might have become the scourge as well as the dread of Europe. . . Souvarof was incapable of pushing destruction farther than was necessary to overcome an enemy. He was not only merciful after the victory, but gentle and generous. The same firmness of character, by which he gave an impulse to his troops enabling them to bear down all opposition, stopped him short in the career of success at the point which justice and duty marked out. Was his luxury so great as to tempt him to despoil the vanquished, to furnish resources to support his expense and prodigality ? Could the cries of a few miserable wretches please that noble and daring spirit, which estimated victory only in proportion to the efforts of courage necessary to obtain it ? The conquest of Poland is a memorable demonstration of the excellence of his character. That country never was more tranquil and happy, than at the time when prostrated on a sudden by the assault of Praga, it was placed completely at the mercy of the conqueror. While Souvarof governed it as a military

and civil officer, the most profound order and tranquility reigned throughout. Unhappy Poland was vexed and harassed only when those who had not conquered it, under pretence of organizing, came to appropriate to themselves the fruit of the conquest.

Souvarof possessed much knowledge of various kinds. He held science in great estimation, venerated learning, and cherished improvement. The notions that have been spread abroad on this subject are calumnies circulated by anticipation, which no action of his, nor any epoch of his life, can tend in the slightest degree to support. He loved the arts, so far as they serve to develop the greatest and noblest faculties of man, but not when they conduce to stifle those same faculties, by ministering to a thousand frivolous and luxurious indulgencies. An avowed enemy to luxury, he made those about him remove from an apartment destined to his use, every article of sumptuous furniture and all that was not of strict necessity; and sometimes when by chance a looking-glass had been left, he broke it in pieces with his hand, as a piece of furniture useless or disgraceful to a soldier.*

* This hatred which Souvarof had to mirrors has given much employment to the idle talk of weak minds in Europe. But how long is it since men, and military men in particular, have been permitted to boast of such an article of luxury? It is not two centuries since looking-glasses were known at all in Europe. And not more than thirty years ago in polished and refined France, old officers were found who made it a boast that they had never used one; and twenty five years since, a young officer who should be detected viewing himself in a mirror would infallibly incur the ridicule of all his companions. Is it surprizing then if these rigid but sound and wholesome ideas should be preserved to a later period in Russia, a country far less refined and civilized than France? And further, the luxury which under Catharine had pervaded the whole court of St Petersburg, disgusted Souvarof. He foresaw the fatal effect of this upon a country which nature has not marked out for a country of voluptuousness. And yet few give themselves the trouble to consider these things; there are many who think that Souvarof disliked mirrors from superstition, and

In his love for simplicity, it was not that he feared expense, for he had the most sovereign contempt for money, so much so that he would never carry any about him or have any concern with it. His son, his relations, friends, and the officers of his suite, profited by, and enjoyed his fortune, which was very large. He himself valued only his diamonds, and in these he was immensely rich. They were chiefly the fruits of the munificence of Catharine; and it was doubtless on this account that he particularly valued them. He had them always carried with him. We have already related the circumstance of his spreading them on a table in the midst of the Muttenthal; a circumstance which it appears quite impossible to ascribe to mere whim or fancy of the moment. In the situation in which he then was, it was doubtless a bravado towards the enemy, and a method of animating the confidence of his troops, by shewing them his own unconcern and security. On great days of military or religious ceremonies, he was accustomed to decorate himself with all his diamonds and badges of the different orders he had received; when he distributed, for example, solemnly in the church, the crosses and swords, sent to the officers of his army, as rewards of bravery and good conduct. This Asiatic pomp formed a strong contrast to the simplicity of his ordinary dress. In summer he wore a coat of cotton stuff edged with scarlet, large linen pantaloons or breeches, small boots resembling those worn in the time of chivalry, and a small casque or helmet.

There is no doubt but that in all the countries attacked by modern revolutionary principles where the arms of Souvarof penetrated, he would have restored as far as lay in his power the ancient authorities, the ancient public worship, and in general all the institutions which related to religion, to honour,

because he thought they contained witchcraft. That Souvarof should be afraid of witchcraft is an idea so truly ridiculous, that we can scarcely imagine how it came to enter the head of any one.

and to that spirit of chivalry- whose influence has been so powerful in the civilization of Europe. Those disastrous times have now passed by, when the prevalence of contrary principles menaced to extirpate all virtue, and banish the light of knowledge for ever from the world. Now then we demand if the principles of Souvarof were ignoble ; now then we demand of the world, if for sentiments and actions like these he deserves to be depicted as a robber and a cannibal ?

No general ever set a higher value upon the duties of subordination than Souvarof. He gave an example of it, by exercising it on himself. He made one of his aides-de-camp order him on different occasions to sit down to table, to rise from his meal, to go to sleep, or to wake up, &c. Sometimes he would appear astonished at the command and ask, *by whose order ?* By order of marshal Souvarof himself, was the answer ; upon which he immediately did what was required, saying in a loud and firm tone, *he must be obeyed.* These were all-powerful words. By obeying himself, he taught that imperious obligation to others.

But he reserved the exercise of the empire he had acquired over his troops, and the subordination he taught them, for great and important occasions. In the ordinary intercourse he was indulgent in the extreme ; and this man who has been reproached with cruelty, sometimes pushed his clemency even to weakness. Ten examples of punishments ordered by him can scarcely be cited. He was often severe and harsh in language, but never in actions. He never brought before a court any complaints against an officer or general. When applied to, to punish slight faults, he commonly answered, *I am not the provost of the army.* He took care, however, that the provost and other officers whose business it was, should not be interrupted in the performance of their duty ; reserving to himself the office of mercy. He gave a signal example of his clemency and moderation, in regard to the Austrian general

Linken, of whom he had much reason to complain for having precipitately abandoned the post of Glarus, on the gratuitous supposition that Souvarof and his army were lost, and exposed him thereby to real and most imminent danger of total ruin. This general was presented to him at Ifflauz, a small village of the Grisons, just as the marshal had extricated himself from the gulf into which Linken had contributed to plunge him. The marshal was surrounded by a crowd of Austrian and Russian officers ; and made no reproach to Linken, but assuming a theatrical manner and in a solemn voice, he cried out, " general Linken, how many enemies can each " of your soldiers bayonet ? mine can bayonet six." Whether Linken was astounded at this singular reception, or whether he comprehended the malice of the marshal, who intended he should feel how little use he had made of the valour of his soldiers in the most critical and important circumstance of the war, he answered coldly, " Your highness, my soldiers do " what they can, and they do well." Souvarof, without pushing his raillery any farther, appeared satisfied with the answer of the Austrian general, received him kindly, and treated him afterwards very well.

By the pleasantries of different sorts and the stories he told them, he amused his soldiers, and made himself almost adored by these rude and simple children of nature. Skilful in seizing the shades of difference between nations, he changed his manner when commanding the Austrians, and had he commanded the French, would have altered it still more. But with all he would have been familiar; because this cannot be attended with inconvenience, and there are often eminent advantages derived from it. This was the system of Hannibal, of Cæsar, and of Trajan in antiquity ; of Henry the Fourth, Turenne, Vendome, Marlborough, Saxe, and the great Frederick, among the moderns. With such names as authority we can follow an example without fear of being led into error.

Souvarof took great care of his soldiers. He desired particularly, that they should be well fed, whatever it might cost to the country through which he marched. He often visited the hospitals of the army, and encouraged the sick and wounded; but he familiarised all about him to the idea of a severe and rigorous service, which admitted of no abatement or interruption from the seasons, fatigues, or dangers. He accustomed his soldiers to be terrible in combat. It was his adage, *that the bayonet was wise, the ball was a fool*. The soldier was therefore to depend on the push of the bayonet, and to despise the fire of his adversary. When he ordered, *march for the Poles!* the soldier plunged his bayonet once. *March for the Prussians!* the soldier plunged his bayonet twice; (he never liked the Prussians on account of their conceit and too great attention to appearance and dress.) *March for the French!* the soldier pushed his bayonet three times. These images were often realised on the field of battle, to the ruin of those who had been the subjects of the lesson.

Sometimes at the dawn of day, he went through the camp imitating the crowing of the cock and waking his soldiers. Thus announcing to them the warlike sentiment with which they should rise from the arms of sleep.*

* The following anecdote will prove that his pleasantries and oddities had some important end in view, however concealed or remote it appeared. During the first war of Poland, finding himself with a very small number of troops opposed to a very strong body of confederates, he discovered a spy among the people of his suite, and resolved to take advantage of it to extricate himself from his unpleasant situation. He published, in the order of the day that, at the first crowing of the cock, the troops would march to attack the enemy, and caused the spy to send word that the Russians would be upon them some time after midnight. But about eight o'clock Souvarof ran through the camp imitating the crowing of the cock; the troops were immediately under arms, and he led them directly to the attack. The enemy, completely surprized, lost a great number of men and was driven from his position. There are some persons who insist that after the success of the scheme the spy received the thanks of, and was rewarded by the general.

Had Souvarof lived in ancient times, all these traits would have been thought admirable, and enlightened men would have been occupied in elucidating their object and meaning. And they would have been rewarded for their pains, for in all of them there was some hidden end in view. Why then should we ridicule these singularities, merely because they are modern ?

When he halted for the night, after a fatiguing march, he lay down upon fresh straw ; and often in an inclement season, he caused his attendants to open the windows, saying that he was not cold, and to take away the doors, saying he was not afraid. The soldiers who saw it, laughed and were ashamed to acknowledge fear or cold. As to the officers and especially the young ones who had been living at court, they shivered a little, but dared not grumble, and the lesson consequently was doubly useful to them.

When he was about to take the command of the army in Italy, the court of Vienna desired that the Austrian troops should act by themselves and separate from the Russians, although still under the orders of Souvarof. But he refused this condition. In fact, the two armies being destined to combat in the same country, and with the same object in view, it was proper to mingle them and take advantage of the emulation naturally excited between them. Not but we are convinced, that if Souvarof had had a free choice at the opening of the war, he would much rather have acted with a considerable army of Russians and on some other theatre of operations, than to have joined the Austrians, who were greatly superior to the Russians in number, and in a country the conquest of which was solely to benefit Austria.

But since it had been so determined by the cabinets of Petersburg and Vienna, to have separated the two armies would only have added new inconveniences to those already

experienced. Souvarof employed the Austrians in all detached parties and on advanced posts, and the Russians in attacks of main force, where desperate boldness was required more than skill or knowledge in war. He composed his general staff chiefly of Austrian officers, and the chief of this staff possessed his entire confidence in the arrangement of a plan of operation. The disposition of an attack or march was always read to him, and it was with an exquisite and infinitely prompt discernment that he struck out what was bad, and added whatever he thought wanting. When several plans were drawn up for the same operation, it was with the highest degree of intuitive sagacity that he immediately selected the best. Count de Kinsky was at first the chief of his staff. He quitted him for the marquis de Chasteler who pleased him by his bravery, his bold projects and his great knowledge ; but afterwards he quitted him also, complaining that he occasioned confusion by his unsteadiness and the too great variety of his ideas and plans. He gave the appointment then to colonel Weyrother, an officer of high established character and great talents, and retained him in that situation until his departure for Russia.

In private intercourse and in the moments of relaxation, Souvarof was simple and to a certain degree familiar with his officers. He amused himself after business very often in childish sports ; and he quitted then his strange manner of speaking, and his oddities, preserving however, always a tincture of originality, which he naturally contracted from the constant habit of counterfeiting and assuming eccentricity. There can indeed be no doubt, but that he assumed that character to further his advancement, and to isolate him as it were, in his military career, and render him independent of the intrigues of ministers and court favourites. Hence Catharine often repeated with complacency, what she had written to him upon sending him the staff of marshal after the conquest of Poland : *It was not I who made Souvarof a marshal: it was himself.*

We have seen upon his arrival in Italy, with what vigour he immediately commenced the pursuit of the French, whom the victorious Austrians were quietly permitting to recover from their defeat. This great eagerness in pursuit, the rapidity of his marches, his daring boldness in attacking every where without hesitation, were without doubt the great means of his success: but it is not in the capacity of all generals to employ them, and particularly to employ them wisely. It appears that he had less aptitude for the details of war; as for example, to know how to profit in a battle of any advantage of ground, or suddenly to change his dispositions. His plan once conceived and arranged, he marched on to its execution, and was not easily diverted from it. After all, he fought the French under circumstances altogether so very extraordinary, in which there were so many moral considerations interwoven with military combinations, and the French on their part carried on the war after a system so very different from any that had been previously practised, that it is impossible to say what would have been the conduct of Souvarof, had he led the Russians into Italy in other and more tranquil times. It is probable, that he would in that case, notwithstanding his characteristic intrepidity and energy, have chosen a more regular and moderate system by which to conduct the war.

He was particularly fond of that kind of warfare, which made a strong impression upon the opinions of men. His generals and soldiers were daring and bold like himself, and the enemy constantly kept in astonishment and wonder, were allowed no time to recover from it. In an engagement, he attacked indifferently, posts and batteries at the point of the bayonet, and rarely sought less dangerous but more tedious means. "*If I lose,*" said he, "*some men to-day, I shall not lose so many on another occasion.*" He was sometimes excited to the most violent bursts of passion against his offi-

teers, and abused them in the harshest terms, when an attack was not going on at first as he wished ; but these fits of anger were never followed by any unpleasant consequences to those who were the objects of them, except in cases of evident cowardice, which he never pardoned. He preserved harmony between the Austrians and Russians in Italy, and that (it will be acknowledged) was not an easy task. When he issued a general order to the army, commanding that every Russian general and officer should be bound by the advice or request of the Austrian generals and officers, in the same order he extolled above all, the bravery of his Russians. Some of these orders he wrote himself in French, and we have seen some which were tedious and even contradictory. Others not so long were correct, and drawn up with great ability. It would be difficult to form an opinion upon his talent for writing ; but there is no doubt that he possessed an excellent discernment and taste for whatever was good in that way. General Moreau issued a proclamation to the inhabitants of Italy, to which Souvarof thought proper to reply, and he desired the marquis de Chasteler to draw up the sketch of an answer. At the first reading of this piece, Souvarof made with great readiness, different alterations, giving it more force and meaning by erasing some expressions, and adding others. A good composition is rarely made with such precipitation. This, of which we have cited some fragments, was found to be excellent.

Souvarof spoke very well (beside the Russian) the Turkish, Polish, Italian, German, and French languages. The two last he also wrote correctly. He knew even the corrupt German spoken at Vienna, and which he used when he ridiculed or upbraided the Austrians, whose slowness and irresolution often called forth the bitterest sarcasms. He had a little knowledge of the English. He understood the Latin, Greek, and Arabian authors. It is even said, that he was able to write in Arabic ; but we do not know how far this

pretension was well founded. He spoke to every one according to his profession ; of theology to a clergyman, of jurisprudence to a judge, of medicine to a physician. He cited ancient and modern history with a precision and strength of memory truly admirable. In the extent of his knowledge and acquirements, he was really a prodigy ; a strange and wonderful circumstance, and which proves the transcendant genius of this extraordinary personage, whose life, a continued scene of agitation and bustle, seemed scarcely to permit him to devote a single hour to study.

His remarks were sometimes caustic and satirical in the highest degree ; many proofs of this have been already given, and some among others, which shew that he did not spare even the emperor, his master.

He embraced all those who were presented to him, and gave them his benediction. The embrace is an ancient custom preserved among the Russians. As to the benediction and the custom of kissing the hand of priests, the Russians adopted them from the Greek christians ; and Souvarof only followed in these respects the manners of the great bulk of the Russian people, who have not yet adopted the modern manners of Europe.

Souvarof could not bear to be answered *I don't know*, or *I cannot*. This is to be understood only with reference to the questions or directions to the officers whom he employed. And as he gave the example himself of finding nothing impossible, it stimulated those who served under him ; for it is certain, that he who is sure that his ignorance or incapacity will be considered as a heavy fault, is able to find resources in himself, which he at first scarcely suspected that he possessed. Besides, the fear of being taken by surprize, produces attention and a degree of reflection ; and this, recurring upon frequent occasions, strengthens into an useful habit. The bold-

ness of an assertion, even at hazard, seemed to Souvarof the indication of natural resources of mind. He had, in a word, a sort of esteem for him who never stopped half-way.

As he despised intrigue, so he had the greatest dislike to court favourites and upstarts. When he was recalled to Petersburg, for the purpose of being sent to take the command of the Austro-Russian army in Italy, the emperor Paul sent, to compliment him on his arrival, a Turk of the lowest extraction; who, after having served him as valet-de-chambre, had become his favourite and confidant; whom he had created a count, grand master of the horse, decorated with the blue ribband, and in fine, loaded with wealth. The count Koutajof is announced to Souvarof. "I do not know any Russian family of than name," cried the marshal, pretending ignorance on the subject of the newly titled count; "but however, shew him in." The latter being introduced, Souvarof demands of him his name, pretends much astonishment, and begs him to tell him of what country he was a native. The count a little embarrassed, answers at last, "I am a native of Turkey; it is to the bounty of the emperor, that I am indebted for my title." "Oh!" cried Souvarof, "you have doubtless rendered some eminent services. In what corps did you serve? In what battle were you distinguished?" "I never served in the army." "Never! You were then employed in the affairs of state?—and pray in what capacity?" "I never served in any office of state; I have always been about the august person of his majesty."—"Ah! in what quality?" The count in vain endeavoured to equivocate; he was obliged at last to come to the avowal which the unsparing Souvarof wanted to draw from him. "I was," says he, "first Valet-de-chambre to his Imperial Majesty."—"Oh! very good," cried Souvarof, and turning to his domestics who were present, he said to his own valet-de-chambre, "Ivan, do you see this great lord! he was

“ once just what you are, (except indeed that he waited on our most gracious sovereign.) But see what good fortune he has had ; he is now a count and decorated with the orders of Russia. So behave yourself well, Ivan ! who knows what you may be, one day or other ?” This scene finished, he begged the count, almost stupified with mortification, to inform him what commands he had been charged with from the emperor.

Would it be believed that it was a Russian who gave to his master a lesson so severe, yet so well deserved ? What more could Themistocles have done, at the court of the great king ?

But so many noble and admirable qualities which rendered the character of Souvarof so interesting in the great relations of society, were not without some admixture of faults. In common with many other great men, he disdained the suavities and amenities of life, and whatever was calculated merely to please. He sometimes harassed his aides-de-camp and those who were about him, by ungracious and rude remarks, and questions which were embarrassing and without an object. He fatigued them by the services he required of them, and did not always recompense the attachment of those, who were most devoted to him. He displaced without any ceremony, an officer with whom he was displeased. He is accused, of not sufficiently protecting the fortune and securing the advancement of officers of merit, and of often making promises of his interest and protection, which he never fulfilled. In general, he treated the soldiers much better than the officers, and the officers of the army still better than those, who were attached to his person. We must not expect to find Souvarof a man of the world,—nor a man of refinement and polish—nor yet a man gifted with gentle and pleasing qualifications for social and private life. He never would have become a character of eccentric originality, if nature had not given him dispositions

fitted for that part ; and these dispositions being strengthened by habit, which became a second nature, would naturally lead him to be sometimes capricious, stubborn, and difficult of access. This same character, so severe, so firm, so adapted to great and noble undertakings, was perhaps, on that account so much the less fitted to sweeten the intercourse of private life. He would have better consulted his own happiness and his duty by remaining single ; instead of marrying, to be almost always separated from his wife, by his manner of life and the avocations of his profession ; and without being able to pass happily, even the few moments which he gave to her society. After some time of misunderstanding and unhappiness, they separated. Nevertheless, he still continued to shew towards her all marks of respect, and some indeed of a very peculiar kind. The birth-day of an individual is celebrated among the Russians with great attention, and with as much ceremony as each one can afford. It is reported that Souvarof, being more than an hundred versts (twenty leagues) distant from his spouse, and recollecting that her birth-day was approaching, thought that he could not omit to give her some mark of his respect, and pay her the customary compliments on that day. He set out therefore, and arrived at the seat where she then was, very early in the morning. Upon his entrance he was told that she had not yet risen, and was then asleep. Her women wished to show him up, but Souvarof would not permit it, and commanded them merely to inform their mistress, when she awoke, that her husband had been to pay his compliments and felicitate her upon her birth-day. Upon which he immediately got into his carriage, and returned.

Souvarof had two children ; a son and a daughter. His son was an officer in the Imperial guard, and was on the point of marrying a daughter of the last duke of Courland at Prague, during the stay that Souvarof made in that city after the campaign of Italy. Paul opposed the marriage ; for rea-

sons which were never made known. It is the son of Souvarof, whom we have seen under the name of count Italiski, pursuing with distinction the career of diplomacy.

The daughter of Souvarof, married to the count Nicholas Zoubof, brother of the last favourite of Catharine, was a woman of very distinguished merit. Her father loved her tenderly, and testified it in his peculiar manner. He would gaze upon her with admiration, and for hours would kiss her hands, and run about the apartment, leaping up and rejoicing that Heaven had given him such a treasure.

Souvarof left a very rich inheritance to his family. His patrimonial estate, not very considerable, had been prodigiously augmented by the generosity of Catharine. Notwithstanding the services he daily rendered and the value he set on the favours of the empress, he refused to accept of estates until after he had children.

He was decorated with all the orders of Russia, Poland, Germany, and Sweden; but what he valued above all was the title of generalissimo of the Russian armies, which for a long time had been united to the crown, but which Paul detached from it, purposely to bestow upon Souvarof. He was, in fine, loaded with honours; but superior to this ostentation and pomp that surrounded him, he rose above all his trophies, as himself the honour and glory of his country. Nevertheless, he was tenacious of his numerous titles. Was it from a weakness often found in great men? Or, was it because he knew the importance which men attach to these trifles, and wished to use them as means of increasing his ascendancy over them? Both these causes might have influenced his sentiments on this subject. This much is certain: that he chose his titles to be always given to him, and shewed himself particularly jealous of being always addressed as *your highness*.

We believe that we shall render a just homage to the memory of our hero, and fulfilling the duties imposed upon us as historians, conduce to the instruction of the public—if we place in the termination of our work, a comparison between Souvarof and the most remarkable and celebrated generals of the last century.


Charles the Twelfth, Frederick the great, prince Eugene, marshals Villars, Saxe, Schwerin, Munich, and Laudon were the great masters of the art of war in the 18th century. To be deservedly brought near to and compared with these illustrious men, is already no inconsiderable glory; but the glory of him is complete who shall be acknowledged equal to any,—with the exception of one alone, whose equal in all respects it will be difficult ever to meet again. It is with his titles and his claims displayed that we demand this glory for our hero. The campaign of 1789 against the Turks, that of Poland, that of Italy, the passage of the Alps and the march through Switzerland, incontestably place Souvarof in the rank of those generals who have been most distinguished for the consummate skill of their marches, their expertness in manœuvring, and their skill in conducting the scientific operations of war. The assault of Ismail, and that of Praga, the battles of Rymnik, of the Trebia, and of Novi, place him by the side of those great men who are dignified with the appellation of *heroes*;—to whom Heaven has accorded the talent of attaching other men to their fortune, and the power of influencing and directing them according to the impression they communicate. In heroism, Souvarof was equal to the famous Charles the Twelfth. He possessed the same boldness, the same intrepidity, the same unerring coup-d'œil, the same perseverance, the same unbounded empire over his soldiers. As a skilful general he is superior to the Swedish monarch. Charles the Twelfth will always remain under the imputation of having committed an important fault at Pultowa; a fault which consisted, not in being vanquished at Pultowa (for

the greatest generals may be sometimes beaten) but in having led his army to Pultowa.

Eugene and Marlborough were great generals ;—the former in particular was really admirable. His prodigious exploits against the Turks were without a parallel, and appeared in all probability likely ever to remain so ;—But Souvarof has fully equalled them against these same Turks and against the Poles. As to the campaigns of the war of the Spanish succession, it is impossible not to admire in them the genius, the resources, and the activity of Marlborough and Eugene. But these campaigns present rather a collection of brilliant detached actions, than any well digested, extensive, and systematic plan. They cannot sustain a comparison with campaigns conceived with such talent, unity, and precision, and executed with such rapidity and exactness as the campaigns of Souvarof in Poland and Italy. We may, without injustice, say the same of the warlike exploits of Villars, Saxe, Munich, Schwerin, and Laudon. We do not mean to say that these great men, and the three last in particular, did not possess a profound knowledge of the science of war :—or even that Munich in respect to the universality of his talents was not superior to Souvarof,—or that Laudon would not have performed all that the Russian achieved, if he had possessed in an equal degree the absolute and independent control of his troops. But allowing therefore, that the circumstances under which they acted, were not so favourable to these generals as they were to Souvarof, it is clearly established that their actions have not that splendid colouring which sets off and illustrates the actions of Souvarof.

There remains then only Frederick ; and to Frederick, Souvarof may yield without dishonour, because to him every one has hitherto yielded. This all-powerful genius, who in the compass of history has no equal but Cæsar, performed far greater actions than the gain of battles ; he was the founder

and creator of those who gained them; he gave birth to a new art; he created for himself a force and power, of which he afterwards availed himself, to become one of the most powerful monarchs of the world. Such deeds are of an order too lofty and exalted, to permit a comparison with the actions of Souvarof. But in the exercise of his art, the warrior has at least some points of near resemblance with the monarch. Like Frederick, Souvarof was thoroughly acquainted with his country-men, and knew how to govern and to lead them in the spirit and manner most congenial to them. Like Frederick, his victories made the armies of his country the best troops in Europe,—a reputation of which it deprived the Prussians, who enjoyed it only during the life-time of their illustrious monarch. Like Frederick (or rather in imitation of him, for this king was the inventor of this system in modern times,) Souvarof was convinced that the element of war consisted in armies more than in stores, strong places, and money; and that success depended more on rapidity of movement, than the excellence of positions. Like Frederick he thought that the defensive should never enter with premeditation into a plan of warfare;—and like him too he singularly estimated cavalry, an arm of war, of which he made constant and powerful use. He was too like Frederick, a father to his soldiers, who exhibited the same devotion to him, an individual and a subject, that the subjects of Frederick manifested to their king. Like Frederick, in fine, he possessed an original and creative genius;—under every circumstance he evinced the most perfect knowledge of mankind, and of his own age in particular,—and he made this knowledge the basis of all his operations. And in a word, if in the career of arms, Frederick was his precursor and his model, certainly it will be allowed that no pupil of that illustrious monarch has seized his manner and spirit with more ability, or followed his footsteps with more splendid success.



APPENDIX.

FIELD MARSHAL COUNT ALEXANDER VASSILI-
AVITCH SOUVAROF'S

“Discourse under the trigger.”*

Being a Series of Instructions drawn up by himself, for the use of the army under his command, after the Turkish war; and since transmitted, by order of the Russian government, to every regiment in the service. It is commonly called “Sowwarof’s Catechism.”

“DISCOURSE UNDER THE TRIGGER.”

[The general is supposed to be inspecting the line, and addressing the troops.]

HEELS close—knees straight.—A soldier must stand like a dart!—I see the fourth—the fifth I don’t see!

A soldier’s step is an *arcaine*†—in wheeling, an *arcaine* and a half. Keep your distances well!

Soldiers, join elbows in front! First rank three steps from the second—in marching, two!

* A *Discourse under the trigger*, is the harangue made by a general to his troops, when the line is drawn out and the soldiers rest their pieces.

† The Russian *arcaine* is twenty-eight inches.

Give the drum room !

Keep your ball three days :—it may happen for a whole campaign, when lead* cannot be had !

Fire seldom—but fire sure !

Push hard with the bayonet : The *ball* will lose its way—the *bayonet* never !
The *ball* is a fool—the *bayonet* a hero !

Stab once ! and off with the Turk from the bayonet ! Even when he's dead, you may get a scratch from his sabre.

If the sabre is near your neck, dodge back one step, and push on again.

Stab the second !—stab the third ! A hero will stab half a dozen.

Be sure your ball's in your gun !

If three attack you, stab the first, fire on the second, and bayonet the third !
This seldom happens.

In the attack there's no time to load again.

When you fire, take aim at their guts ; and fire about twenty balls. Buy lead from your *economy*†—it costs little !

We fire sure—we lose not one ball in thirty. In the light artillery and heavy artillery, not one in ten.

If you see the match upon a gun, run up to it instantly—the ball will fly over your head—The guns are yours—the people are yours ! Down with 'em upon the spot ! Pursue 'em ! Stab 'em. To the remainder give quarter—it's a sin to kill without reason ; they are men like you.

Die for the honour of the Virgin Mary—for your *mother*‡—for all the royal family ! The church prays for those that die ; and those who survive have honour and reward.

* The Russian soldiers buy their own lead. † The treasury of the mess.
‡ The name given by the Russians to the empress.

Offend not the peaceable inhabitant! he gives us meat and drink—the soldier is not a robber. Booty is a holy thing! If you take a camp, it is all yours! If you take a fortress, it is all yours! At *Ismael*, besides other things, the soldiers shared gold and silver by handfuls; and so in other places; but, without order, never go to booty!

A battle in the field has three modes of attack :

1. *On the wing* which is weakest. If a wing is covered by wood, it is nothing, a soldier will get through. Through a morass, it is more difficult. Through a river you cannot run. All kind of entrenchment you may jump over.

2. *The attack in the centre* is not profitable—except for cavalry, to cut them in pieces—or else they'll crush you.

3. *The attack behind* is very good. Only for a small corps to get round. Heavy battle in the field, against regular troops. In squares, against Turks, and not in columns. It may happen against Turks, that a square of 500 men will be compelled to force its way through a troop of 6 or 700, with the help of small squares on the flank. In such a case, it will extend in a column. But, till now, we had no need of it. There are the *God-forgotten, windy, light-headed Frenchmen*—if it should ever happen to us to march against them, we must beat them in columns.

The battle, upon entrenchments, in the field.—The ditch is not deep—the rampart is not high. Down in the ditch! Jump over the wall! Work with your bayonet! Stab! Drive! Take them prisoners! Be sure to cut off the cavalry, if any are at hand! At Prague, the infantry cut off the cavalry; and there were threefold, and more, entrenchments, and a whole fortress; therefore we attacked in columns.

The storm *—Break down the fence! Throw wattles over the holes! Run as fast as you can! Jump over the palisades! Cast your faggots! [into the ditch.] Leap into the ditch! Lay on your ladders! Scour the columns! Fire at their heads! Fly over the walls! Stab them on the ramparts! Draw out your line! Put a guard to the powder-cellars! Open one of the gates! The cavalry will enter on the enemy! Turn his guns against him! Fire

* It is impossible in this translation, consistently with fidelity, to preserve the brevity and energy of the *original Russian*.

down the streets! Fire briskly! There's no time to run after them! When the order is given, enter the town! Kill every enemy in the streets! Let the cavalry hack them! Enter no houses! Storm them in the open places, where they are gathering. Take possession of the open places! Put a capital guard! Instantly put picquets to the gates, to the powder-collars, and to the magazines! When the enemy has surrendered, give him quarter! When the inner wall is occupied, go to plunder!

There are three military talents:

1. *The coup d'œil*.—How to place a camp. How to march. Where to attack; to chase; and to beat the enemy.

2. *Swiftness*.—The field artillery must march half or a whole verst in front, on the rising ground, that it may not impede the march of the columns. When the column arrives, it will find its place again. Down hill, and on even ground, let it go in a trot. Soldiers march in files, or four abreast, on account of narrow roads, streets, narrow bridges, and narrow passes through marshy and swampy places; and only when ready for attack draw up in platoons, to shorten the rear. When you march four abreast, leave a space between the companies. Never slacken your pace! Walk on! Play! Sing your songs! Beat the drum! When you have *broken off** ten versts, the first company cast off their load and lie down. After them, the second company; and so forth, one after the other. But the first never wait for the rest! A line in columns will, on the march, always *draw out*. At four abreast it will draw out one and a half more than its length. At two abreast it will draw out double. A line one verst in length will draw out *two*. Two versts will draw out *four*; so the first companies would have to wait for the others half an hour, to no purpose. After the first ten versts, an hour's rest. The first division that arrived (upon the coming of the second) takes up its baggage, and moves forward ten or fifteen paces: and if it passes through defiles, on the march, fifteen or twenty paces. And in this manner, division after division, that the hindmost may get rest. The second ten versts, another hour's rest, or more. If the third distance is less than ten versts, halve it, and rest three quarters, half, or a quarter of an hour; that the *children*† may soon get to their kettles. So much for the infantry.

* This is a Russian mode of expression. To proceed ten versts, they say to *break off* ten.

† An appellation given by Souvarof to his troops.

The cavalry marches before. They alight from their horses and rest a short time, and march more than ten versts in one stage, that the horses may rest in the camp. The kettle-waggons and the tent-waggons go on before. When the *beathers** arrive, the kettle is ready. The master of the mess instantly serves out the kettle. For breakfast, four hours rest; and six or eight hours at night, according as the road proves. When you draw near the enemy, the kettle-waggons remain with the tent-waggons, and wood must be prepared beforehand.

By this manner of marching, soldiers suffer no fatigue. The enemy does not expect us. He reckons us at least an hundred versts distant; and when we come from far, two hundred, or three hundred, or more. We fall at once upon him, *like snow on the head*. His head turns. Attack instantly *with whatever arrives*; † with what God sends. The cavalry instantly fall to work—*hack and slash! stab and drive!* Cut them off! Don't give them a moment's rest!

3. *Energy*.—One leg strengthens the other! One hand fortifies the other! By firing many men are killed! The enemy has also hands; but he knows not the *Russian bayonet!* (alluding to the Turks.) Draw out the line immediately; and instantly attack with *cold arms!* [the bayonet.] If there is not time to draw out the line, attack from the defile, the infantry with the bayonet; and the cavalry will be at hand. If there be a defile for a verst, and cartridges over your head, the guns will be yours! Commonly the cavalry make the first attack, and the infantry follows. In general cavalry must attack like infantry, except in swampy ground; and there they must lead their horses by the bridle. Cossacks will go through any thing. When the battle is gained, the cavalry pursue and hack the enemy, and the infantry are not to remain behind. In two files there is strength—in three files, *strength and a half*. ‡ The first tears—the second throws down—and the third perfects the work.

Rules for diet.—Have a dread of the hospital! German physick stinks from afar, is good for nothing, and rather hurtful. A Russian soldier is not used to it. Messmates know where to find roots, herbs, and pismires. A soldier is inestimable. Take care of your health! Scour the stomach when it is foul!

* An appellation given by Souvarof to his troops.

† *Whatever arrives*.—Souvarof began the attack as soon as the colours arrived, even if he had but half a regiment advanced.

‡ *Strength and a half*.—A common mode of expression in Russia. Souvarof aimed at the style and language of the common soldiers, which renders his composition often obscure.

Hunger is the best medicine! He who neglects his men—if an officer, *arrest*—if a sub-officer, *lashes**—and to the private, *lashes*, if he neglects himself. If loose bowels want food, at sun-set a little gruel and bread. For costive bowels, some purging plant in warm water, or the liquorice root. Remember, gentlemen, *the field physick of doctor Bellypotski* † In hot fevers eat nothing, even for twelve days‡—and drink your soldiers' *quass*§—that's a soldier's physick. In intermitting fevers, neither eat nor drink. Its only a punishment for neglect, if health ensues. In hospitals, the first day the bed seems soft—the second comes French soup—and the third, the brother is laid in his coffin, and they draw him away! One dies, and ten companions round him inhale his expiring breath. In camp, the sick and feeble are kept in huts, and not in villages; there the air is purer. Even without a hospital, you must not stint your money for medicine, if it can be bought; nor even for other necessaries. But all this is frivolous—we know how to preserve ourselves! Where one dies in a hundred with others, we lose not one in five hundred in the course of a month. For the healthy, *drink, air, and food*—for the sick, *air, drink, and food*. Brothers, the enemy trembles for you! But there is another enemy greater than the hospital—the d-mn'd *I don't know!*|| From the half-confessing, the guessing, lying, deceitful, the palavering equivocation,**, squeamishness, and nonsense of *don't know*, many disasters originate. Stammering, hacking**—and so forth, it's shameful to relate! A soldier should be sound, brave, firm, decisive, true, honourable! Pray to God! from him comes victory and miracles! God conducts us! God is our general! For the *I don't know*, an officer is put in the guard—A staff-officer is served with an *arrest* at home. Instruction is *light*! Not instruction is *darkness*! *The work fears its master* †† If a peasant knows not how to plough, the corn will not grow! One wise man is worth three fools! and even three are little, give six! and

* *Lashes*.—The literal translation of the original is *sticks*.

† Professor Pallas supposed this to have been a *manual of medicine*, published for the use of the army.

‡ Here he endeavours to counteract a Russian prejudice, that it is favourable to immoderate eating during fevers.

§ A sour beverage, made of fomented flour and water.

|| Souvarof had so great an aversion to any person's saying *I don't know*, in answer to his questions, that he became almost mad with passion. His officers and soldiers were so well aware of this singularity, that they would hazard any answer instantly, accurate or not, rather than venture to incur his displeasure by professing ignorance.

** The words here are some of them not to be translated, and seem to be the coinage of his own fancy. The Russians themselves cannot affix an explication to them.

†† A Russian proverb.

even six are little,* give ten! One clever fellow will beat them all—overthrow them—and take them prisoners!

In the last campaign the enemy lost 75,000 *well-counted* men—perhaps not much less than 100,000. He fought desperately and artfully, and we lost not a full thousand.† There, brethren, you beheld the effect of military instruction! Gentlemen officers, what a triumph!

N. B. This translation has been rendered perfectly literal; so that effect is often sacrificed to a strict attention to the real signification of the words, instead of introducing parallel phrases.

* Here Souvarof is a little in his favourite character of the buffoon. He generally closed his harangues by endeavouring to excite laughter among his troops; and this mode of forming a climax is a peculiar characteristic of the conversation of the Russian boors. In this manner: "*And not only of the boors, but the gentry!—and not only of the gentry, but the nobles!—and not only of the nobles, but the emperor!*"

† A slight exaggeration of Souvarof's.

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